DJIBOUTI CODE OF CONDUCT
\nAn instrument to suppress piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the
\nGulf of Aden<\/p>\n
ABSTRACT
\nTitle of Dissertation: Djibouti Code of Conduct, an instrument to suppress piracy in
\nthe Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
\nDegree: Master of Science
\nThe Djibouti Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery
\nagainst ships in Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden signed on the 29th January
\n2009 provides for Member States to cooperate in their efforts to repress acts of piracy in
\nthe region. This followed hijacking of MT Sirius Star laded with Crude oil worth 100
\nmillion USD and MV Faina carrying a consignment of military armaments which
\nincluded 33 battle tanks.
\nThis dissertation examines the Code with emphasis on the concept of the principal
\narticles in the areas of embarkation of law enforcement officers, information sharing
\nmechanism and review of domestic legislations on piracy. An evaluation of existing
\ncooperative mechanisms in the region is included for the purposes of identifying
\npotential partners who could provide synergy and minimize duplication in the course of
\nrealization of these objectives.
\nAfter analyzing the Code concept through literature review of similar practices and
\npiracy cases prosecuted in the region, the dissertation concludes the Code is sufficient in
\nintention and text save for the political will, which will have to be aroused and
\nmaintained through rigorous campaigns, such as IMO 2011 theme \u201cpiracy: orchestrating
\nthe response\u201d to raise awareness on the negative effects of piracy on shipping and
\nseafarers, who are subjected to these acts.
\nKey words: Piracy, Embarked officers, Information sharing, National legislation,
\nIncident reporting, Extradition
\niv
\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
\nAIS Automatic Identification System
\nAMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
\nAOR Area of Responsibility
\nASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
\nBC Before Christ
\nCENTCOM Central Command
\nCGPS Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
\nCJTF Combined Joint Task Force
\nCMF Combined Maritime Force
\nEASBRIG East Africa Brigade
\nESAF East Africa Stand by Force
\nESA-IO East and South Africa \u2013Indian Ocean
\nEU European Union
\nEUNAVFOR European Naval Force
\nGISIS Global Integrated Shipping Information System
\nGMDSS Global Maritime Distress and safety System
\nGWOT Global War on Terror
\nICS International Chamber of Shipping
\nv
\nICU Islamic Courts Union
\nIGAD Inter Governmental Authority on Development
\nIMB International Maritime Bureau
\nIOMoU Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding
\nIRTC International Recommended Transit Corridor
\nLRAD Long Range Acoustic Device
\nLRIT Long Range Information and Tracking
\nMDA Maritime Domain Awareness
\nMEND Movement foe Emancipation of Niger Delta
\nMSC-HOA Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa
\nMSSI Maritime Safety and Information System
\nNATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
\nPCASP Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel
\nPLANELM Planning Element
\nPRC Piracy Reporting Centre
\nReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
\nArmed Robbery against Ships in Asia
\nRPG Rocket Propelled Grenade
\nSHADE Shared Awareness and De-confliction
\nvi
\nSNM Somali National Movement
\nSOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
\nSSAS Ships Security Alarm System
\nSSDF Somali Salvation Defense Force
\nSUA Suppression of Unlawful Acts
\nSWIFCO South West Indian Fisheries Commission
\nTFG Transitional Federal Government
\nTFI Transitional Federation Institutions
\nUK United Kingdom
\nUKMTO United Kingdom Maritime Transport Office
\nUN United Nations
\nUNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
\nUNMGSE United nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
\nUNODC United Nations Office for Drug and Crime
\nUNSC United Nations Security Council
\nUSA United States of America
\nUSSR United Soviet Socialist States of Russia
\nvii
\nLIST OF FIGURES
\nFigure 1. Pirate attacks for three selected regions 11
\nFigure 2. Pirate attacks for the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin 12
\nFigure 3. Number of disrupted and pirated attacks 13
\nFigure 4. Position of pirated ships held at Jan 2011 15
\nFigure 5. Flow diagram for reporting incidents in ReCAAP 39
\nFigure 6. Illustration of LRIT System Architecture 42
\nFigure 7. Venn diagram Djibouti Code of Conduct and IOMoU 56
\nFigure 8. Anti-Piracy Growth Strategy 57
\nFigure 9. Venn diagram for Djibouti Code and EASBRIG 59
\nviii
\nTABLE OF CONTENTS
\nDECLARATION…………………………………………………………………………………………………..i
\nABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………………………………..iii
\nLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………………………………………..iv
\nLIST OF FIGURES …………………………………………………………………………………………….vii
\nChapter 1……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..1
\nIntroduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
\n1.1 Background …………………………………………………………………………………………….1
\n1.2 Objectives……………………………………………………………………………………………….3
\n1.3. Research questions…………………………………………………………………………………..3
\n1.4 Scope……………………………………………………………………………………………………..3
\n1.5 Research Methods……………………………………………………………………………………4
\n1.6. Organization……………………………………………………………………………………………4
\nChapter 2……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..5
\nPiracy, origin, evolvement and trends ……………………………………………………………………..5
\n2.1 Background …………………………………………………………………………………………….5
\n2.1.1 Piracy in general ……………………………………………………………………………….5
\n2.1.2 Response to piracy incidents in South East Asia……………………………………6
\n2.1.3 Trends and Tactics…………………………………………………………………………….6
\n2.1.4 Piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa ……………………………7
\nix
\n2.1.5 Somali Piracy……………………………………………………………………………………7
\n2.1.6 The Somali piracy statistics………………………………………………………………10
\n2.1.7 Somali Pirates modus operandi …………………………………………………………14
\n2.1.8 Somali piracy business model……………………………………………………………15
\n2.1.9 Ransom Payment …………………………………………………………………………….16
\n2.2 Cause and effect …………………………………………………………………………………….16
\n2.3 International and regional response to Somali piracy………………………………….17
\n2.4 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………18
\nChapter 3……………………………………………………………………………………………………………20
\nAnti-piracy regional instruments: Djibouti Code of Conduct and ReCAAP………………..20
\n3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..20
\n3.2 Preamble……………………………………………………………………………………………….20
\n3.4 Principal features……………………………………………………………………………………23
\n3.4.1 Embarked officers……………………………………………………………………………23
\n3.4.2 Information Sharing Centre ………………………………………………………………24
\n3.4.3 National Focal Points……………………………………………………………………….24
\n3.4.4 Assistance among participants…………………………………………………………..25
\n3.4.5 Review of National Legislation …………………………………………………………26
\n3.4.6 Extradition ……………………………………………………………………………………..26
\n3.4.7 Dispute settlement and claims …………………………………………………………..27
\n3.4.8 Consultations ………………………………………………………………………………….27
\n3.5 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………27
\nChapter 4……………………………………………………………………………………………………………28
\nx
\nEmbarkation of Law enforcement officers……………………………………………………………..28
\n4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..28
\n4.2 Concept background……………………………………………………………………………….28
\n4.3 Prospective host participants……………………………………………………………………30
\n4.3.1 The United States…………………………………………………………………………….30
\n4.3.2 European Union Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta………………….31
\n4.3.3 Members of Combined Maritime Force (CMF) …………………………………..31
\n4.3.5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization-\u201coperation ocean shield\u201d ………………32
\n4.3.6 Peoples Republic of China………………………………………………………………..32
\n4.4 Challenges to realization of the concept ……………………………………………………33
\n4.4.1 Contravention of UNCLOS ………………………………………………………………33
\n4.4.2 Human Rights consideration……………………………………………………………..33
\n4.5 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………34
\nChapter 5……………………………………………………………………………………………………………35
\nIncident reporting and Information sharing mechanism……………………………………………35
\n5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..35
\n5.2 Maritime Safety: Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)…….36
\n5.2.1 Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)……………………………………………………36
\n5.2.2 Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) ……………………..37
\n5.3 Piracy Information exchange …………………………………………………………………..37
\n5.3.1 IMB Piracy Information Center…………………………………………………………37
\n5.3.2 ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC) ……………………………………….38
\n5.3.4 NATO Shipping Center (NSC)………………………………………………………….40
\nxi
\n5.3.5 The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) ………………………………….40
\n5.4 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) ………………………………………………………40
\n5.4.1 Automatic Identification System (AIS)………………………………………………40
\n5.4.2 Long Range Information and Tracking System (LRIT) ………………………..41
\n5.4.3 The Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSI)……………….42
\n5.4.4 The Ship Security Reporting System (SSRS)………………………………………43
\n5.5 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………43
\nReview of National legislation for the regional countries…………………………………………44
\n6.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..44
\n6.2 Background …………………………………………………………………………………………..44
\n6.2 Prosecution……………………………………………………………………………………………45
\n6.2.1 Republic of Kenya-The Penal Code …………………………………………………..45
\n6.2.2 Kenya Merchant Shipping Act (2009)………………………………………………..46
\n6.3 Republic of Tanzania ……………………………………………………………………………..48
\n6.3.4 Tanzania Merchant Shipping Act 2003 ………………………………………………49
\n6.4 Correctional facilities……………………………………………………………………………..50
\n6.5 Extradition…………………………………………………………………………………………….50
\n6.6 Challenges facing piracy trials in Kenya and Tanzania ……………………………….51
\n6.6.1 Procedural challenges………………………………………………………………………51
\n6.6.2 Criminal Prosecution of non- nationals………………………………………………52
\n6.7 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………52
\nChapter 7……………………………………………………………………………………………………………53
\nExisting regional cooperative arrangements: Avenues for Synergy……………………………53
\nxii
\n7.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………..53
\n7.2 Short term strategy on containment ………………………………………………………….53
\n7.2.1 Shared Awareness and \u201cDe-confliction\u201d (SHADE) mechanism…………….53
\n7.2.2 Adoption of the Best Management Practice (BMP)……………………………..54
\n7.2.3 The Combined Joint Task Force \u2013Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)…………….55
\n7.3 Midterm strategy on capacity building ……………………………………………………..55
\n7.3.1 Maritime Safety and Security related cooperative arrangements……………55
\n7.3.2 Security cooperative arrangement: The East Africa Standby Force………..58
\n7.4 Long term strategy …………………………………………………………………………………60
\n7.4.1 The East and South Africa-Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Regional Strategy…..60
\n7.4.2 South West Indian Fisheries Commission (SWIFCO) ………………………….61
\n7.5 Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………………………62
\nChapter 8……………………………………………………………………………………………………………63
\nAce my homework – Write my paper – Online assignment help tutors – Discussions and Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………..63
\n8.1 Piracy criminal acts………………………………………………………………………………..63
\n8.2 Regional cooperation mechanism-text analysis………………………………………….64
\n8.3 Embarkation of Law enforcement officers ………………………………………………..65
\n8.4 Information sharing mechanism……………………………………………………………….65
\n8.5 Review of Regional National Legislations ………………………………………………..66
\n8.6 Avenues for strategy ………………………………………………………………………………67
\n8.7 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………………………..68
\nHelp write my assignment – Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………………………………69
\nAPPENDIX:1……………………………………………………………………………………………………..70
\nxiii
\n1
\nChapter 1
\nIntroduction
\n\u201cThe escalating problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia is completely
\nunacceptable and requires an urgent and coordinated response\u201d (Ban Ki
\nMoon UN Secretary General 2011)
\n1.1 Background
\nPiracy in the past had been repressed using various state sanctioned means with historical
\nrecords dating as early as the era of the Roman Empire indicating that General Pompey,
\n(66BC) used military to clear piracy in the Mediterranean Sea in record 89 days.
\nState sanctioned anti-piracy measures in the Middle Ages by the then powers in Europe
\nof England, Denmark and the Netherlands took form of privateering in suppressing
\npirates. The challenges facing use of these groups led to the treaty of Paris in 1856 by
\nBritain, France, Prussia Russia, Austria and Turkey which abolished the use of privateers
\nas a means of curbing piracy (Roazen, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, P 89).
\nDifferent writers have traced different players in the 18th and 19th centuries who used
\nmilitary to repress and end piracy citing Napoleon invasion of Malta in 1798, the
\nAmerican invasion of the North African Barbary States during President James Madison
\nin 1815 and the Lord Exmouth bombardment of Algiers in 1816. These military
\ncampaigns and the total mastery of seas strategy adopted by US and Great Britain closed
\nthe chapter on piracy and relegated it to movie theatres at least for most of the 20th
\ncentury (Green, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 80).
\nPiracy incidents resurfaced again in the mid-80s in South East Asia following the end of
\nthe cold war which had been superseded by the two world wars and birth of independent
\nformer colonies in Asia and Africa. The timing of this resurgence found the United States
\n2
\nof America, the only superpower whose policy and strategy had shifted from military and
\npolitical ideologies to development of commerce, human rights and democracy.
\nWith war risk insurance premium being imposed on shipping in the South East Asia
\nregion, the littoral states agreed to tackle the piracy problem through various initiatives
\nadopted within regional forums, such as the Association of South East Asian Nation
\n(ASEAN) and extra regional stakeholders including shipping companies and concerned
\nnations like Japan and the USA. Notable among these initiatives is the Tokyo Appeal of
\nMarch 2000 which culminated into signing of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on
\nCombating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in November
\n2004 (Tamara, 2000, p 163).
\nThis agreement ushered in a new concept of regional solution to a regional problem
\nworth emulating. IMO began mobilizing the Horn of Africa and West Indian Ocean
\nregional countries as early as 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers in Sana\u2019a Yemen and Tanzania in 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers to address
\npiracy in the region. These meetings culminated in adoption of the Code of Conduct
\nconcerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western
\nIndian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (Djibouti Code of Conduct) on 29th January 2009 in
\nDjibouti. Nine countries out of the 21 eligible signed the Code on the adoption day with
\nothers following in different times making a total of 18 by July 2011.
\n\u201cIn 2011 IMO will focus on promoting further co-operation between and
\namong states, region and organizations in reducing the risk of attacks on
\nships through a variety of mechanisms including information sharing;
\ncoordination of military and civil efforts; development and implementation of
\nregional initiatives such the Djibouti Code of Conduct\u201d. (Efthimios
\nMitropoulos- IMO Secretary General)
\n3
\n1.2 Objectives
\nThis research aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the Djibouti Code of conduct in
\naddressing piracy in Somalia by analyzing the core concept of the Code based on its
\nmain articles. The research will also identify existing arrangements which provide
\nopportunities for synergy and partnership.
\n1.3. Research questions
\nThe research will seek to answer the following questions to reach a conclusion:
\n1. How big a problem is Somali piracy and how is it organized and perpetuated?
\n2. What were the motives and the intentions of the framers of different articles
\nof the Code?
\n3. How practical is the embarkation of law enforcement officers taking into
\naccount regional capability of the Djibouti Code participants and what options
\nexist which could make up for the incapacity?
\n4. On information sharing what information systems exist in the region and what
\nis available in the market that could inform the choice of the system?
\n5. On review of domestic legislation what inadequacies exist in the domestic
\nlaws of the regional countries and what can be learned from the piracy cases
\nprosecuted in Kenya?
\n6. What other cooperative arrangements exist in the region which may provide
\nopportunities for partnership and synergy?
\n1.4 Scope
\nThe scope of this research include an analysis of the main articles of Djibouti Code of
\nConduct, its concept and implementation options taking into consideration the existing
\nenvironment in the region in terms of players and known practice elsewhere.
\n4
\n1.5 Research Methods
\nThe research method used in this study is qualitative analysis based on published
\ninformation on piracy available from literature research and data from various piracy
\ninformation centers such as the International Maritime Bureau(IMB), European Union
\nNaval Force (EUNAVOR), Maritime Security Centre, Horn of Africa, (MSC-HOA),
\nNATO Shipping Centre (NSC) and ReCAAP.
\nThe research on the Code main features is based on other similar practices such as the
\nship rider practice in anti-narcotics campaigns, existing information sharing mechanisms
\nand the maritime domain awareness concept and strategies. The research also includes
\ncase laws on current prosecution of pirates held in Kenya, theories of cooperation in
\ninternational relations published and various reports to the United Nations Security
\nCouncil (UNSC) by different United Nations bodies.
\n1.6. Organization
\nThe research is organized into eight chapters where chapter one introduces the logical
\nfoundation of the research by stating the objectives, research questions and the scope.
\nThe second chapter reviews piracy literature in trends and evolvement while chapter
\nthree looks at the Code text. Chapter four, five and six will deal with the three principal
\narticles of the Code, which are embarkation of law enforcement officers, information
\nsharing and review of national legislation. Chapter seven will explore the regional
\ncooperative mechanisms which could provide synergy in the realization of the Code
\nobjectives. Chapter eight will contain the discussions and conclusions of the research.
\n5
\nChapter 2
\nPiracy, origin, evolvement and trends
\n\u201cIf you know the enemy and know yourself, you can win a hundred battles
\nwithout a single loss\u201d. (Sun Tzu Art of War)
\n2.1 Background
\n2.1.1 Piracy in general
\nUnderstanding the nature of pirate attacks and their modus operandi is essential before
\ninformed mitigation measures, such as the cooperative approach advanced by the
\nframers of the Djibouti Code can be effectively put in use. This chapter will look at
\npirate attacks in the past and the present with particular emphasis on Somali piracy with
\na view to understanding their organization and operations to enable an in depth
\nevaluation of the Code in its overall effectiveness in repressing piracy. Recorded history
\nduring the Roman Empire has it that piracy was a common criminal act in the
\nMediterranean in the BC and that maritime powers played a role in suppressing these
\ncriminal acts from the Roman hegemony to the Spanish and Portuguese. The last century
\nmaritime powers of Britain and US are credited for restoring order in the world oceans.
\nThe 20th century witnessed the two world wars followed by the cold war era in the
\nfifties, sixties and the seventies with two superpower blocks of the United States of
\nAmerica and the United Soviet States of Russia dominating the world oceans. The
\ncollapse of the USSR left the US as the only super power, whose policies and ideologies
\nled to reduction of its naval force among other major naval powers (Abhyankar, 2005 p
\n225). Piracy incidents started re-emerging in the 1980s in South East Asia and spread to
\nother parts of the world oceans with high number of attacks in the turn of the millennium
\nrecorded in the Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea in West Africa.
\n6
\n2.1.2 Response to piracy incidents in South East Asia
\nThe first international response to the increased piracy incidents and other maritime
\nrelated crimes can be traced to the creation of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB),
\na specialized division of the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) in 1981 to act as a
\nfocal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractices. It is
\nhowever, the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in 1992 based in Kuala
\nLumpur in Malaysia which brought the world-wide alerts in its reporting of piracy
\nincidents and compiling statistics of piracy. Among other things the IMB PRC Centre
\ndefined piracy as \u201can act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any
\nother crime and with the intent or capability force in the furtherance of that act\u201d. This
\ndefinition, however, deviates from UNCLOS probably because the practical purpose is
\nto facilitate the collection and analysis of data (Mejia, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer p 291).
\nThe piracy incidents in the region evolved from various maritime crimes in the region
\nnotably the phantom vessel phenomena in the late 70s and 80s. There were three means
\nof acquiring vessels for this kind of operation namely through purchase in the open
\nmarket, creating a new ownership on paper for vessels that were already in the
\npossession of the syndicates and hijacking or stealing vessels to order (Abhyankar, 2007
\np 97).
\n2.1.3 Trends and Tactics
\nThe spectrum of these piratical attacks are that at one end, a group of pirates boards a
\nvessel with the intention of stealing whatever they can steal such as crew\u2019s personal
\nvalues, cash, ship\u2019s equipment and stores within easy reach. On the extreme end, the
\npirates approach the vessel, fire automatic weapons at the bridge and are extremely
\naggressive when they board and take over the vessel. The crew are transferred to other
\npirate craft or set adrift or executed as the pirates take over the ship and cargo
\n(Mukundan, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 7).
\n7
\nThe case of MV Alondra Rainbow is a typical example of these extreme cases where the
\ngeneral cargo ship was hijacked by a group of pirates, who forcefully took over the
\ncontrol and command of the ship in October 22 1999. The pirates transferred the crew
\nmembers to another pirate vessel where they were later transferred to a raft and set
\nadrift. The crew was rescued after drifting for about ten days at sea by a fishing boat and
\ntaken to Phuket in Thailand.
\nThe vessel was intercepted by the Indian Coast Guard after having changed her name to
\nMV Mega Rama. The pirate crew on being intercepted set fire to the documents of MV
\nAlondra Rainbow and further attempted to sink the ship by opening the sea chest valves
\nto fill the engine room with sea water. The pirates were charged in a Mumbai Court with
\npiracy (Venkiteswaran, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 175).
\n2.1.4 Piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa
\nThis region includes coastlines of Angola, Cameroun, Benin, Guinea, Ghana, Ivory
\nCoast and Nigeria. The region according to the 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer IMB PIC reports recorded the third
\nhighest reported incidents in the period of 2000 to 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer. These incidents initially
\ninvolved the low level attacks to ships mostly at anchor, but the situation changed from
\n2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers particularly in the Niger Delta where more violent attacks have been witnessed.
\nIncidents of attacks on supply vessel and oil platforms associated with the political
\narmed groups of the Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) became
\ncommon as the militants kept their pressure on the government of Nigeria. This group
\nhas been involved with kidnapping workers in the oil platforms and demanding ransom.
\nThis region has recorded high attacks in 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer and 2011 leading to insurance companies
\nimposing war risk premiums at a similar rate to those of Somalia (Payne, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p120).
\n2.1.5 Somali Piracy
\nFor the purposes of this paper the Somali piracy will be considered as those piracy
\nincidents perpetuated by members of the Somali community off the seas adjacent to the
\n8
\nSomali coast and neighboring areas in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin in the
\nIndian Ocean which are covered by the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
\nThe period preceding the fall of the Siad Barre government of Somalia in 1991 is
\nimperative in attempting to understand the genesis of Somali piracy. Incidents of early
\nhijacking involved one of the factions fighting the Mogadishu government the Somali
\nNational Movement (SNM), in an attempt to prevent vessels calling at the Somali ports
\nstill under the Mogadishu government.
\nWith the fall of the Barre government in January 1991 there were isolated reports of
\nships coming under attack in the region off Puntland. The attack on MV Bonsella in
\nSeptember 1994 by a party of 26 pirates posing as Coast Guards who used the ship as a
\nbase to attack other ships in the area is vital in attempting to unravel the genesis of
\nSomali piracy. The pirates said they would use the ships to apprehend fishing vessels
\noperating without licenses. The ship was eventually released after offloading the ship\u2019s
\ncargo of aid supplies alongside ship stores and cash and served as the beginning of
\nreactions to fishing off the coast of Somalia by fishing community backed by militias.
\nAnother notable incident involved a Taiwanese trawler, MV Shen Ko in 1997, which
\nwas captured by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) of the Majarteen Clan,
\nwho demanded a fine of $800,000 to release the ship, $40,000 for the captain and
\n$10,000 for each member of the crew (Murphy, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p. 13)
\nAn account by one of the pirates on the early attacks to ships points to a rivalry between
\nthe foreign fishing vessels and the local fishermen. He confessed that in 2003 they
\nsurrounded a large fishing vessel with 18 crew members, climbed and held the ship for
\ntwo weeks. Somali and Arab mediators stepped in and paid $50,000 as a compensation
\nfor damaged fishing boats and gears of the local fishermen. To him this came as a
\nsurprise and inspired the duo to hunting ships (Nigel, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 148).
\n9
\nMany of these early incidents involving mostly fishing vessels seem to have been
\nunreported to IMB \u2013PIC and hence the reason why there were no statistical data,
\npresumably due to the fact that mostly, it involved fishing vessels near the coast. There
\nhowever, exists literature which point to the fact that these incidents were common
\nThe earliest appreciable data by International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Information
\nCentre (IMB-PIC) reports of piracy attacks in Somalia were in 1995 when 14 incidents
\nwere recorded in Somalia, while in the Gulf of Aden the first incidents were recorded in
\n2000 comprising of 14 incidents. Though the region continued recording incidents
\naveraging 10 annually, it did not attract international attention until 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers, when IMBPIC statistics recorded Somali piracy incidents exceeded those of other areas, in
\nparticular Indonesia, which had led the path. The center started issuing warnings on
\nships not scheduled to call Somalia to avoid the Somali coast by at least 50nm This
\nwarning increased the range to more than 200nm in 2007, 250nm in 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers and by 2009 it
\nincreased to 600nm. For ships routeing North South, they were to consider keeping East
\nof 60 E Longitude East of Seychelles (Mejia, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer p 298).
\nThe turning point in Somali piracy occurred in 2005 when the highest incidents were
\nrecorded at 35. The attack on MV Seabourne Spirit involving a passenger ship caught
\ninternational attention on piracy primarily due to the number of potential hostages had
\nthe pirates succeeded and also due to the fact that the ship used the Long Range
\nAcoustic Device (LRAD) to repel the pirates. This was the first incidence using active
\ndevices to repel the pirates The incident caused IMO to organize a meeting in Sana\u2019a,
\nYemen in April 2005 as a first attempt to go regional on the issue. This was followed by
\na similar conference in Oman in January 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers.
\nThe year 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers witnessed a significant decline of attacks off the Coast of Somalia and on
\nships delivering WFP aid to Mogadishu owing to the control exercised by Islamic Courts
\nUnion (ICU) who controlled Mogadishu and southern parts of Somalia. The Transitional
\n10
\nFederal Government (TFG) backed by the Ethiopian forces drove the ICU out of
\nMogadishu and established some form of control and chose a new town Baidoa, as the
\nseat of the government. This TFG control waned with the withdrawal of Ethiopian
\ntroops resulting in an escalation of attacks in 2007 and subsequent years (Murphy, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer
\np 84).
\n2.1.6 The Somali piracy statistics
\nPiracy statistics have been compiled first by the IMB PIC with others following suit
\namong them, the IMO and ReCAAP. With recent deployment of naval forces reports
\nare also compiled by European Union (MSC-HOA), and NATO (NSC). These reports
\nhave been acknowledged in the past that they are not compressive as most of them are
\ncompiled based on the reported cases by ship masters particularly in the beginning of the
\nreporting period (Mejia, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer). The statistics for the last two years are however more
\ncomprehensive owing to the use of LRIT and the presence of the military in the region.
\nThis research uses statistics from two sources in order to depict specific information of
\nchoice.
\n11
\nTable 1: Number of reported pirate attacks in three regions (2000-2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer)
\nFigure 1
\nSource: ICC International Maritime Bureau. (2011) IMB- Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,
\nAnnual Report 1st January \u2013 31st December 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer. Accessed from www.icc-ccs.org
\nThe figure shows trends in piracy attacks of reported cases from selected areas of South
\nEast Asia, Somali region including Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea in West Africa.
\nThe piracy incident attacks are based on original data collected by IMB-PIC for the
\nperiod 2000 to 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer. As can be seen in figure 1 the piracy incidents in South East Asia
\nwere the highest from 2000 up to 2007 when Somali pirate attacks shot up to record the
\nhighest attacks and remained so till the end of the reporting period of 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer. Piracy
\nincidents in the Gulf of Guinea show a gradual fluctuating trend of between 25 and 35
\nincidents per year.
\n0
\n50
\n100
\n150
\n200
\n250
\n300
\n350
\n1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer 2014: 2024 – Essay Writing Service. Custom Essay Services Cheap
\nSOMALIA HORN
\nOF AFRICA
\nSOUTH EAST
\nASIA
\nGULF OF
\nGUINEA
\nTOTAL
\nNumber of reported pirate attacks in three regions (2000-2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer)
\n12
\nIn South East Asia there was a decline of piracy incidents attributed to the adoption of
\nReCAAP information sharing mechanisms and regional joint operations such as \u201ceye in
\nthe sky\u201d by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
\nTable 2: Number of pirate attacks in Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden (2005-2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer).
\nFigure 2
\nSource: ICC International Maritime Bureau. (2011) IMB- Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships,
\nAnnual Report 1st January \u2013 31st December 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer. Accessed from www.icc-ccs.org
\nThe figure shows trends in piracy attacks perpetuated by Somali pirates in the Gulf of
\nAden and Somali basin. There was a steep increase of piracy attacks in the Gulf of
\nAden in 2007 and 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers with the trend changing to a gradual fall in 2009. The attacks in
\nthe Somali Basin plummeted in 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers and rose gradually to overtake the Gulf of Aden in
\nmid-2009. This trend can be attributed to the deployment of naval vessels to protect
\nmerchant ships which saw an International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)
\nestablished in the Gulf of Aden. This led to the pirates adopting use of mother ships to
\nattack ships in mainly Somali Basin.
\n0
\n50
\n100
\n150
\n200
\n250
\n2005 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers 2007 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers 2009 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer 2011
\nSOMALI BASIN
\nGULF OF ADEN
\nTOTAL
\n13
\nTable 3: Monthly number of disrupted and pirated attacks (Jan 2009 \u2013 December
\n2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer)
\nFigure 3:
\nSource: European Union Council Secretariat (2011). EEU NAFOR ATALANTA, www.eunafor.eu
\nThe figure shows trend in monthly statistics for the, pirated, disrupted and attacked. The
\ntrend illustrate seasonal fluctuations in the number of attacks with highs recorded in
\nOctober to April and lows recorded in May to September a factor attributed to the
\nseasonal weather pattern of the monsoon period in the Indian Ocean region.
\nThough the general trend is seasonal, the number of successful attacks shown by the
\ndifference between the total attacks and successful pirated ships is widening depicting a
\nhigher rate of disruptions from 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer owing to increased patrolling by the combined
\nmaritime force and use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCSG) by
\nships.
\n-10
\n0
\n10
\n20
\n30
\n40
\n50
\nSep-08 Dec-08 Mar-09 Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 May-10 Aug-10 Nov-10 Feb-11
\nATTACKS
\nPIRATED
\nDISRUPTED
\nTOTAL
\n14
\n2.1.7 Somali Pirates modus operandi
\nMilitary strategists have in the past considered an analysis of an enemy essential in
\ndrafting their military mission orders. Such a clause will consist of facts, such as enemy
\ncomposition, disposition, strength, activity locations, units, observed equipment, enemy
\ncapabilities, limitation and enemy\u2019s course of action among others. This approach will
\nguide this paragraph in its quest to understanding the Somali pirates.
\nVarious suppositions have been advanced as to the origin and evolvement of Somali
\npiracy with two common hypotheses, namely the pirates evolved from rag tag fishermen
\nto a well organized crime network with financiers and ground security. The second
\nhypothesis has it that it evolved from a holy alliance of three groups, which are the fisher
\nfolks who know the sea, the militia men who knows the weapons and use of violence
\nand the financiers who sponsor the operations. Some common names and organizations
\nassociated with Somali pirate groups are the Somali Marines led by Abdi Mohamed
\nAfywene referred to as the most organized, the Puntland group. the Marka group led by
\nYusuf Indha\u2019adde made up of several decentralized groups and the National Volunteer
\nCoast Guard headed by Garaad Mohamed operating around Kismayu in the southern
\nregion. What many authors and military intelligence organizations agree is the fact that
\nmost of these groups are clan based (Eichstaedt, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 56; Mejia, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 294; Geiss &
\nPetrig 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 10).
\nThe Somali piracy tactics have evolved to match the operational readiness of both the
\nships and the naval protection force. In 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers and 2007 the pirates would pounce on
\nunsuspecting ships and vulnerable ships plying the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden.
\nIn 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers, 2009 and 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer with the use of captured fishing vessels as mother ships they
\nwould attack even faster ships hundreds of miles away from the coast. The weapons
\ncaptured and those witnessed by the crew who had been attacked in the past point to an
\nassortment of arms ranging from Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) to small arms AK
\n47.
\n15
\nTable 4 Position of pirated ships in January 2011
\nFigure 4
\nSource: NATO (2011), Piracy in the Horn of Africa, IMO Somali piracy updates
\n2.1.8 Somali piracy business model
\nDetails obtained by the UN monitoring group on Somalia claim that ransom payments
\nare usually managed by a committee comprising of a chair, two principal investors and
\ntwo commanders, that is sea pirates and the guard force and are assisted by an
\naccountant who is rewarded with a share equal to that of a guard.
\n16
\nThe main expenses covered by a ransom payment are the direct operational costs and
\nprofits. The profits are normally arrived after deductions from the operational expenses.
\nSources indicate that the profits are divided between the investors who take 30% guard
\nforce 30% and the sea pirates who take 40%. The pirate\u2019s operational costs includes
\ncommittee members, provisions for pirates and captured crews, logistics, cooks,
\nnegotiators and payoff to other local militia groups. A social obligation to share wealth
\nShahaad is also factored as a cost (Eichtaedt, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 57).
\n2.1.9 Ransom Payment
\nRansom payment has been sighted as a main contributor to the growth of piracy, as part
\nof this money is reinvested to acquire better equipment for the pirates and better
\nweapons with increased logistics support enabling the pirates to venture far and recruit
\nmore pirates (UNSC Resolution 1897 (2009)). The payment takes different methods
\nwith aircrafts dropping the ransom money on hijacked ships to payment through
\ntransfers such as Hawala system and investments in \u201ckhat\u201d drugs. Money paid in
\nransom in 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers is estimated by United Nations to be over $150 million with single
\nransom payment of MT Sirius Star believed to have been $3 million against the $25m
\ndemanded and MV Faina $3.2million against an initial demand of $35 million (Payne,
\n2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer; Nigel 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer).This has led to expansion of the Contact Group on Piracy off the
\ncoast of Somalia (CGPCS) to include a fifth working group of the CGPCS chaired by
\nItaly to look for ways of tracing the ransom payment.
\n2.2 Cause and effect
\nPiracy has affected nearly all maritime users with the shipping industry bearing the brunt
\nof the scourge. In the report The Economic Costs of Piracy published by One Earth
\nFuture (OEF) Foundation the international economic cost is estimated to be between $7
\nto $12 billion per year (Bowden, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 2,; IMO, 2011).
\n17
\nThese costs are inform of direct financial costs of piracy which includes insurance costs,
\nransoms, cost of rerouting ships via the cape, security arrangements including private
\nsecurity detachments, cost of maintaining navies among other related government
\nexpenses. Other indirect costs occur as negative effects on other related areas like trade,
\nfishing, inflation and tourism resulting to decrease in foreign revenue.
\nPsychological effects such as trauma to the seafarers and their families for those held
\nand also for those working in the piracy affected areas are common. By June 2011 there
\nwere 462 seafarers and 22 ships held by Somali pirates for ransom (IMO, 2011). The
\nsetting on fire of MV Yasin C in 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer and MV Pacific Express in 2011 after the crew
\nescaped to citadel is an indication of what seafarers can be exposed to by frustrated
\npirates. In the fragile Somalia, the pirates net more money than government causing
\nmore political instability. It is a case of money equating power and the pirates are
\nexploiting their new found influence and affluence (Payne, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 34).
\n2.3 International and regional response to Somali piracy
\nThe IMO Assembly adopted Resolution A. 979 (24) (IMO, 2005) on piracy and armed
\nrobbery against ships in waters off the Coast of Somalia in consultation with the
\nTransitional Federal Government (TFG). This marked the beginning of high level
\nengagement of the IMO on Somali piracy. The IMO sought the attention of the president
\nof the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), who issued a presidential statement on
\nthe matter in 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers.
\nIMO revised Resolution A.979(24)(IMO,2005) and in place adopted Resolution
\nA.1002(25)(2007) which urged parties with naval capability to deploy naval ships and
\nfurther addressed the Flag states on the advice to give to ship crews sailing these areas.
\nIn paragraph 7 the Resolution \u201ccalled upon Governments in the region to conclude, in
\nco-operation with the Organization and implement as soon as possible, a regional
\nagreement to prevent, deter and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships\u201d. The
\n18
\nIMO held its first regional meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania where a draft text of
\nagreement was drafted in April 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers setting the scene for the adoption of the Code.
\nOn the International scene, the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) which
\nauthorized States cooperating with the TFG to enter the territorial sea off the coast of
\nSomalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea is cited as
\nthe turning point in the anti-piracy campaign. The wording of the Resolution contained
\nsome fundamental principles of International law on sovereignty and was limited for a
\nsix month period.
\nWith international backing the IMO mobilized the regional countries of Comoros,
\nDjibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives,
\nMozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, the
\nUnited Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen to adopt the
\nDjibouti Code on 29 January 2009. Nine governments signed the Code on the date of
\nadoption making the Code effective since it only required signatures by two participants.
\nIMO established a multi donor trust fund and a counter piracy Project Implementing
\nUnit (PIU) in 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer to assist signatory states to implement the Code. The team is
\ncomposed of a team head, and three project officers. At the time of writing the Fund had
\nreceived donations from Japan, South Korea, France, Norway, the Kingdom of Saudi
\nArabia and Panama.
\n2.4 Conclusion
\nPiracy criminal acts as seen in the chapter are bound to adopt new tactics and means
\nwith chances that they may resurface in different geographical localities provided that
\nthe underlying factors exist in that particular geographical area, such as weak states
\nunable to establish rule of law, weak surveillance and law enforcement at sea.
\nMilitary means used in the past for suppressing piracy is no longer viable owing to the
\nmodern globalized political environment where human rights and sovereignty issues are
\n19
\nconsidered fundamental. This call for the IMO and the international community to adopt
\nother mechanisms aimed at discouraging would be pirates to engage in criminal acts by
\nincreasing the consequences of engaging in the crimes as contained in the articles of the
\nDjibouti Code of Conduct. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair put the situation
\nsuccinctly with the following statement: \u201cOur ultimate weapon against piracy is not our
\nguns but our belief.\u201d
\n20
\nChapter 3
\nAnti-piracy regional instruments: Djibouti Code of Conduct and ReCAAP
\n\u201cThe devil is in the details\u201d (Ludwig Van Der Rohe 1886-1969)
\n3.1 Introduction
\nThe importance and implication of a text in a contract of the nature of a treaty is codified
\nin the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) where in section 3 Article 31 to
\n33 is dedicated to treaty interpretation. Although the Djibouti Code is not a treaty yet, it
\nshould be borne that Article 13 of the Djibouti Code provides that the participants intent
\nto consult with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement.
\nArticle 18 of the Vienna Convention on obligation not to defeat the object and purpose
\nof a treaty prior to its entry into force is a guiding principle when dealing with the Code.
\nThis chapter will seek to scrutinize the text of the Djibouti Code with a view to
\nestablishing the motive of the framers of various articles and the expectation from the
\nparticipants in implementing the Code by drawing parallels with the existing ReCAAP,
\nthe first such regional cooperation mechanism in modern time and expressly stated as
\nthe inspiration of the Code in the preamble.
\n3.2 Preamble
\nThe significance of preamble in a treaty is entrenched in the Vienna Convention on the
\nLaw of Treaties (1969) text on interpretation of treaty where it is stated that \u201ca treaty
\nshall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with ordinary meaning to be given to the
\nterms of the treaty in their context and in light of its objective and purpose\u201d. Article 32
\nfurther provides for supplementary means of interpretation, including \u201cthe preparatory
\nwork\u201d of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
\nThe Djibouti Code was signed in January 2009, following the astronomical increase in
\nSomali piracy cases in 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers, and against a background where these incidents had
\nattracted a worldwide attention. Notable hijackings included MV Faina with a cargo of
\n21
\n33 T-72 Soviet designed tanks among other assorted military ware and MT Sirius Star, a
\nnewly built ship worth $150 million, carrying crude oil worth $100 million. These two
\nincidents had attracted worldwide publicity and concern sending all interested parties in
\na desperate search for a solution to these attacks. This explains the wide acceptance
\ngiven to the initiative. Nine regional countries signed the Code on adoption.
\nThe signing took place following the UNSC issue of Resolutions 1816 in June, 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers,
\nResolution 1838 in 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers, 184 in 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers and 1851 in October, 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers issued under chapter
\nVII of the UN Charter which applied only to the case in Somalia. The Code notes all
\nthese four resolutions in the preamble pointing to the influence of the UNSC in the
\npreparatory work of the Code. The UN Resolution 63\/111 of December 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers on Ocean
\nand the Law of the Sea is also noted in the preamble. This resolution contains a text
\nwhich recognizes the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional,
\nsub-regional and bilateral levels in combating threats to maritime security.
\nThe motive of IMO prior to the signing of the Code is evident in its Resolutions A.922
\n(22) adopted in November 2001 on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes
\nof Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. This resolution invited governments to
\ndevelop agreements and procedures to facilitate co-operation in applying efficient and
\neffective measures to prevent acts of piracy. Resolution A.1002 (25) adopted in
\nNovember 2007 specifically for Somali waters called governments in the region to
\nconclude, in co-operation with IMO, and implement a regional agreement to prevent,
\ndeter and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships; pointing to the role that IMO
\nwould play in such a regional agreement.
\nPlayers recognized in the preamble are international agencies, such as the United
\nNations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development
\nProgram (UNDP), European Commission and League of Arab States who are touted as
\npotential partners in provision of technical assistance and other forms of capacity
\n22
\nbuilding. This is an indication of the partnership concept which guides the cooperative
\nmechanism of the Code. The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
\n(CGPCS) established a fortnight before the signing is mentioned possibly due to the
\nexpected international role it would play in mobilizing and coordinating contributions of
\ninternational efforts.
\nThe last paragraph of the preamble notes the need for a comprehensive approach to
\naddress the poverty and instability that create conditions conducive to piracy which may
\ninclude strategies for effective environmental conservation and fisheries management.
\nThe need to address the possible environmental consequences of piracy is also included,
\nwhich could be interpreted as recognizing the interests of Somalia and at the same
\nacknowledging the need for alternative livelihood strategies to be included in the long
\nterm.
\nIn ReCAAP the preamble is brief and recognizes UNCLOS concept for ships and crew
\nto exercise the right of navigation and the State duty to cooperate in the prevention and
\nsuppression of piracy. This can be construed to be the guiding principle of the
\nAgreement. There exist a clause affirming that each participant should strengthen its
\nmeasures aimed at preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships
\nindicating a State centered approach before moving towards a regional and international
\ncooperation. This approach may not be applicable in Djibouti Code considering that
\nSomalia, which is a major player in the Code, is a failed state.
\nReCAAP acknowledged origin is in the Tokyo Appeal of March 2000, the Asia AntiPiracy Challenge 2000 and Tokyo Model Action Plan of April 2000 (Menefee, 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers, p
\n187). The ASEAN +3 summit meeting proposed a conference on combating piracy and
\narmed robbery against ships. This meeting was held on October, 2001 and discussed
\nmedium and long term visions of a regional cooperation framework. The text of the
\nReCAAP was drafted by representatives from the ASEAN+6 that is the ten members of
\n23
\nASEAN plus six other countries, which are Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka and East
\nAsia China, Japan and South Korea. The key pillars of the agreement which are
\ninformation sharing and capacity building are expressed in the preamble indicating the
\nconcept the framers intended to pursue right from the onset unlike Djibouti where this is
\ncontained in the principle articles (Mejia, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 128).
\nBoth the Agreement and the Code have adopted the piracy definition provided in
\nUNCLOS 101 and further defines armed robbery against ships as defined in the Annex
\nto the Resolution A.922(22) adopted in January 22, 2009. ReCAAP in its introductory
\npart dwells on General Provisions under Article 2 and General Obligations in Article 3.
\nThese articles address generic issues of contracting parties, such as sovereignty rights.
\nThe Djibouti Code is very specific regarding geographical location where the code
\napplies. The opening clause under purpose and scope states \u201cconsistent with the
\navailable resources and related priorities\u201d a clause which can be interpreted as a
\nreflection of the non-binding nature of the Code leaving it to participating States to
\ndetermine what areas of the Code to execute, including prioritization.
\n3.4 Principal features
\n3.4.1 Embarked officers
\nThe Djibouti Code introduces a concept of embarked officers in article 7 where a
\nparticipant may nominate law enforcement or other authorized officials to a patrol ship
\nof another participant. In the preceding paragraphs the drafters attempt to guide the
\nconduct of the embarked officers by laying down some basic legal and policy
\nconsiderations.
\nThis could be in anticipation of bilateral agreements to be entered and hence lays the
\nbackground of what could possibly be included in the text agreement. A more elaborate
\nanalysis of this article is discussed in the next chapter. This concept is not contained in
\nthe ReCAAP model probably due to complex issues of these kinds of agreements such
\n24
\nas reciprocity, suspicion and State interests which have the potential of slowing down
\nany international cooperation (Baylis &Smith, 2004, p 426).
\n3.4.2 Information Sharing Centre
\nThe Code designates three information sharing centers to be situated in the maritime
\nrescue coordination center in Mombasa Kenya and Dar es Salaam in the United
\nRepublic of Tanzania and the regional information center in Sana\u2019a Yemen.
\nReCAAP has created an information sharing center with its location in Singapore and
\nstructures for the Centre comprising a Governing Council and a Secretariat complete
\nwith functions for each. Article 6 of ReCAAP also provides for a financing mechanism
\nof the center and states the sources of funding as, host state, voluntary contributions
\nfrom Contracting Parties, voluntary contributions from international organizations and
\nother entities, in accordance with relevant criteria adopted by the governing council and
\nany other voluntary contributions as may be agreed upon by governing council.
\nThe Djibouti Code lacks such elaborate text on functions of such centers and does not
\nspecify the relations among the three and leaves the individual participants to ensure the
\nsmooth running of these centers. This could be deliberated and agreed once the Code
\nbecomes binding.
\n3.4.3 National Focal Points
\nThe national focal points are deemed in the Code as part of the information sharing
\nmechanism where participants are expected to designate a focal point capable of
\nreceiving and responding to alerts and requests for information or assistance at all times.
\nThis article could be interpreted as laying down the basic requirements in terms of
\nminimum communication infrastructure and the authority of the point of contact to
\ncoordinate and offer assistance through competent national authorities.
\n25
\nThe ReCAAP requires the contracting parties to designate a focal point responsible for
\nits communication with the Centre and which should be declared at the time of the
\nsignature or deposit of an instrument of notification. The agreement requires the
\ncontracting parties to ensure smooth and effective communication between its
\ndesignated focal point and other competent national authorities including rescue
\ncoordinating centers.
\nThe Code further states the intention of the participants to keep each other fully
\ninformed concerning their respective applicable laws and guidance, particularly those
\npertaining to the interdiction, apprehension, investigation, prosecution and disposition of
\npersons involved in piracy and armed robbery.
\nThe inclusion of this clause shows that the emphasis of Djibouti Code is leaning more to
\nprosecution as a means of addressing piracy while at the same time it could be
\nacknowledging the inability of the Somali government institutions to enforce law and
\norder and carry out judicial functions.
\n3.4.4 Assistance among participants
\nThe Code stipulates areas where a participant may request another participant that is
\npersons who have committed, reasonably suspected of committing both piracy and or
\narmed robbery or pirate ships, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect the ships.
\nInformation on ships or persons subjected to piracy or armed robberies is also included.
\nJoint exercises and capacity building, which may include technical assistance, such as
\neducational training programs to share experience and best practices, are also included
\nas part of assistance among participants.
\nReCAAP dwells heavily on cooperation, dedicating two articles in part 3 and the entire
\npart 4 of the agreement. Areas for request of cooperation include requests to cooperate in
\ndetecting pirates, pirate ship or any person who have committed armed robbery against
\nships. Request for cooperation also include arrest or seizure. It further states the request
\n26
\nmay be to take effective measures to rescue a victim ship, and victims of piracy or armed
\nrobbery against ships. In article 11 the agreement compels a contracting party to make
\nevery effort to take effective and practical measures to implement such requests.
\n3.4.5 Review of National Legislation
\nThe Code has an article on review of national legislation (article11) which is aimed at
\nhaving adequate laws within the region to tackle piracy and armed robbery. The
\nReCAAP did not consider this kind of approach probably due to the fact that most of the
\nincidents were happening in territorial waters of the littoral states, whose laws were
\nprobably deemed adequate in addressing these acts. The Djibouti Code envisions
\nfulfillment of this article through review of participant\u2019s national legislation to allow for
\nprosecution, conviction, punishment and facilitate extradition or handing over when
\nprosecution is not possible.
\nReCAAP article 13 obligates contracting parties subject to their national laws and
\nregulations to endeavor to render mutual legal assistance in criminal matters including
\nthe submission of evidence related to piracy and armed robbery against ships at the
\nrequest of another contracting party.
\n3.4.6 Extradition
\nThe ReCAAP has an article on extradition whereby the parties are obliged, subject to
\ntheir national laws and regulations, to endeavor to extradite pirates or persons who have
\ncommitted armed robbery against ships and who are present in its territory to the other
\ncontracting party which has jurisdiction over them at the request of that contracting
\nparty.
\nThe Code has included this important aspect in its article on review of national
\nlegislations whose process should facilitate extradition or handing over when
\nprosecution is not possible.
\n27
\n3.4.7 Dispute settlement and claims
\nThe Code has two separate articles on dispute settlement and claims and states that if
\nresponsibility is established the claim should be resolved in accordance with the national
\nlaw of that participant and adds in a manner consistent with international law including
\narticle 106 and Paragraph 3 of article 110 of UNCLOS. The ReCAAP combines
\nsettlement of disputes and claims in one article, where it states that such shall be settled
\namicably by the contracting parties concerned through negotiation with applicable rules
\nof international law.
\n3.4.8 Consultations
\nThe Code has one salient clause in article 13 on consultation, which states that within 2
\nyears of the effective date (1st Feb 2009) the participant intends to consult with the
\nassistance of IMO with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement. This is further
\namplified under miscellaneous provisions, which state that nothing in the Code is
\nintended to create or establish a binding agreement except as noted in the article. In
\nReCAAP the government of Singapore is the depository of the agreement, while in the
\nCode the depository is the IMO headquarters clearly defining the leaders in the two
\ninstruments.
\n3.5 Conclusion
\nThe text of the Djibouti Code is found to be sufficient in rallying the regional countries
\ntogether to address the piracy incidents in the region albeit for the short and middle term.
\nAn in depth analysis of the three main articles will be discussed in the preceding
\nchapters in order to arrive at a fair assessment and expectation of the impacts of the
\narticles in suppressing piracy acts.
\nThe experience from ReCAAP, however, points to regional political commitment by the
\nsignatory states, role of regional leadership by Singapore and a hegemonic stability role
\nprovided by Japan as key to this successful cooperative mechanism.
\n28
\nChapter 4
\nEmbarkation of Law enforcement officers
\n\u201cThe new shiprider protocol is clearly a force multiplier, it will significantly
\nassist in the fight against narcotics traffickers in the region, together
\nJamaica and United States along with our partners will have greater
\ncoverage, greater reach, greater ability to detect and seize narcotics
\nshipments\u201d ( Sue Cobb, US Ambassador to Jamaica 2004)
\n4.1 Introduction
\nThe deployment of international navies in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin in early
\n2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers was met with unexpected challenges in apprehension of pirates leading to some
\nnavies adopting the catch and release tactics due to lack of clear course on what to do
\nwith the captured pirates. Issues related to human rights, ships mandate, missions and
\nrules of engagement further complicated matters for the naval forces.
\nThis challenge was expressed in the UNSC meeting by the UNODC executive director
\nAntonio Costa, who proposed the use of the \u201cshiprider\u201d concept to circumvent the legal
\nimpediments being faced. The concept was incorporated in the UNSC Resolution 1851
\nof 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers, which invited all states and regional organizations fighting piracy in the region
\nto enter into \u201cship rider\u201d agreements. This chapter will examine this principal article of
\nthe Code with a view of identifying the possible implementation avenues and potential
\nkey players for its realization.
\n4.2 Concept background
\nThe inclusion of this article can be traced to the \u201cShiprider\u201d concept where two states
\nenter into a bilateral agreement to have officials of one State embark on a vessel of
\nanother State for the purposes of law enforcement. The purpose of such agreements are
\nto overcome jurisdictional hurdles and broaden law enforcement powers (Geiss & Petrig
\n29
\n2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer) This approach has been practiced by the United States of America with Canada
\nand the Caribbean countries on anti- narcotics campaigns.
\nThe UNSC Resolution 1851 of November 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers contains a paragraph where it invites all
\nstates and regional organizations fighting piracy off the Coast of Somalia to conclude
\nspecial agreements or arrangements with countries willing to take custody of pirates in
\norder to embark law enforcement officials (\u201cshipriders)\u201d. The Resolution went further to
\nstate that this would facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a
\nresult of operations conducted preceding the resolution. The resolution contains a clause
\nthat the above is subject to advance consent of the TFG for the exercise of third state
\njurisdiction by \u201cshiprider\u201d and that it should not prejudice the effective implementation
\nof the SUA Convention. This resolution came amid press claims that the navies were
\nreleasing captured pirates due to lack of prosecution powers.
\nThe above text was repeated after the signing of the Djibouti Code in November 2009
\nthrough UNSCR 1897, which among other things acknowledged the signing of the
\nDjibouti Code in January 2009. At the time of this Resolution, prosecutions problem of
\npirates still persisted and there were no known agreements which had been concluded to
\nthat effect prompting the repeat of the concept in the resolution.
\nThe wording of Article 9 paragraph one of the Code that a participant may nominate law
\nenforcement or other authorized officials to embark in the patrol ships or aircraft of
\nanother participant may itself limit the scope of host participants since the Code limits
\nnumber of states eligible Participants to the Code (21). Of the eligible countries only
\nFrance has warships in the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and has to date not signed
\nthe Code further restricting the use of the concept to only those states willing to
\ncontribute law enforcement officers.
\nIn the wording of UNSC Resolutions 1851 and 1897 the envisioned purpose of the
\n\u201cshiprider\u201d is more a means for enabling the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction rather
\n30
\nthan enlarge enforcement powers since TFG had already given consent for States
\ninvolved in counter piracy operations to enter Somali territorial waters through the same
\nUNSC resolutions (Geiss & Petrig, 2011, p 87).
\nA review of \u201cshiprider\u201d agreements points to the fact that these agreements are bilateral
\nand very specific between two countries (the US and Canada, the US and Trinidad and
\nTobago, the US and Jamaica). The purpose of the \u201cshiprider\u201d is to grant authority on
\nbehalf of the host state. In order to realize this concept the regional countries would need
\nto enter into a specific agreement with states operating in the region and would grant
\npermission in case the pirates were to be pursued to the countries\u2019 territorial waters. The
\narticle could be expanded to allow the embarked officers to apply and act under their
\nown law to effect seizure and detention of pirate vessels.
\n4.3 Prospective host participants
\n4.3.1 The United States
\nThe United States has a presence in the region comprising ships employed under the
\nTask forces 150,151 and 153 which could see bilateral arrangements signed between the
\nUnited States of America and the regional countries. The areas of responsibility of this
\nTask force include Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea and Seychelles. There are indications
\nthat there exists a possibility of including the neighboring areas of Tanzania, Mauritius,
\nMadagascar, Mozambique, Yemen and Comoros who are members of the Djibouti Code
\nof Conduct.
\nThe US has an existing memorandum of understanding with Kenya on prosecution of
\npirates captured by their naval forces, and through this memorandum pirates were
\nprosecuted and convicted (Omar v Republic 2007).. Similar arrangement exists with the
\nSeychelles, where prosecution of pirates handed over by the US is ongoing.
\n31
\n4.3.2 European Union Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta
\nThis force was formed as a result of UN resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1836 and following
\na joint council action 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers\/851\/CFSP of 10th November, 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers on EU military operation
\nto contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed
\nrobbery off the coast of Somali. This force comprise of EU members who have
\ncontributed assets, personnel and finances. The Headquarters is based in Northwood, the
\nUnited Kingdom.
\nThe force size at any one time consists of 5 to 10 surface combat ships, 1 to 2 auxiliary
\nships and 2 to 4 maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft. It comprises a total of around
\n2000 military personnel including land-based personnel. Operation Atalanta\u2019s stated
\nmission objectives include the protection of vessels of WFP delivering food aid to
\ndisplaced persons in Somalia, protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali
\ncoast and deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery
\nagainst ships off the Somali Coast and contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities
\noff the coast of Somalia. The EU has signed an agreement on transfer of pirates with
\nKenya and Seychelles and can have this memorandum reviewed to include \u201cshiprider\u201d
\nprovision.
\n4.3.3 Members of Combined Maritime Force (CMF)
\nThe CMF force comprises of Task Forces 150, TF 151 and 152 formed with a principle
\naim to deter, disrupt and defeat attempts by international terrorist organizations to use
\nthe maritime environment as a venue for an attack or as a means to transport personnel
\nweapons and other materials. The contributing members include Australia, Canada,
\nDenmark, France, German, Italy, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
\nPakistan, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States The
\nTask Force 151 established in January 2009 was specifically to conduct counter piracy
\noperations around the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin. The Task Force 152 operates in
\nthe Arabian Gulf conducting Maritime security operations in conjunction with regional
\n32
\npartners to prevent destabilizing activities and promote maritime security. Members of
\nthis task force include Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, France, New Zealand, Italy, Australia,
\nthe UK and the US. The inclusion of regional states in this military forum particularly
\nthose of Gulf States come with potential for realization of this concept.
\n4.3.4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization-\u201coperation ocean shield\u201d
\nThe involvement of NATO in anti-piracy operations has its genesis to the UNSC
\nResolutions 1814.1816 and 1836 when the organization launched Operation Allied
\nProvider between October and December 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers. The mission of this operation was to
\nescort World Food Program (WFP) vessels and patrol the waters around Somalia. This
\nfirst mission had three combat Ships from Italy, Greece and the UK.
\nThis mission was followed by Operation Allied Protector from March to August 2009
\nwhich had its mission and objectives modified to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate
\nactivities in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa in response to increased attacks
\nrecorded in this period.
\nThis operation gave rise to the current Operation Ocean Shield which commenced in
\nAugust 2009 after the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the mission. This
\noperation introduces a new element to its mission by offering regional states assistance
\nupon request to develop a regional maritime capacity in combating piracy such as law
\nenforcements, which may include Coast Guards operations.
\nThis offer could be easily expanded to include embarkation of these law enforcement
\nofficers as part of the assistance to regional training where the \u201cshipriders\u201d could be
\nutilized to carry out law enforcement roles in the course of onboard training.
\n4.3.5 Peoples Republic of China
\nThe People\u2019s Republic of China has contributed naval assets comprising of two
\ndestroyers and one supply vessel since January 2009 and has been participating in the
\n33
\nSHADE monthly meetings. The country has signed a memorandum of understanding
\nwith Kenya on transfer of captured pirates an indication of commitment of the country in
\nregional stability in its quest for new investments and markets.
\nChinas\u2019 involvement in the region can easily see a \u201cshiprider\u201d agreement concluded as it
\ncurrently enjoys a close collaboration with the regional countries through its investments
\npolicy in the region.
\n4.4 Challenges to realization of the concept
\n4.4.1 Contravention of UNCLOS
\nThe rationale behind use of flag is embedded in UNCLOS and its legal certainty in the
\nexercise of enforcement of powers at sea. It has been argued that by embarking law
\nenforcement officers to operate from a host vessel for the purposes of law enforcement
\nsubjects the ship to two flags or two legal regimes which could be in contravention of
\nthe principle of UNCLOS where a ship only sails under one flag. (Geiss & Petrig, 2011,
\np 90)
\nUNCLOS Article 107 on ships and aircraft which are entitled to seize pirate ships states
\nthat it may be carried by warships or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and
\nidentifiable as being on government service. Whereas this can be easily attained on the
\nhost vessel it may complicate matters for law enforcement officers in the high seas and
\nonly restrict the use of these \u201cshipriders\u201d to the territorial waters of the embarked
\nofficers.
\n4.4.2 Human Rights consideration
\nThe MoU between Kenya and EU, Denmark and the United States has a clause which
\nstipulates that the transferred pirates will not be given death sentence or have to be
\ncommuted to life sentence. This can be seen as a safeguard to the principle of nonrefoulment. It is not clear what course such a case would take if it was done primarily
\n34
\nusing the domestic law in those jurisdictions where death penalty exist in Yemen, Kenya
\nand Tanzania.
\nIt is not clear how this legal principle can be circumvented in the event that the captured
\npirates will be tried under the Kenyan Law, which provides for death penalty without
\nexplicit provisions like the ones contained in the memorandum of understanding.
\n4.5 Conclusion
\nThe \u201cship rider\u201d concept has the potential for increasing law enforcement capacity by
\nutilizing the regional countries\u2019 law enforcement officers and the deployed assets in the
\nregion. The \u201cshipriders\u201d policing skills and forensic work background could provide
\ninitial and on spot investigation of piracy cases crucial for gathering and collection of
\nevidence for later criminal proceedings.
\nThere are for the time being sufficient resources in terms of naval vessels (32) deployed
\nin the region and available regional law enforcement officers who could be deployed as
\n\u201cshipriders\u201d. The Djibouti Code training center could be used to train regional law
\nenforcement officers who could provide a pool to be embarked onboard willing naval
\nships for the purposes of attainment of this objective under the Code.
\nThis research has, however established that such agreements are concluded between two
\nstates and hence the IMO could consider devising ways of initiating these bilateral
\narrangements. The existing MoU between western countries and some regional
\ncountries, such as Kenya and the Seychelles on prosecution of pirates could be explored
\nfor possible inclusion of “shiprider” clauses.
\n35
\nChapter 5
\nIncident reporting and Information sharing mechanism
\n\u201cWe will conduct operations with compatible information and
\ncommunication systems, usable data and flexible operational constructs
\nbeyond battlefield application,\u201d (Robert Gates Defense secretary on US
\ndefense strategy 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers).
\n5.1 Introduction
\nThe push for a common system of communication in the maritime industry first came
\ninto the scene with the first treaty of SOLAS in 1914 following the sinking of RMS
\nTitanic in 1912, which introduced requirement for carriage of Radio and continuous
\nRadio watches. Versions of SOLAS have been adopted since then with the latest 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer
\nedition still containing an entire chapter IV on Radio Communications specifying Radio
\nrequirements for both shore facilities and ships in regulations 5 and 6.
\nThe information technology sector has, however, recorded one of the fastest growths
\nwith breakthroughs in digital and satellite technologies ushering in a wide range of
\nequipment and systems. This can present a challenge to a consumer in deciding on a
\nparticular system in such a large market and hence the need for the user to determine a
\nminimum system requirement to guide his choice. The IMO has relied on performance
\nstandards and result based standards when it comes to decisions related to similar
\nsystems.
\nThis chapter will review the existing communications and information system with a
\nview of identifying those systems which can be adopted in the implementation and
\nrealization of this article of the Code.
\n36
\n5.2 Maritime Safety: Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS)
\nThe GMDSS system adopted as an amendment to SOLAS chapter IV introduced a new
\nera in the maritime industry as far as information exchange is concerned. The adoption
\nof this amendment came in the wake of another convention the International Convention
\non Maritime Search and Rescue (1979) which introduced the Global Search And Rescue
\n(SAR) Plan which seeks to achieve a worldwide SAR coverage by responsible nations.
\nThe designation of the maritime rescue coordination centers as the piracy information
\ncenter in the Code hints that the GMDSS concept forms the basic equipment
\nrequirement in the arrangement. The specifications for this system are contained in
\nSOLAS Chapter IV regulations 5 and 6. The system enables a ship to send distress in
\nany part of the globe. It would mean that the national focal point will consider the
\nGMDSS as the primary communication information sharing system.
\nThe main advantage for this system is the fact that it is subject to IMO regulations with
\nalready developed performance standards and the hardware are readily available in the
\nmarket.
\n5.2.1 Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)
\nThe SSAS has its roots in the infamous September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the US by
\nuse of civilian aircrafts on both the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. IMO woke up to
\nthe realization that ships could also be used to carry out similar attacks on civilian
\ntargets. This led to adoption of Resolution A .924(22)(2001) which amended SOLAS
\nChapter XI-2 and ushered a new role of IMO in maritime security. These amendments
\nbrought in a new carriage requirement under regulation 6 which ships and mobile
\noffshore drilling platforms have complied since 1
\nst July 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers. The system has been
\nwidely used in disseminating information on piracy attacks.
\n37
\nThe concept of the system is that a ship should be able to send a security alert when
\nunder attack to the Administration, the company, maritime rescue coordination center or
\nany other security center as specified by the administration of the ship.
\nThis system can be linked to the Djibouti Code PIC that could also monitor the alarm.
\nThe information can be further relayed to a particular center focal point which could
\ninclude the country\u2019s law enforcements and naval detachments capable of responding.
\n5.2.2 Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS)
\nThis IMO information sharing system has its origins in circular. ES 18\/16 (1995) which
\nsought to have an international ship information data base (ISP) with a purpose then to
\ncompile and make information available on worldwide basis on maritime safety
\npollution prevention and on conditions of ships.
\nThe system has been expanded to support other reporting modules including piracy
\ninformation among other modules such as maritime security, recognized organization,
\nport reception facilities, contact points, marine casualties and incidents, pollution
\nprevention equipment, training simulators and greenhouse gas emissions.
\n5.3 Piracy Information exchange
\n5.3.1 IMB Piracy Information Center
\nThe IMB-PIC is a nonprofit organization which established a piracy reporting center in
\nOctober 1992 in Kuala Lampur in Malaysia. This center has been involved in compiling
\nall reports on piracy and disseminating the same information to ships ever since.
\nThe center sends broadcast to ships via Inmarsat C safety net containing daily status
\nreports on piracy incidents and also posts information and update on attacks in its
\nwebsite www.ics-ccs.org.
\n38
\nThe IMB-ICC has a wider coverage as all GMDSS compliant ships receive this
\nbroadcast. It may not be cost effective to duplicate this system of broadcast and what
\ncould be looked at is linking the regions\u2019 piracy information centers to IMB-PIC as a
\npriority source of information and maintain a single source of broadcast for the time
\nbeing.
\n5.3.2 ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC)
\nThe ISC-Focal point concept uses a web based secure network linking the national focal
\npoints with the information sharing center based in Singapore. The national focal points
\nare connected to other Focal points via other means of communication as agreed in
\ndifferent countries mostly Telephone and VHF Radio and MF Radio also part of the
\nGMDSS set of equipment.
\nMember Countries are able to log in and update information on reported incidents
\nwhich is made available to all other focal points. This system could be linked to the three
\ninformation centers for a wider global picture of pirate attacks as these centers are
\npermanently manned unlike the naval centers which are deployed for a specified time
\nand are subject to extension on case by case and priority consideration.
\n39
\nTable 5: Flow diagram for reporting Incidents in ReCAAP
\nFigure 5
\nSource: ReCAAP-(2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer), Measures for combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia,
\nAPEC\/OPRF Workshop
\n5.3.3 The Maritime Security Center \u2013Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA)
\nThis center was established by the European Naval Force with close cooperation with
\nthe industry in 2009 to provide a 24hr manned monitoring of ships transiting through the
\nGulf of Aden. This initiative runs an interactive website which gives updated piracy
\ninformation and enables vessels to register movement.
\nThis website allows a password access where merchant ships transiting the Gulf and
\nSomali Basin are able to log in electronically and also receive the latest warning and
\ninformation concerning piracy attack.
\n40
\n5.3.4 NATO Shipping Center (NSC)
\nThe NSC established by NATO forces acts as a link between the NATO forces deployed
\nin the region and the merchant shipping community. The center has launched a new
\npiracy information website which gives alerts and enables ships to log and gain
\ninformation regarding potential piracy risks and actions ( \u201cNATO Launches\u2026piracy
\ninformation website\u201d 2011, Sep\/Oct The Sea,(213), pp2)
\n5.3.5 The UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
\nThis office based in Dubai United Arab Emirates (UAE) has its origin in the aftermath
\nof the US bombing by civilian aircraft on September 11, 2001. The office was launched
\nto act as a point of contact by the maritime industry on security issues in the Gulf region.
\nHowever the focus has shifted to anti-piracy and maritime security operations where the
\ncenter acts as the primary point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military
\nforces operating in the region.
\nThe center also administers the voluntary reporting scheme where merchant vessels are
\nencouraged to send regular reports regarding the ship position, course and speed which
\nis shared with the naval forces. The center is listed in the Best Management Practices
\n(BMP) a handbook developed by the Industry as the primary point of contact for ships
\ncoming under the piracy attacks.
\n5.4 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
\n5.4.1 Automatic Identification System (AIS)
\nThe AIS is designed to provide information about a ship to other ships and coastal
\nauthorities automatically. The system was adopted through an amendment to SOLAS
\nchapter V which brought in mandatory carriage requirement by ships of 300GT and
\nabove with effect from 31st December 2004.
\n41
\nInformation provided automatically by a ship fitted with AIS includes ships identity,
\ntype, position, speed, navigational situation and other safety related information. A ship
\nfitted with an AIS receiver also receives similar information.
\n5.4.2 Long Range Information and Tracking System (LRIT)
\nThe LRIT System was brought to the shipping industry through an amendment to
\nChapter V regulation 19-1 by a MSC Resolution MSC.202 (81) (2005) establishing a
\ncarrying requirement for specified ships including mobile offshore drilling unit since 1
\nst
\nJanuary 2009.
\nThe system consists of ship borne LRIT information transmission equipment,
\ncommunications service provider, application service provider and data LRIT data
\ncenter. The information transmitted includes the ship\u2019s identity position and the time of
\ntransmission.
\nThe above Regulation further allowed access of LRIT information by interested parties,
\nsuch as the to the flag state on ships entitled to fly its flag to determine their location
\nanytime, Port State on ships which have indicated to enter its port facilities, Coastal state
\non ships navigating within 1000 and not intending to entre its port facilities and Search
\nand rescue services relating to ships and persons in distress.
\nThe anti-piracy potential for this system was realized through the adoption of an MSC
\nResolution MSC 298 (87)(IMO 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer) which established a distribution facility for the
\nprovision of LRIT information to security forces operating in the Gulf of Aden and the
\nWestern Indian Ocean to aide their operations on repression of piracy. This can also be
\npursued for the Code to have a similar data distribution facility for the organization.
\n42
\nTable 6: Illustration of LRIT System Architecture
\nFigure 6
\nSource: International Maritime Organization, (2009), Introduction to the Long Range and tracking,
\nwww.lrit.com
\n5.4.3 The Maritime Safety & Security Information System (MSSI)
\nThe MSSI was developed by the Volpe National Transportation System center at the US
\nDepartment of Transportation Research and Innovative Technology Administration and
\nis a freely shared unclassified near real time data collection and distribution network.
\n43
\nThis system is available to nations willing to participate and several regional countries,
\nsuch as Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles are already participating. The
\nsystem provides participating States access to global shipping information using a
\npassword protected Internet based link.
\n5.4.4 The Ship Security Reporting System (SSRS)
\nThe SSRS is a counter piracy service that enhances the ship security alert system by
\nlinking the ship sending the alert to the information sharing centers in the region such as
\nthe MSC-HOA, UKMTO and OPS ATALANTA.
\nThe service continuously monitors alerts transmitted by SSAS on board vessels and is
\nable to compare the position of the vessel sending the alert and the position recorded by
\nthe MSC-HOA and UKMTO. On confirmation of the alert and attack the information is
\npassed on to all the operating forces with a copy going to the Company Security Officer
\n(CSO) who also get to know which forces have been alerted and hence could get in
\ntouch with them for any update.
\n5.5 Conclusion
\nThe wide range of technologies and information system discussed above are found
\nsuitable for the task envisioned in the Code. However there need to be established
\nminimum system requirements which could be guided by some basic principles of a
\nsystem such as compatibility, reliability, adaptability and affordability.
\nThose systems which have already been approved by the IMO and have minimum
\nperformance standards agreed could be prioritized when it comes to choice of a system.
\nIt should also be borne in mind that due to the fast technological changes in the sector
\nconsiderations should also be made for utilization of emerging technologies. This may
\nrequire further consideration by the IMO sub-committee on Communications and Search
\nRescue (COMSAR) the subcommittee of MSC which works with ITU on issues of
\nfrequency allocation for similar maritime communication systems.
\n44
\nChapter 6
\nReview of National legislation for the regional countries
\n\u201cThere never has been any doubt that every nation may lawfully conduct a
\nwar against pirates, even if they have not been attacked by them\u201d(Francis
\nBacon, English Statesman 1561-1616)
\n6.1 Introduction
\nInternationally there exists a sufficient legal regime capable of addressing piracy cases
\nwith many legal scholars citing the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea
\n(UNCLOS 1982) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
\nSafety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 1988) as the most important ones having been
\nassented by most of the UN member states. However, it is the municipal law of a given
\ncountry which determines whether prosecution of pirates succeeds or is defeated in
\naccordance with the provisions and procedures of the particular jurisdiction.
\nThis chapter will examine the provisions of piracy in Kenyan Law having prosecuted the
\nhighest number of suspected pirates. The legal regime of Tanzania is also examined
\nowing to its inability to carry out prosecutions. The chapter will seek to identify legal
\nchallenges to be addressed in the process of reviewing the legislation in fulfillment of
\nthis Article of the Code.
\n6.2 Background
\nThe jurisdictional dilemma in prosecution of piracy can be traced to the treatise of
\nCicero, a Roman author of 44 BC where he notes on pirates \u201cThe common enemy of all
\n(Communis hostis omnium), cannot be considered a criminal, because he does not
\nbelong to the city- state, yet he cannot be counted among the foreign opponents of war\u201d
\n(Daniel, 2009, p16). A similar dilemma faces the current navies deployed in the region
\non what to do with the pirates once captured.
\n45
\nThe framers of the Djibouti Code sought to solve this judicial puzzle by insertion of
\nArticle 11 where the participants would review their national legislation with an
\nintention of ensuring that there are national laws in place to criminalize piracy and
\narmed robbery against ships. This article is viewed by many as one of the most
\nprogressive provision of the Code (Wambua, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p10). The wording of this article
\nleads one to sum the end state as achievement of prosecution, conviction, punishment,
\nand extradition which guides the content of this chapter.
\n6.2 Prosecution
\nProsecution can be understood as the legal process of bringing an alleged offender to
\ntrial. It is therefore prudent to establish what constitutes these legal processes to allow an
\nin depth evaluation of a given nation\u2019s legal framework before an attempt can be made
\non identification of areas requiring review. One important aspect is to look at the
\nJurisdictional basis and the related legal framework which creates the jurisdiction to try
\ncases. This legal framework consists of existing legal regime comprising of customary
\ninternational law, UNCLOS, the ISPS Code, SUA, Regional and Bilateral treaties and
\nNational Law (Mbiah, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 303).
\n6.2.1 Republic of Kenya-The Penal Code
\nThe Republic of Kenya has a common law legal system whose piracy prosecutorial
\npowers had been derived from the Penal Code (Chapter 63 Laws of Kenya), section 69
\nprior to enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act (2009), which repealed the section.
\nThis section provided that \u201cany person who, in territorial waters or upon high seas,
\ncommits any act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of offense of piracy\u201d. It further states
\nthat \u201cAny person who is guilty of the offence of piracy is liable to imprisonment for
\nlife\u201d.
\nKenya prosecuted the first ten suspected pirates under the charge of piracy contrary to
\nsection 69(1) as read with Section 69 (3) of the Penal Code .( Chapter 63 Laws of
\n46
\nKenya). The case was tried in the Magistrates Court at Mombasa (Republic v Hassan M.
\nA 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers) and the accused were sentenced to seven (7) years with Right to Appeal in 14
\ndays.
\nThe case was appealed (Hassan M. A v Republic 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) where the appellant raised issues
\namong them that the principal magistrate erred in law in her finding that she had
\njurisdiction to try the case and also in finding out that she could try the offence under the
\nPenal Code even when the offence was committed outside the territorial sea of Kenya.
\nThe appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the offence of piracy can be adjudicated
\nand is punishable in the country and no limitations existed in the section. The judge F.
\nAzangala held that the court with jurisdiction is that of a 1st class magistrate of all ranks
\nsave the rank of resident magistrate and hence the principle magistrate clearly had
\njurisdiction under the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.
\nIn delivering the ruling, the judge allowed the definition of piracy to apply as defined in
\nUNCLOS Article 101 and held that the Country is a member of the civilized world and
\nhence was bound to apply international norms and instruments. He further held that the
\ncountry being a member of the United Nations cannot act in contradiction of these
\ninternational norms particular on matters of universal crimes.
\n6.2.2 Kenya Merchant Shipping Act (2009)
\nKenya enacted the Merchant shipping Act (2009), which incorporates the provisions of
\nUNCLOS and SUA, hence adopting the definitions of piracy and armed robbery against
\nships and subsequently repealing the Section 69 of the Penal Code. This legislation gives
\nthe elements of the offence of piracy and at the same time creates the extraterritorial
\njurisdiction desired for successful prosecution of pirates.
\nThe newly enacted Merchant Shipping Act (2009) was tested by case (Republic v
\nAbdirahman I. M. and others 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer). The four suspected pirates were charged with the
\n47
\noffence of piracy contrary to Section 369 (1) (a) (ii) as read with section 371 (a) of the
\nMerchant Shipping Act (2009). The defense Counsel argued that the trial court
\n(magistrate court) had no jurisdiction to entertain any matter brought under the Merchant
\nShipping Act 2009 and only the High Court had such jurisdiction. The Counsel argued
\nthat the Judicature Act section 4 provides \u201c(1) The High Court shall be a court of
\nadmiralty and shall exercise admiralty jurisdiction in all matters arising on the high seas,
\nor in territorial waters, or upon any lake or other navigable inland waters in Kenya\u201d. The
\ndefense invoked section 76 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap. 75 Laws of Kenya) as
\npermitting a reference to the high court when a doubt arises on an issue of which court
\nshould try an offence.
\nThis matter was referred to the High Court for a decision (Republic and Abdirahaman
\n2011). The judge J Ojwang held that the High Court preoccupation with admiralty
\nmatters was a non-criminal preoccupation essentially of maritime commerce. He further
\nheld that the basic jurisdiction for the trial of offence of piracy lies with courts other than
\nthe High Court. In Kenya, those courts are the magistrate court. The Merchant Shipping
\nAct, (2009) provides that the word \u201ccourt\u201d means the High Court \u201cunless the context
\notherwise requires\u201d. The Judge held that the context otherwise requires in the instant
\nmatter-and the proper trial for the offence of piracy is the magistrate court.
\nScholars have, however, expressed different opinions on this ruling. Some have pointed
\nto contradictions between section 4 of the judicature Act and Section 4 of the Criminal
\nAct. The former vests exclusive jurisdiction in the high court to exercise jurisdiction in
\nall admiralty matters arising on the high seas, or in territorial waters or upon any lake or
\nnavigable waters in Kenya. The later vest jurisdiction in both the high court and the
\nsubordinate courts. Another view advanced is that section 3 (2) of the Magistrates Act
\nconfers jurisdiction on Magistrates courts \u201cthroughout Kenya a fact strongly suggesting
\nthat the subordinate jurisdiction is territorial (Gathii, 2009,; Wambua, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 7).
\n48
\nThe lack of clarity as to who is entitled to prosecute non Kenyan nationals who have
\ncommitted piracy crimes outside the territorial jurisdiction of Kenya was also raised in
\nan IMO consultant mission report on legislation on anti-piracy held in September 2009
\nby Ashley Roach .
\n6.3 Republic of Tanzania
\nThe United Republic of Tanzania has a common law system and has not prosecuted
\npiracy cases. The country is a signatory to the main international conventions against
\npiracy including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) and the Convention
\nfor the Suppression of unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA
\n1988). The country has other related domestic legislation which can be used to prosecute
\npirates including the Penal Code of (1945) (as amended by Act no 14, 1980), the
\nMerchant Shipping Act of 2003, Prevention of Terrorism Act (Act 21 of 2002), Proceeds
\nof Crime Act (Act No 25 of 1991) and anti-money laundering Act (Act 12 of 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers).
\n6.3.1 Tanzanian Penal Code 1945 (as amended)
\nThe Tanzanian Penal code has been the main legal framework on piracy prior to the
\nincorporation of UNCLOS which defined piracy in the Merchant Shipping Act 2003.
\nThis legislation is, however, restricted by the territorial scope and effects on citizenship.
\nThe wording is framed to the effect that the courts of mainland Tanzania may exercise
\njurisdiction when an act of piracy is committed against a ship registered in the United
\nRepublic of Tanzania or against persons or property on board that vessel (Kamuli, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer,
\np 55).
\nFurther the definition given in section 66 of the Penal Code requires an unlawful act of
\nviolence to have been committed against a ship or a vessel or a person onboard that ship
\nor vessel. The Code does not explicitly list the acts that would amount to piracy, and that
\nleaves the presiding magistrate or judge to assign a meaning to the offence. This was
\nevident in Kenya in the (Hassan M.A v Republic 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) case when the judge used
\n49
\ndefinitions contained in the Law of the Sea (Churchill & Lowe, 1988, p 209) to assign
\nmeaning to piracy. This has been argued that without an explicit description of the acts
\ncould infringe the principle of criminal justice.
\nThis lack of clarity can lead to a charge of murder on suspected pirates in the event one
\nof the victims subjected to piracy dies in the process. It should be noted that many of the
\nEuropean countries have abolished death sentence in their jurisdictions and this may
\ndissuade the countries from handing over captured pirates. The Memorandum on
\ntransfer of pirates has a specific provision that any death sentence would be commuted
\nto life sentence.
\n6.3.4 Tanzania Merchant Shipping Act 2003
\nThis is the piece of legislation which incorporates the provisions of UNCLOS Article
\n101. Critics have pointed out that this legislation confines the definition of piracy and
\ndoes not create the offence nor does it provide for punishment. What is observed is that
\nthe Act mentions offence under 341 and 342 of the Merchant shipping Act (2003) and in
\nthis case according to the methods of statute interpretation of Tanzania, introductory
\nwords do not constitute part of the statute. The Act however explicitly criminalizes and
\npenalizes the offence of hijacking, which falls in the same part as the provision covering
\npiracy in the legislation and hence it can be summed that the legislature did not intend to
\ncriminalize piracy. (Kamuli, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 59).
\nThere are provisions within the Merchant Shipping Act (2003) which stipulates the fine
\nwhere there is no specific punishment provided, a fine of \u201cnot less than one thousand US
\ndollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both\u201d, applies to these offences.
\nThis is the punishment one is likely to be given if charged under this section. This
\npunishment to be too light to dissuade would be pirates from engaging in piracy criminal
\nacts and probably the reason Tanzania has been reluctant to initiate such prosecutions.
\n50
\n6.4 Correctional facilities
\nThe regional country\u2019s\u2019 correctional facilities have been quoted to operating in more
\nthan double the capacity. The capacity for these facilities is fundamental to achievement
\nof this article as justice includes the post-trial stage of the pirates. The research
\nestablished that UNODC has been involved in projects aimed at increasing capacity for
\nthese facilities both in the region and Somalia.
\nMeasure could be explored at tackling the under capacity of these facilities, which in the
\npast have included positive measures, such as community service programs and
\npresidential prerogative.
\n6.5 Extradition
\nThe Code envisages participants to review national legislation to facilitate extradition or
\nhanding over in those cases where prosecution is possible. However, different opinions
\nexist as to how this process can be strengthened with some quarters citing that
\nextradition remains bilateral treaty based and requires reciprocity and that piracy by law
\nof nations is an extradition crime in Tanzania (Extradition Act 1965). This view is
\nhowever contradicted by the argument that Article 100 of UNCLOS cannot be read as an
\nobligation to either prosecute or extradite piracy suspects (Geiss & Petrig, 2011 p 187).
\nThis provision if properly implemented can be used to alleviate the burden on the
\nprosecuting country, which has to deal with the after sentence challenges of deportation.
\nThe IMO can extend the legal assistance to include drafting of generic extradition
\ninstruments to guide the bilateral arrangements for countries wishing to enter into such
\ntreaties.
\n51
\n6.6 Challenges facing piracy trials in Kenya and Tanzania
\n6.6.1 Procedural challenges
\nThe evidence collection and its admissibility are provided for in the Evidence Act of
\n1963 which did not take into consideration the emergence of electronic imaging and that
\nrules for reception of photographic evidence can only be circumvented by a case law.
\nThe requirement also that the evidence to prove a fact in court is direct oral evidence
\nmakes it mandatory for the arresting naval officers and persons who witnessed the
\npiratical attacks being committed to personally attend the Court and give a testimony.
\nThis has created a serious problem especially with the merchant ships whose owners
\nmay not be ready to incur extra expenses in releasing and transporting their crew to give
\nevidence in a lengthy court process. Neither video link nor photographic evidence is
\nadmissible to prove a case in Kenya (Wambua, 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, p 22). The consultancy report on
\nKenya\u2019s legislation noted that this evidence Act does not reflect the exigencies of
\ndetention of criminal suspects far at sea.
\nThere are issues with constitutional guarantees to a fair trial that require persons
\nsuspected to have committed criminal offences to be produced in court within 24 hours
\nand those suspected of capital offence to be produced in court within 14 days from their
\narrest or commencement of their detention( Constitution of Kenya 73 (3) ). This could
\nprove a challenge to piracy cases as most of the incidents take place in distant places
\nmaking it impractical to present the suspects within the dictates of the constitution.
\nThere seems to have been no serious issues raised as far as piracy is concerned though
\nthe local courts in some cases have dismissed cases on the grounds of rights of accused
\npersons (Cisse Djibra v Republic 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers)
\nWitness attendance at trials has been claimed as a challenge by the prosecution team in
\nKenya where the burden of producing witnesses is left to them. Whereas there have been
\nagreement with the arresting countries to avail witnesses during trials, there still exists a
\n52
\nchallenge when it comes to the seafarers\u2019 witnesses whose companies may not be
\nwilling to incur the extra cost of flying the witnesses to attend trials which are lengthy.
\n6.6.2 Criminal Prosecution of non- nationals
\nIn Tanzania the Penal Code Act (1945 as amended) establishes a statutory procedure
\nwhere any proceedings for the trial of any foreigner who commits an offence within the
\nterritorial waters of Tanzania should not be instituted in court except with the leave of
\nthe director of public prosecution.
\nThe Code further provides that in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him, the
\ndirector of prosecution is obliged to exercise his own discretion and shall not be subject
\nto directions or control of any person except the president. This provision restricts
\nprosecution based on arrangements, such as the Djibouti Code, which will require
\nfurther presidential guidance to institute prosecution on non-citizen.
\n6.7 Conclusion
\nThe chapter concludes that the provisions of UNCLOS are adequate in defining piracy
\nand the elements of the offence are well covered. In the domestic legislation matters of
\nprocedure seem to play a major role in determining cases brought before the domestic
\ncourts( Republic v Abdirahaman & others 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer)
\nThis calls for an all-inclusive review of both the main and related subsidiary legislation
\nto avoid inconsistencies, which have been quoted as potential challenges to successful
\nprosecution of piracy cases in the region. This leads to the conclusion that the process of
\ntransforming international conventions to domestic law is a crucial step with far
\nreaching consequences if not done comprehensively.
\n53
\nChapter 7
\nExisting regional cooperative arrangements: Avenues for Synergy
\n\u201cIn the long history of humankind (and animal kind too) those who learned
\nto collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed\u201d. (Charles
\nDarwin 1809-1882)
\n7.1 Introduction
\nIn the modern era of globalization, the role and rise of transnational actors have come to
\nchallenge the traditional approach to international relations dominated by a realist school
\nwith emphasis on state actors. The liberal approach advanced by theorist such, as
\nKeohane and Nye seem to have gained popularity in the last decade with complex
\ntransnational connections and interdependence increasing while the use of military and
\npower balancing is decreasing, though they remain important.
\nThe drafters of the Code appears to subscribe to this theory given the fact that the Code
\nenvisions this transnational and interdependence cooperation even though the emphasis
\nis on the region. This chapter explores the existing regional cooperative arrangements
\nboth political and military with a view to identifying potential avenues of synergy at the
\nsame time eliminating duplication of efforts in the pursuit of implementing the Code.
\n7.2 Short term strategy on containment
\n7.2.1 Shared Awareness and \u201cDe-confliction\u201d (SHADE) mechanism
\nThe SHADE mechanism was initiated in December 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers by those nations and
\norganizations involved in counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin with
\na purpose of conducting informal meetings to share best practices and de-conflict the
\nactivities of the players. Initially it was composed of Combined Maritime Force, NATO
\nand EUNAVOR but was later expanded to include most of the Nations contributing
\nnaval assets including Japan, China Republic of South Korea and Russia.
\n54
\nThe SHADE is credited with the establishment of the International Recommended
\nTransit Corridor (IRTC) endorsed by IMO in July 2009. This corridor has been very
\neffective in conducting escort missions of merchant ships and played a big role in
\nreducing the pirate attacks in the Gulf in recent years.
\nThe IMO short term strategy as articulated by the Secretary General in various forums
\nincluding the speech for 2011maritime day remains containment and thwarting of pirate
\nattacks at sea. This can only be accomplished by use of naval vessels deployed at sea
\nmaking this grouping of now expanded 22 countries the most ideal partner for the time
\nbeing. It should also be noted that the mechanism holds monthly meetings where issues
\naffecting their operations are discussed. IMO is represented in these monthly meeting
\nhence has the opportunity of articulating the Organization and the Code strategies as far
\nas Djibouti Code is concerned.
\n7.2.2 Adoption of the Best Management Practice (BMP)
\nThe best management practices were developed by the CGPS working group 3 chaired
\nby the United States and comprising of some member States and the industry. This set of
\npractices was meant to assist ships to avoid or delay attacks while transiting in defined
\nhigh risk areas. The advice entails advising ships to register with UKMTO and the MSCHOA security information center to following the (IRTC). Other measures included are
\nship protection and deterrent measures deemed appropriate in reducing vulnerability of
\nthe ship.
\nThe practices cover areas such as pre planning stage, where it recommends a thorough
\nrisk assessments based on the piracy activity information from various sources listed in
\nthe handbook. The risk analysis should identify among other things measures for
\nprevention, mitigation and recovery. It should also be noted that these guidelines
\nincludes advice on use of Private Contracted Armed Security personnel PCASPs despite
\nthe fact that the industry has not supported their use on long term. The Djibouti Code
\n55
\nStates could adopt recommendatory measures based on these best practices in their role
\nas Flag and Port States.
\n7.2.3 The Combined Joint Task Force \u2013Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
\nThis US combined Task Force was established in November 2002 operating aboard USS
\nMount Whitney arriving in the Horn of Africa December 2002 and transitioned ashore to
\nCamp Lemonnier in Djibouti in May 2003. The creation of this Task force followed the
\ninvasion of the US and UK of Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the Global War
\non Terrorism (GWOT) to capture Osama Bin Laden and destroy Al Qaeda. Initially
\nunder the CENTCOM its mission was to capture terrorists who could flood the Horn of
\nAfrica from the Middle East.
\nThe CJTF-HOA Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes the countries of Kenya,
\nSomalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Seychelles with a further interest being
\nYemen, Tanzania, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, Comoros,
\nChad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda.
\nThis Task Force mission has however evolved to conducting operations in the combined
\njoint operation area to enhance partner nation\u2019s capacity, promote regional security and
\nstability, dissuade conflict and protect US and Coalition interest. The future plans based
\non a committee report to Congress (2011-2014: 2024 – Essay Writing Service. Custom Essay Services Cheap) indicates a mission with a long term
\nobjective in the region making it a preferred partner in the realization of the Code
\nobjective.
\n7.3 Midterm strategy on capacity building
\n7.3.1 Maritime Safety and Security related cooperative arrangements
\nThe IMO has been involved in maritime security issues with one of its committee the
\nMaritime Safety Committee (MSC) having a permanent agenda on piracy. The adoption
\nof both hard and soft law frameworks on safety of navigation such as the SUA
\n56
\nconvention and the ISPS Code in 2002 and numerous recommendations makes the
\norganization a central player in maritime security issues. The ongoing work of the MSC
\non recommendations on use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)
\non board ships is an indicator of dynamism and expertise possessed by the Organization.
\nThis makes the organizations existing arrangement the preferred choice among other
\nregional arrangements.
\nThe role of Port State Control (PSC) is hailed as one of the major achievements of IMO
\nin ridding the industry of unseaworthy ships. This arrangement is replicated in most
\nregions following the signing of Paris Memorandum of Understanding by mostly
\nEuropean region. The Indian Ocean region is covered by the Indian Ocean
\nMemorandum of understanding on Port State Control (IOMoU) with current
\nmembership of 19. Most of these members are signatory to the Code with exceptions of
\nAustralia, India, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. The rest of the 15 members are eligible
\nmembers of the Djibouti Code. Members of Djibouti Code who are not members of
\nIOMoU are Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate (UAE).
\nTable 7: Venn illustration diagram, Djibouti Code of Conduct and IOMoU
\nFigure: 7
\nSource: Djibouti Code of Conduct; Indian Ocean Memorandum of understanding
\n57
\nIn evaluating how this MoU can be incorporated into the anti-piracy roles, a productmarket strategy business model developed by Igor Ansoff (1918-2002) is used.
\nTable 8: Anti-Piracy growth strategy matrix
\nFigure 8
\nSource: Mc Graw, (1965), corporate Strategy: An analytic approach to business policy for growth and
\nexpansion
\nOn applying the market penetration concept, Ansoff considers measures such as increase
\nof market share of current products. In this case, the IOMoU could extend to those
\ncountries in the Indian and Gulf region who are not members such as Egypt and other
\nMediterranean countries granting them observer status. Other means of achieving this
\npenetration strategy would include securing dominance of the existing PSC measures by
\nPenetration Development
\nDevelopment Diversification
\nExisting (PSC) New (Anti-Piracy)
\nNew Djibouti Members
\nExisting IOMoU
\nMembers
\n58
\naggressive campaigns and increasing the port state control inspections of the member
\ncountries.
\nThe product and market development would include introduction of anti-piracy
\nmeasures within the PSC regime and in particular those inspections related to the ISPS
\nCode. Measures as those developed in the Best Management Practices could be
\nincorporated in the inspections to ensure these ships operating in the region are
\ncomplying with the recommendations and have these copies on board as part of the antipiracy kit. This strategy can also see the members adopt a common policy on ships using
\nPCASP when calling on member ports to avoid possible detentions which could arise
\nthrough their presence on board. The fourth strategy of the market diversification cited
\nas the most risky by market strategist would be to introduce these anti-piracy measures
\nto other regions such as the neighboring Riyadh MoU.
\n7.3.2 Security cooperative arrangement: The East Africa Standby Force
\nThe EASF is part of the five regional forces under the African Union Standby Force
\nwith its headquarters in Addis Ababa. This standby force draw its mandate under the
\nUnited Nations Charter Chapter VII on maintenance of peace and the African Union
\nPeace and Security Commission Protocol on Peace and Security adopted in May 2003 in
\nAddis Ababa. The EASF covers 13 countries in the horn of Africa which includes 10
\nDjibouti Code participants namely Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
\nMadagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia and Sudan. The three members not part of
\nthe Code are Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. It should be noted that Uganda and Burundi
\nhave contributed troops in the AU peace keeping mission in Somalia.
\nThe EASF has a standby brigade arrangement, the East Africa Brigade (EASBRIG)
\nwhich comprises a full time planning element (PLANELM) based in Nairobi, Kenya
\ncomprising 15 staff members drawn from civilian police and the military and a further
\nlist of brigade staff on call in member states. The brigade has units which are on standby
\n59
\nin the member states and are subject to verification visit by PLANELM to identify
\nstandards and shortfalls. This force carried out a joint field training exercise \u201cAMANI
\nCARANA\u201d in Djibouti in November 2009, which tested the application of principles of
\nthe peace support operation doctrine in a failed state \u201cCARANA\u201d
\nEASBRIG enjoys support of the regional countries through the regional economic and
\npolitical body of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and has already
\nattracted funding from European countries such as the UK under the peace support
\nmission, the Netherlands and Norway who also have funded a consultative work on
\nincorporating a naval component of the force by the year 2015 – Research Paper Writing Help Service.The IMO and the PIU
\nthrough the Regional office based in Nairobi could partner with the PLANELM in areas
\nof training of personnel from this organization who has considerable potential as a long
\nterm substitute for the current deployed naval forces on the expiry of their mandate.
\nTable 9: Venn illustration of Djibouti Code members and EASBRIG
\nFigure 9
\nSource: Djibouti Code of Conduct (2009) IGAD Secretariat (2004), Protocol for EASBRICOM
\n60
\n7.3.3 Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
\nThe African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established following an
\nAfrican Union Peace and Security Commission decision in 2007 to assist the
\nTransitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia to consolidate its position after the
\nwithdrawal of Ethiopian troops in the same year. This force which to date total up to
\n8,000 troops comprises of 9 infantry battalions and support staff. The mandate
\nAMISOM is to conduct peace and support operations in Somalia, to stabilize the
\nsituation and create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities by protecting
\nthe Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI). The mission has been extended to 31 August
\n2014: 2024 – Essay Writing Service. Custom Essay Services Cheap a projected time for handing over to the United Nations in accordance with the
\nforce concept of operation.
\nThis is the only unit inside Somalia with the law enforcement capability which IMO
\ncould incorporate in the attainment of its midterm strategy of undermining organized
\ncriminal elements by denying them access to their operational bases both on land and
\nalong the coast where hijacked ships are anchored awaiting ransom negotiations. The
\nforce is set to get additional 3,000 troops in December 2011 according to Wafula
\nWamunyinyi the deputy special representative of the chairperson of the African Union
\nCommission. This will boost the force in consolidating the positions they have been
\nholding in Mogadishu and the outlying areas after driving the Al-Shabaab militias linked
\nto Al Qaeda terrorist group in August. Priority could be given to those areas currently
\nperceived as pirate strongholds of Hardhere, Macca, Eyl and Hobyo in the next phase of
\nexpansion of AMISOM to new areas of operation.
\n7.4 Long term strategy
\n7.4.1 The East and South Africa-Indian Ocean (ESA-IO) Strategy
\nThe ESA-IO regional strategy action plan for 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer was adopted by the second regional
\nministerial meeting on piracy and maritime security held in Mauritius 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer.The regional
\n61
\nstrategy has three pillars with the first pillar being the development and implementation
\nof the Somali action plan by IGAD, encouraging states in the region to carry out
\nprosecution of pirates and strengthening of regional capacity to secure their maritime
\nzones. The secretariat is composed of Inter-Regional Coordination Committee (IRCC)
\nwhich consists of Common Market for Easter and Southern Africa (COMESA), Indian
\nOcean Commission (IOC) Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and EU.
\nThe pillars of this organization are similar to the objectives of the Djibouti Code, hence
\nthe need to partner with this group particular on the implementation on the first pillar on
\nthe Somali action plan where the focus is on inter Somali dialogue, reconstruction of key
\nSomali institution and dialogue with international community to mobilize resources to
\nrevive growth of economic activities which are key to provision of alternative livelihood
\nnot fully covered in the Djibouti Code as part of the long term solution.
\n7.4.2 South West Indian Fisheries Commission (SWIFCO)
\nSWIFCO was established in 2004 by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), a
\nUnited Nations body charged with a mandate to promote sustainable utilization of
\nmarine resources in the region of South West Indian Ocean. The members of the
\ncommission are the Comoros, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius
\nMozambique, the Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa Tanzania and Yemen who are all
\nparticipants of the Djibouti Code.
\nIn executing its functions in the region such as assisting fishery managers in the
\ndevelopment and implementation of fishery management systems, the commission
\nprovides an opportunity to revive the fishing sector in Somalia, which is a key economic
\nlifeline of the Somali fishing community destroyed by successive years of illegal and
\nunregulated fishing. The commission could also assist the fishing community to
\naccessing markets for their catches.
\n62
\n7.5 Conclusion
\nThe chapter has identified a group of players considered central in partnership and
\nproviding the necessary synergy in the restoration of sanity in Somalia and the adjacent
\nmaritime areas. In a congested field of multiple players, there exist a challenge to this
\nsynergy which may result to duplication of efforts leading to waste of scarce resources
\nand hence the need for the movers of Djibouti Code to embrace an approach which focus
\non partnership in repression of piracy in the region in all aspects of a short, medium and
\nlong term strategy.
\n63
\nChapter 8
\nAce my homework – Write my paper – Online assignment help tutors – Discussions and Conclusions
\n8.1 Piracy criminal acts
\nPiracy criminal acts remain a threat to shipping and freedom of navigation with statistics
\nshowing that there were 22 ships held with 462 seafarers awaiting payment of ransom in
\ndeplorable conditions in Somalia in July 2011(IMO, 2011). The economic cost of piracy
\nis estimated to be between $7 to $12 billion to the industry with considerable human cost
\nthrough death, torture and psychological trauma on captured seafarers and their families
\n(Bowden 2010 – Essay Writing Service: Write My Essay by Top-Notch Writer, ITF 2011).
\nThe piracy business model points to the role played by sea gangs as contributing to 40%,
\nleaving the remaining 60% to the shore based organizers who comprise the sponsors
\ncum investors and shore security. Efforts must be geared to tackling the shore
\norganizers, who are fueling the piracy at sea, through reinvestment of ransom money in
\nrecruitment of youths including juveniles and supplying the logistics enabling the pirates
\nto extend their range of operations.
\nSomali pirates\u2019 mode of operation involves forcefully boarding a ship, commandeer it to
\nSomali coast and then demand ransom to release the captured seafarers. The hostage
\ntaking of two tourists in the neighboring Kenya resorts located more than 60nm using
\nspeedboats and the hijacking of MT Fairchem Bogey after it disembarked the PCASP is
\na pointer to the changing tactics of the pirates in their attempt to beat the measures
\nadopted by international navies at sea and the industry. As long as the reward for ransom
\npayment exceeds the risks associated, there will be new recruits willing to engage in
\nthese criminal acts. Measures should be adopted aimed at increasing probability of
\ndetection, capture and conviction to dissuade would-be pirates.
\nThe case of South East Asia shows that the pirate attacks went down after the littoral
\nstates carried out joint operations and signed the ReCAAP. The Djibouti Code holds the
\n64
\npotential of bringing down these acts, but requires revival of governance institutions in
\nSomalia to establish a rule of law and deny the pirates and militant groups such as Al
\nShabaab operating bases on land.
\n8.2 Regional cooperation mechanism-text analysis.
\nThe setting of the Code text was influenced by UNSC Resolutions 1816 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers), 1838
\n(2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) and 1846 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) on Somalia, which stand out as the most progressing resolutions
\nin the fight against Somali pirates and credited with mobilizing one of the largest flotilla
\nin modern time on maritime law enforcement with up to 32 ships deployed in the region.
\nThe invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the UNSC is a further indication of
\nthe political support given to the problem of piracy in the region.
\nThe concept of the main articles is based on existing practices elsewhere with the
\ninformation sharing mechanism having contributed to a reduction of piracy incidents in
\nSouth East Asia. In the region there existing information sharing centers, such as
\nUKMTO, NATO Security Center and EEU MSC-HOA who have been instrumental in
\ncoordinating escorts and military interventions. On review of national legislation,
\nsuccessful prosecution have been instituted following the enactment of the Kenya
\nMerchant Shipping Act (2009), an indication that the article once implemented by other
\nparticipants will enable prosecution to be instituted and concluded.
\nThe Code is still not binding despite the fact that the participants intended to have a
\nbinding instrument by January 2011. This has however not impacted on the
\nimplementation of the Code. The process to a binding instrument will need careful
\nconsideration of some aspects such as regional leadership, hegemonic stability factor
\nand regional state interest cited as key to any international cooperation by the realist
\nschool of international relations. The case of Malaysia and Indonesia having not signed
\nto ReCAAP should serve as a lesson as participants move to the next level of a binding
\nagreement.
\n65
\n8.3 Embarkation of Law enforcement officers
\nThe research established that this concept though key to overcoming prosecutorial
\nchallenges faced by the navies deployed has not been realized. The reasons point to the
\nfact that these agreements are bilateral and specific and have political considerations
\nsuch as reciprocity and sovereignty which may be subject to protracted diplomatic
\nnegotiations before conclusion.
\nThe countries contributing naval assets in the region are not eligible participants to the
\nCode with an exception of France, which has also not signed the Code despite having
\ncontributed to the IMO Trust Fund. This leaves the regional countries with the role of
\nonly providing the law enforcement officers to host countries willing to embark them on
\nboard which further restricts the realization of the concept.
\nThere are reservations from legal point of view on the use of the \u201cshipriders\u201d in the high
\nseas as this has been cited to contradict the principle of one ship one flag rule in
\nUNCLOS and further conflicts article 107 which requires the arresting government
\nvessel to be clearly marked. This argument restricts the use of the \u201cshipriders\u201d to the
\nterritorial seas of the embarked law enforcement officer.
\n8.4 Information sharing mechanism
\nThe research found that there exist sufficient systems and technologies both in the
\nshipping industry and in the field of maritime domain awareness which could be adopted
\nfor use in the attainment of this article of the Code. The system could be based on IMO
\napproved basic communications systems in SOLAS to benefit from the performance
\nstandard criteria already established.
\nThe Naval forces operating in the region have established a web based piracy
\ninformation sharing centers which includes the NATO Security Center and EU MSCHOA where ships gain access to the latest piracy information and alerts. The website
\nenables ships to register their movements electronically. The implementers could
\n66
\nexplore the possibility of complementing these existing systems by linking them with
\nthe regional piracy information centers. Considerations should be made to the fact that
\nthe forces information centers are tied up to the mission of the task force and are subject
\nto expire in December 2014: 2024 – Essay Writing Service. Custom Essay Services Cheap. These services could be taken over by the regional piracy
\ninformation centers on the occasion that the mission is discontinued.
\n8.5 Review of Regional National Legislations
\nThe research established that the international law on repressing piracy and armed
\nrobbery as codified in UNCLOS and SUA are sufficient in addressing piracy. The
\nmunicipal laws of the regional states and the procedures are, however, the ones which
\ndetermine whether a country has sufficient jurisdiction to prosecute persons accused of
\ncommitting piracy at high seas or territorial waters of a failed state.
\nThe nexus clause in the execution of universal jurisdiction is found to be retrogressive in
\nthe modern shipping business practice. This is complicated by the wider number of
\nstakeholders involved in a single business venture who represent ship owners, seafarers,
\ninsurers, Flag states, business managers and others. The concluded pirate cases in Kenya
\nproved that the universal jurisdiction established under UNCLOS is sufficient and
\nadequate in carrying out prosecution of pirates arrested by third parties.
\nThe capacity for correctional facilities in the regional countries carrying out pirate trials
\nis a factor, which if not solved, may see the countries become reluctant in accepting
\narrested pirates. This could be solved by having prison transfer arrangements in the
\nregion which would ease the burden for the prosecuting countries by having the
\nconvicted pirates serve their sentences in a third state party. However, this requires
\nelaborate bilateral arrangements on extradition of pirates which has to address some
\nfundamental issues such as reciprocity, human rights, constitutional guarantees and
\ndeath sentences contained in some jurisdictions.
\n67
\nIn June 2011 the Working Group 2 of CGPCS estimated that there are close to 1000
\npirates either convicted or going on trial in 20 countries. This means that there exist
\nsufficient case laws which could be used to influence the course of review of the Code
\nParticipants\u2019 national legislation.
\n8.6 Avenues for synergy
\nThere exist players in the region who are currently involved in the activities of
\nrepressing piracy in the region both at sea and land. This paper finds the SHADE
\nmechanism the most appropriate partner in the attainment of short term goal of
\ncontainment of piracy. The industry guidance through the Best Management Practices
\nfor Protection against Somalia based Piracy (BMP), now in its 4th edition, has also been
\nestablished as having an effect in reducing the successful pirate attacks in many cases
\nhence its incorporation in the short term could be considered.
\nThe EASBRIG mechanism of the East Africa Standby Force has the potential of
\nstabilizing the region owing to its wide regional participation and its strategic plan for
\nincorporation of a naval component of the regions Standby force by 2015 – Research Paper Writing Help Service. This regional
\nmilitary alliance can be an alternative to the Combined Maritime Forces operating in the
\nregion once their mandate expires.
\nThe revival of economic institutions alongside the political institutions in Somalia holds
\na key to provision of alternative livelihood. UNODC has been involved in rebuilding of
\nprison facilities both in Puntland, Somaliland and Somalia. Similar efforts could be
\ninstituted to revive the fishing sector in the long term to dissuade the fisher folk
\ncommunity from becoming pirates. The establishment of Somalia maritime zones could
\nbe prioritized to provide for territorial jurisdiction and Economic Exploitation Zone to
\nenable the government to manage the fishing industry and earn revenue through
\nlicensing regime.
\n68
\n8.7 Conclusions
\nThe following International organizations are core to the realization of the Djibouti Code
\nof Conduct. The United Nations, through the UNSC whose mandate of preservation of
\npeace can be invoked to revive law and order in Somalia and continued deployment of
\nMilitary assets in the region, the UNDP, who have the capacity to provide alternative
\nlivelihood to Somalia through its development role and the UNODC which has been
\nrebuilding incarceration facilities inside Somalia.
\nMember States have a duty to protect ships flying their flags and their citizen who serve
\nunder these Flags. UNCLOS also obligates states to cooperate to the fullest possible
\nextend in repression of piracy on the high seas. This research concludes that the
\nfollowing States have a stake in the fight against piracy, The US through its policy on
\nGlobal War on Terror and its program on Maritime Domain Awareness, France through
\nits territories in the Indian Ocean, Kenya Ethiopia and Djibouti who are neighboring
\nStates to the failed State of Somalia and whose national security is threatened by the
\nlawlessness State of Somalia.
\nThe industry which bears the brunt of piracy should keep pressure on the state actors to
\nattract the political will required to protect the vital industry and guarantee the freedom
\nof navigation in the high seas. The industry could also embrace the best management
\npractices and carry out appropriate risk assessments while operating in these high risk
\nareas.
\nThe IMO roles in the attainment of the overall objective of the Djibouti Code remain
\ncore and require concentrated effort and engagement with the international community,
\nMember States and the industry beyond its traditional mandate of safer ships on cleaner
\noceans. This call for adoption of dynamic and proactive strategies such as 2011 year\u2019s
\ntheme, \u201cpiracy: orchestrating response\u201d.
\n69
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\nL:MSDOSSHE1MEETINGS8OUT-PRESWest Indian Ocean 2Djibouti MeetingFINALFinal authentic textENGLISHCode of Conduct.doc
\nANNEX
\nCODE OF CONDUCT
\nCONCERNING THE REPRESSION
\nOF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS
\nIN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN AND THE GULF OF ADEN
\nThe Governments of Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Jordan, Kenya,
\nMadagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Somalia,
\nSouth Africa, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen
\n(hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe Participants\u201d),
\nDEEPLY CONCERNED about the crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships in
\nthe Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden and the grave dangers to the safety and security
\nof persons and ships at sea and to the protection of the marine environment arising from such
\nacts;
\nREAFFIRMING that international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, sets out the legal
\nframework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea;
\nNOTING that the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (hereinafter
\nreferred to as \u201cIMO\u201d), at its twenty-fifth regular session, adopted, on 27 November 2007,
\nresolution A.1002(25) on Piracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of
\nSomalia which, among other things, called upon Governments in the region to conclude, in cooperation with IMO, and implement, as soon as possible, a regional agreement to prevent, deter
\nand suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships;
\nNOTING ALSO that the General Assembly of the United Nations, at its sixth-third
\nsession, adopted, on 5 December 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers, resolution 63\/111 on Ocean and the law of the sea which
\namongst others:
\n– recognizes the crucial role of international cooperation at the global, regional, subregional and bilateral levels in combating, in accordance with international law,
\nthreats to maritime security, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, terrorist acts
\nagainst shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests, through
\nbilateral and multilateral instruments and mechanisms aimed at monitoring,
\npreventing and responding to such threats, the enhanced sharing of information
\namong States relevant to the detection, prevention and suppression of such threats,
\nthe prosecution of offenders with due regard to national legislation and the need
\nfor sustained capacity-building to support such objectives;
\n– emphasizes the importance of prompt reporting of incidents to enable accurate
\ninformation on the scope of the problem of piracy and armed robbery against
\nships and, in the case of armed robbery against ships, by affected vessels to the
\ncoastal State, underlines the importance of effective information-sharing with
\nStates potentially affected by incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships,
\nand takes note of the important role of the IMO;
\nAPPENDIX:1
\n77
\nPage 2
\n– calls upon States to take appropriate steps under their national law to facilitate the
\napprehension and prosecution of those who are alleged to have committed acts of
\npiracy;
\n– urges all States, in cooperation with the IMO, to actively combat piracy and armed
\nrobbery at sea by adopting measures, including those relating to assistance with
\ncapacity-building through training of seafarers, port staff and enforcement
\npersonnel in the prevention, reporting and investigation of incidents, bringing the
\nalleged perpetrators to justice, in accordance with international law, and by
\nadopting national legislation, as well as providing enforcement vessels and
\nequipment and guarding against fraudulent ship registration;
\n– welcomes the significant decrease in the number of attacks by pirates and armed
\nrobbers in the Asian region through increased national, bilateral and trilateral
\ninitiatives as well as regional cooperative mechanisms, and calls upon other States
\nto give immediate attention to adopting, concluding and implementing
\ncooperation agreements on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships at
\nthe regional level;
\n– expresses serious concern regarding the problem of increased instances of piracy
\nand armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, expresses alarm in particular at
\nthe recent hijacking of vessels, supports the recent efforts to address this problem
\nat the global and regional levels, notes the adoption by the Security Council of the
\nUnited Nations of resolutions 1816 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) of 2 June 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers and 1838 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) of 7
\nOctober 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers, and also notes that the authorization in resolution 1816 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) and
\nthe provisions in resolution 1838 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) apply only to the situation in Somalia and
\ndo not affect the rights, obligations or responsibilities of Member States of the
\nUnited Nations under international law, including any rights or obligations under
\nthe United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as
\n\u201cUNCLOS\u201d), with respect to any other situation, and underscores in particular
\nthat they are not to be considered as establishing customary international law;
\n– notes the initiatives of the Secretary-General of the IMO, following up on
\nresolution A.1002(25) to engage the international community in efforts to combat
\nacts of piracy and armed robbery against ships sailing the waters off the coast of
\nSomalia; and
\n– urges States to ensure the full implementation of resolution A.1002(25) on acts of
\npiracy and armed robbery against ships in waters off the coast of Somalia;
\nNOTING FURTHER that the Security Council of the United Nations has adopted
\nresolutions 1816 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers), 1838 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers), 1846 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) and 1851 (2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers) in relation to piracy and
\narmed robbery in waters off the coast of Somalia,
\nRECALLING the Assembly of IMO, at its twenty-second regular session, adopted, on 29
\nNovember 2001, resolution A.922(22) on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes
\nof Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which amongst others invited Governments to
\ndevelop, as appropriate, agreements and procedures to facilitate co-operation in applying
\nefficient and effective measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships;
\nTAKING INTO ACCOUNT the Special measures to enhance maritime security adopted
\non 12 December 2002 by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International
\n78
\nPage 3
\nConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended, including the International Ship and
\nPort Facility Security Code;
\nINSPIRED by the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
\nRobbery against Ships in Asia adopted in Tokyo, Japan on 11 November 2004;
\nRECOGNIZING the urgent need to devise and adopt effective and practical measures for
\nthe suppression of piracy and armed robbery against ships;
\nRECALLING that the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
\nSafety of Maritime Navigation (hereinafter referred to as \u201cSUA Convention\u201d) provides for
\nparties to create criminal offences, establish jurisdiction, and accept delivery or persons
\nresponsible for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof
\nor any other form of intimidation;
\nDESIRING to promote greater regional co-operation between the Participants, and
\nthereby enhance their effectiveness, in the prevention, interdiction, prosecution, and punishment
\nof those persons engaging in piracy and armed robbery against ships on the basis of mutual
\nrespect for the sovereignty, sovereign rights, sovereign equality, jurisdiction, and territorial
\nintegrity of States;
\nWELCOMING the initiatives of IMO, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
\nthe United Nations Development Programme, European Commission, League of Arab States, and
\nother relevant international entities to provide training, technical assistance and other forms of
\ncapacity building to assist Governments, upon request, to adopt and implement practical
\nmeasures to apprehend and prosecute those persons engaging in piracy and armed robbery
\nagainst ships;
\nWELCOMING the creation in New York on 14 January 2009 of the Contact Group on
\nPiracy off the coast of Somalia which will help mobilize and co-ordinate contributions to
\ninternational efforts in the fight against piracy and armed robbery against ships in the waters off
\nthe coast of Somalia, pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 1851(2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers);
\nNOTING FURTHER the need for a comprehensive approach to address the poverty and
\ninstability that create conditions conducive to piracy, which includes strategies for effective
\nenvironmental conservation and fisheries management, and the need to address the possible
\nenvironmental consequences of piracy;
\nHave agreed as follows:
\nArticle 1
\nDefinitions
\nFor the purposes of this Code of conduct, unless the context otherwise requires:
\n1. \u201cPiracy\u201d consists of any of the following acts:
\n79
\nPage 4
\n(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for
\nprivate ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,
\nand directed:
\n(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
\nproperty on board such ship or aircraft;
\n(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
\njurisdiction of any State;
\n(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with
\nknowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
\n(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph
\n(a) or (b).
\n2. \u201cArmed robbery against ships\u201d consists of any of the following acts:
\n(a) unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,
\nother than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship
\nor against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State\u2019s internal
\nwaters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;
\n(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph
\n(a).
\n3. \u201cSecretary-General\u201d means the Secretary-General of the International Maritime
\nOrganization.
\nArticle 2
\nPurpose and Scope
\n1. Consistent with their available resources and related priorities, their respective national
\nlaws and regulations, and applicable rules of international law, the Participants intend to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships
\nwith a view towards:
\n(a) sharing and reporting relevant information;
\n(b) interdicting ships and\/or aircraft suspected of engaging in piracy or armed robbery
\nagainst ships;
\n(c) ensuring that persons committing or attempting to commit piracy or armed
\nrobbery against ships are apprehended and prosecuted; and
\n(d) facilitating proper care, treatment, and repatriation for seafarers, fishermen, other
\nshipboard personnel and passengers subject to piracy or armed robbery against
\nships, particularly those who have been subjected to violence.
\n80
\nPage 5
\n2. The Participants intend this Code of conduct to be applicable in relation to piracy and
\narmed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
\nArticle 3
\nProtection Measures for Ships
\nThe Participants intend to encourage States, ship owners, and ship operators, where
\nappropriate, to take protective measures against piracy and armed robbery against ships, taking
\ninto account the relevant international standards and practices, and, in particular,
\nrecommendations
\n1,2
\nadopted by IMO.
\nArticle 4
\nMeasures to Repress Piracy
\n1. The provisions of this Article are intended to apply only to piracy.
\n2. For purposes of this Article and of Article 10, \u201cpirate ship\u201d means a ship intended by the
\npersons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing piracy, or if the ship has
\nbeen used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of those persons.
\n3. Consistent with Article 2, each Participant to the fullest possible extent intends to cooperate in:
\n(a) arresting, investigating, and prosecuting persons who have committed piracy or
\nare reasonably suspected of committing piracy;
\n(b) seizing pirate ships and\/or aircraft and the property on board such ships and\/or
\naircraft; and
\n(c) rescuing ships, persons, and property subject to piracy.
\n4. Any Participant may seize a pirate ship beyond the outer limit of any State\u2019s territorial
\nsea, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board.
\n5. Any pursuit of a ship, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is
\nengaged in piracy, extending in and over the territorial sea of a Participant is subject to the
\nauthority of that Participant. No Participant should pursue such a ship in or over the territory or
\nterritorial sea of any coastal State without the permission of that State.
\n6. Consistent with international law, the courts of the Participant which carries out a seizure
\npursuant to paragraph 4 may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine
\nthe action to be taken with regard to the ship or property, subject to the rights of third parties
\nacting in good faith.<\/p>\n
1
\nMSC\/Circ.622\/Rev.1 on Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed
\nrobbery against ships as it may be revised.
\n2
\nMSC\/Circ.623\/Rev.3 on Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and
\nsuppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships as it may be revised.
\n81
\nPage 6
\n7. The Participant which carried out the seizure pursuant to paragraph 4 may, subject to its
\nnational laws, and in consultation with other interested entities, waive its primary right to
\nexercise jurisdiction and authorize any other Participant to enforce its laws against the ship
\nand\/or persons on board.
\n8. Unless otherwise arranged by the affected Participants, any seizure made in the territorial
\nsea of a Participant pursuant to paragraph 5 should be subject to the jurisdiction of that
\nParticipant.
\nArticle 5
\nMeasures to Repress Armed Robbery against Ships
\n1. The provisions of this Article are intended to apply only to armed robbery against ships.
\n2. The Participants intend for operations to suppress armed robbery against ships in the
\nterritorial sea and airspace of a Participant to be subject to the authority of that Participant,
\nincluding in the case of hot pursuit from that Participant\u2019s territorial sea or archipelagic waters in
\naccordance with Article 111 of UNCLOS.
\n3. The Participants intend for their respective focal points and Centres (as designated
\npursuant to Article 8) to communicate expeditiously alerts, reports, and information related to
\narmed robbery against ships to other Participants and interested parties.
\nArticle 6
\nMeasures in All Cases
\n1. The Participants intend that any measures taken pursuant to this Code of conduct should
\nbe carried out by law enforcement or other authorized officials from warships or military aircraft,
\nor from other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being in government service and
\nauthorized to that effect.
\n2. The Participants recognize that multiple States, including the flag State, State of
\nsuspected origin of the perpetrators, the State of nationality of persons on board the ship, and the
\nState of ownership of cargo may have legitimate interests in cases arising pursuant to Articles 4
\nand 5. Therefore, the Participants intend to liaise and co-operate with such States and other
\nstakeholders, and to coordinate such activities with each other to facilitate the rescue,
\ninterdiction, investigation, and prosecution.
\n3. The Participants intend, to the fullest possible extent, to conduct and support the conduct
\nof investigations in cases of piracy and armed robbery against ships taking into account the
\nrelevant international standards and practices, and, in particular, recommendations3
\nadopted by
\nIMO.<\/p>\n
3
\nResolution A.922(22) on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery
\nagainst Ships as it may be revised.
\n82
\nPage 7
\n4. The Participants intend to co-operate to the fullest possible extent in medical and
\ndecedent affairs arising from operations in furtherance of the repression of piracy and armed
\nrobbery against ships.
\nArticle 7
\nEmbarked Officers
\n1. In furtherance of operations contemplated by this Code of conduct, a Participant may
\nnominate law enforcement or other authorized officials (hereafter referred to as \u201cthe embarked
\nofficers\u201d) to embark in the patrol ships or aircraft of another Participant (hereafter referred to as
\n\u201cthe host Participant\u201d) as may be authorized by the host Participant.
\n2. The embarked officers may be armed in accordance with their national law and policy
\nand the approval of the host Participant.
\n3. When embarked, the host Participant should facilitate communications between the
\nembarked officers and their headquarters, and should provide messing and quarters for the
\nembarked officers aboard the patrol ships or aircraft in a manner consistent with host Participant
\npersonnel of the same rank.
\n4. Embarked officers may assist the host Participant and conduct operations from the host
\nParticipant ship or aircraft if expressly requested to do so by the host Participant, and only in the
\nmanner requested. Such request may only be made, agreed to, and acted upon in a manner that is
\nnot prohibited by the laws and policies of both Participants.
\nArticle 8
\nCoordination and Information Sharing
\n1. Each Participant should designate a national focal point to facilitate coordinated, timely,
\nand effective information flow among the Participants consistent with the purpose and scope of
\nthis Code of conduct. In order to ensure coordinated, smooth, and effective communications
\nbetween their designated focal points, the Participants intend to use the piracy information
\nexchange centres Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen (hereinafter referred to as \u201cthe
\nCentres\u201d). The Centres in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania will be situated in the
\nmaritime rescue co-odination centre in Mombasa and the sub-regional co-ordination centre in
\nDar es Salaam, respectively. The Centre in Yemen will be situated in the regional maritime
\ninformation centre to be established in Yemen based on the outcomes of the sub-regional
\nmeetings held by IMO in Sana\u2019a in 2005 and Muscat in 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers and Dar es Salaam. Each Centre
\nand designated focal point should be capable of receiving and responding to alerts and requests
\nfor information or assistance at all times.
\n2. Each Participant intends to:
\n(a) declare and communicate to the other Participants its designated focal point at the
\ntime of signing this Code of conduct or as soon as possible after signing, and
\nthereafter update the information as and when changes occur;
\n83
\nPage 8
\n(b) provide and communicate to the other Participants the telephone numbers, telefax
\nnumbers, and e-mail addresses of its focal point, and, as appropriate, of its Centre
\nand thereafter update the information as and when changes occur; and
\n(c) communicate to the Secretary-General the information referred to in
\nsubparagraphs (a) and (b) and thereafter update the information as and when
\nchanges occur.
\n3. Each Centre and focal point should be responsible for its communication with the other
\nfocal points and the Centres. Any focal point which has received or obtained information about
\nan imminent threat of, or an incident of, piracy or armed robbery against ships should promptly
\ndisseminate an alert with all relevant information to the Centres. The Centres should disseminate
\nappropriate alerts within their respective areas of responsibility regarding imminent threats or
\nincidents to ships.
\n4. Each Participant should ensure the smooth and effective communication between its
\ndesignated focal point, and other competent national authorities including search and rescue
\ncoordination centres, as well as relevant non-governmental organizations.
\n5. Each Participant should make every effort to require ships entitled to fly its flag and the
\nowners and operators of such ships to promptly notify relevant national authorities, including the
\ndesignated focal points and Centres, the appropriate search and rescue coordination centres and
\nother relevant the contact points
\n4
\n, of incidents of piracy or armed robbery against ships.
\n6. Each Participant intends, upon the request of any other Participant, to respect the
\nconfidentiality of information transmitted from a Participant.
\n7. To facilitate implementation of this Code of conduct, the Participants intend to keep each
\nother fully informed concerning their respective applicable laws and guidance, particularly those
\npertaining to the interdiction, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, and disposition of persons
\ninvolved in piracy and armed robbery against ships. The Participants may also undertake and
\nseek assistance to undertake publication of handbooks and convening of seminars and
\nconferences in furtherance of this Code of conduct.
\nArticle 9
\nIncident Reporting
\n1. The Participants intend to undertake development of uniform reporting criteria in order to
\nensure that an accurate assessment of the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Western
\nIndian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden is developed taking into account the recommendations5,6
\nadopted by IMO. The Participants intend for the Centres to manage the collection and
\ndissemination of this information in their respective geographic areas of responsibility.<\/p>\n
4
\nFor example the Maritime Liaison Office Bahrain (MARLO), the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Office
\nDubai (UKMTO).
\n5
\nMSC\/Circ.622\/Rev.1 on Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed
\nrobbery against ships as it may be revised.
\n6
\nMSC\/Circ.623\/Rev.3 on Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and
\nsuppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships as it may be revised.
\n84
\nPage 9
\n2. Consistent with its laws and policies, a Participant conducting a boarding, investigation,
\nprosecution, or judicial proceeding pursuant to this Code of conduct should promptly notify any
\naffected flag and coastal States and the Secretary-General of the results.
\n3. The Participants intend for the Centres to:
\n(a) collect, collate and analyze the information transmitted by the Participants
\nconcerning piracy and armed robbery against ships, including other relevant
\ninformation relating to individuals and transnational organized criminal groups
\ncommitting piracy and armed robbery against ships in their respective
\ngeographical areas of responsibility; and
\n(b) prepare statistics and reports on the basis of the information gathered and analyzed
\nunder subparagraph (a), and to disseminate them to the Participants, the shipping
\ncommunity, and the Secretary-General.
\nArticle 10
\nAssistance among Participants
\n1. A Participant may request any other Participant, through the Centres or directly, to
\nco-operate in detecting any of the following persons, ships, or aircraft:
\n(a) persons who have committed, or are reasonably suspected of committing, piracy;
\n(b) persons who have committed, or are reasonably suspected of committing, armed
\nrobbery against ships;
\n(c) pirate ships, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that those ships are
\nengaged in piracy; and
\n(d) ships or persons who have been subjected to piracy or armed robbery against
\nships.
\n2. A Participant may also request any other Participant, through the Centres or directly, to
\ntake effective measures in response to reported piracy or armed robbery against ships.
\n3. Co-operative arrangements such as joint exercises or other forms of co-operation, as
\nappropriate, may be undertaken as determined by the Participants concerned.
\n4. Capacity building co-operation may include technical assistance such as educational and
\ntraining programmes to share experiences and best practice.
\nArticle 11
\nReview of National Legislation
\nIn order to allow for the prosecution, conviction and punishment of those involved in
\npiracy or armed robbery against ships, and to facilitate extradition or handing over when
\nprosecution is not possible, each Participant intends to review its national legislation with a view
\n85
\nPage 10
\ntowards ensuring that there are national laws in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery
\nagainst ships, and adequate guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigations,
\nand prosecutions of alleged offenders.
\nArticle 12
\nDispute Settlement
\nThe Participants intend to settle by consultation and peaceful means amongst each other
\nany disputes that arise from the implementation of this Code of conduct.
\nArticle 13
\nConsultations
\nWithin two years of the effective date of this Code of conduct, and having designated the
\nnational focal points referred to in Article 8, the Participants intend to consult, with the assistance
\nof IMO, with the aim of arriving at a binding agreement.
\nArticle 14
\nClaims
\nAny claim for damages, injury or loss resulting from an operation carried out under this
\nCode of conduct should be examined by the Participant whose authorities conducted the
\noperation. If responsibility is established, the claim should be resolved in accordance with the
\nnational law of that Participant, and in a manner consistent with international law, including
\nArticle 106 and paragraph 3 of Article 110 of UNCLOS.
\nArticle 15
\nMiscellaneous Provisions
\nNothing in this Code of conduct is intended to:
\n(a) create or establish a binding agreement, except as noted in Article 13;
\n(b) affect in any way the rules of international law pertaining to the competence of
\nStates to exercise investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on board ships not
\nflying their flag;
\n(c) affect the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for
\nnon-commercial purposes;
\n(d) apply to or limit boarding of ships conducted by any Participant in accordance
\nwith international law, beyond the outer limit of any State\u2019s territorial sea,
\nincluding boardings based upon the right of visit, the rendering of assistance to
\n86
\nPage 11
\npersons, ships and property in distress or peril, or an authorization from the flag
\nState to take law enforcement or other action;
\n(e) preclude the Participants from otherwise agreeing on operations or other forms of
\nco-operation to repress piracy and armed robbery against ships;
\n(f) prevent the Participants from taking additional measures to repress piracy and
\narmed robbery at sea through appropriate actions in their land territory;
\n(g) supersede any bilateral or multilateral agreement or other co-operative mechanism
\nconcluded by the Participants to repress piracy and armed robbery against ships;
\n(h) alter the rights and privileges due to any individual in any legal proceeding;
\n(i) create or establish any waiver of any rights that any Participant may have under
\ninternational law to raise a claim with any other Participant through diplomatic
\nchannels;
\n(j) entitle a Participant to undertake in the territory of another Participant the exercise
\nof jurisdiction and performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for
\nthe authorities of that other Participant by its national law;
\n(k) prejudice in any manner the positions and navigational rights and freedoms of any
\nParticipant regarding the international law of the sea;
\n(l) be deemed a waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities
\nof the Participants to this Code of conduct as provided under international or
\nnational law; or
\n(m) preclude or limit any Participant from requesting or granting assistance in
\naccordance with the provisions of any applicable Mutual Legal Assistance
\nAgreement or similar instrument.
\nArticle 16
\nSignature and Effective Date<\/p>\n
1. The Code of conduct is open for signature by Participants on 29 January 2009 and at the
\nHeadquarters of IMO from 1 February 2009.
\n2. The Code of conduct will become effective upon the date of signature by two or more
\nParticipants and effective for subsequent Participants upon their respective date of deposit of a
\nsignature instrument with the Secretary-General.
\n87
\nPage 12
\nArticle 17
\nLanguages
\nThis Code of conduct is established in the Arabic, English and French languages, each
\ntext being equally authentic.
\nDONE in Djibouti this twenty-ninth day of January two thousand and nine.
\nIN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective
\nGovernments for that purpose, have signed this Code of conduct.
\nS Signed (signatures omitted) in Djibouti on 29 January 2009 by Djibouti,
\nEthiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, United Republic of
\nTanzania and Yemen.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
DJIBOUTI CODE OF CONDUCT An instrument to suppress piracy in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: Djibouti Code\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2468,274,2469,53,2471,354,2470,2467],"tags":[2472,1427,1656,1648,2473,2386,1966],"class_list":["post-6115","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bsn-papers","category-dnp-assignment","category-health-care-essays","category-masters-essays","category-nursing-assessment","category-nursing-assignment","category-nursing-homework","category-nursing-papers-homework-help","tag-healthcare-dissertations","tag-healthcare-essays","tag-medical-papers","tag-medical-research-papers","tag-msn-essays","tag-nursing-case-study","tag-nursing-essays"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6115","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6115"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6115\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6115"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6115"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/homeworkacetutors.com\/nursing\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6115"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}