From prejudice to discrimination<\/p>\n
Order Description<\/p>\n
1.Watch this clip:<\/p>\n
https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watchv=JqfqsOM2WFo<\/p>\n
Are you surprised and\/or upset when the last word comes out Have you in some way influenced by stereotypes<\/p>\n
2. Watch this video clip: Wafa was attacking the extremists and their destructive acts.<\/p>\n
https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watchv=QLOicfZ_bAI&feature=relmfu<\/p>\n
And see this picture<\/p>\n
In download<\/p>\n
Question: Why do you think the terrorists do what they do Is the reason similar to members of KKK lynching Blacks You have to show your knowledge to receive full credit.<\/p>\n
must use book in download as 1 reference<\/p>\n
Chapter 10
\n*
\nFrom Prejudice to
\nDiscrimination
\nRush hour on board a bus or train …. The flood of incoming
\npassengers begins to solidifY …. I am sitting next to a window,
\nmy eyes half-closed …. Dressed conservatively in a tweed
\njacket and tastefully bold tie, I am an unremarkable Ulan, .. , as
\nunnoticed as any other COl1lllluter. Except for Oile thing: amid
\nthe growing crush, the seat beside me remains empty. At stop
\nafter stop, … a succession of seemingly random individual
\ndecisions coalesces into a glaring pattern of unoccupied spaces
\nnext to black males-inc1uding me. Soon the seats beside us are
\nthe only ones left. Other passengers remain standing, leaving
\nonly these seemingly quarantined seats.
\n-BRUCE JACOBS (1999, PP. 15-16)
\nChapter Outline
\nWhat Is Discrimination
\nForms of Discrimination
\nInterpersonal Discrimination
\nThe Relation between Prejudice
\nand Discrimination
\nRegressive Prejudice
\nReactions to Having Acted in a
\nPrejudiced Manner
\nDiscrimination in Organizations
\nOrganizational Research
\nIndividuals in Organizations
\n369
\nHate Crimes
\nHate Crime Offenders
\nMotivations for Hate Crimes
\nEffects on Victims
\nSummary
\nSuggested Readings
\nKey Terms
\nQuestions for Review and
\nHomework help – Discussion
\n370 CHAPTER 10
\nPrejudice, which has been the main focus up to this point in the book, is an
\nattitude; it deals with how people think and feel about members of other
\ngroups. Discrimination, in contrast, is behavior; it deals with how people act to- I ward members of other groups. Discrimination consists of behaving differently
\nl,~oward people based solely or prirnarily on their lllembership in a social group.
\n‘The tenn is usually used to refer to acting in an unfair or demeaning manner, but it
\ncan also refer to giving someone an undeserved advantage. Bruce Jacobs’s (1999)
\nexperience cited above illustrates one aspect of the ongoing problem of discrimination
\nin modem fullerican society: Many White people avoid contact with members
\nof minority groups, even when the avoidant behaviors cause inconvenience for
\nthemselves. Although discrimination against mel11bers of minority groups is not always
\nas blatant as it was prior to the civil rights l110vement of the 1960s, it still occurs.
\nAs we discuss the research on discriminatory behavior you might be tempted to say,
\n“Well, it’s obvious: Prejudiced people discriminate,” but, as we will see, there is only
\na moderate correlation between people’s degree of prejudice and their propensity to
\nengage in discriminatory behavior. That is, not all prejudiced people discriminate
\nevery time they have an opportunity, and some nonprejudiced people discriminate
\nin sallIe situations. In presenting what psychologists know about discrimination,
\nwe first look at the nature of discrimination and then focus on the two forms most
\noften studied by psychologists, interpersonal discrimination and organizational
\ndiscrimination. We conclude with a brief examination of the most severe fonn of
\ndiscrinlination, hate crimes.
\nWhile reading this chapter, bear in mind a point we made in Chapter 7 concerning
\nprejudice: some fonns, such as racial prejudice, are socially proscribed
\nwhereas other forms, such as anti-gay prejudice and prejudice against physically
\nunattractive people, are more socially pernlissible. The same principle applies to
\ndiscrimination. For example, David Schneider (2004) noted the following forms
\nof socially acceptable discrimination: “Most of us would fight having a group
\nhonle for convicted rapists placed next door to our honle, no matter how ‘cleaned
\nup’ or ‘ex-‘ the rapists claimed to be. Most church groups do not invite homeless
\npeople to share their potluck dinners …. Many women prefer their gynecologists
\nto be female, and most males discriminate against males as their sexual partners.
\nThat’s the kind of discrimination we all know and generally approve. So it is not
\nthe fact of discrimination that is controversial, but its application to specific groups”
\n(p. 291). Consider, for example, college students’ ratings of the acceptability of
\nprejudice and discrimination directed at various groups (Crandall, Eschleman, &
\nO’Brien, 2002). Table 10.1 shows the groups for which prejudice and discrimination
\nhad the highest and lowest approval ratings.
\nWHAT IS DISCRIMINATION
\nDiscrimination can manifest itself in many ways, both verbally and behaviorally,
\nand in many settings. For example, Jennifer Livengood and Monika Stodolsak
\n(2004) interviewed American Muslims about the discrimination they experienced
\nin post-September 11. Common experiences included hearing racist epithets,
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 371
\nTAB L E 10.1 Socially Approved and Disapproved Prejudices
\nPercent Percent
\nApproved Prejudices Approving Disapproved Prejudices Approving
\nRapists 98 Mentally retarded people 3
\nChild abusers 98 Native Americans 6
\nChild molesters 97 Black Americans 6
\nWife beaters 97 Jews 6
\nTerrorists 95 Catholics 6
\nRacists 92 Whites 7
\nMembers of the Ku Klux Klan 91 Hispanics 7
\nDrunk drivers 91 Asian Americans 7
\nMembers of the American 90 Canadians 7
\nNazi Party
\nPregnant women who drink 89 Ugly people 10
\nalcohol
\nMen who refuse to pay child 89 Interracial 11
\nsupport couples
\nNegligent parents 86 People with AIDS 11
\nPeople who cheat on their 82 Fat people 11
\nspouses
\nSOURCE: Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien (2002, Table 1, p. 362).
\nreceiving hostile and disapproving looks, being subjected to obscene gestures,
\navoidance by others, and, in some cases, being personally threatened, having
\nproperty vandalized, or being physically attacked. As one respondent noted,
\n“They scream at you and … say really mean things … like ‘you crazy terrorist,
\nyou go back home. You rag head [referring to Muslim head coverings] and
\nyou are so backward.'” (p. 192). Respondents reported experiencing ‘hate
\nstares’ as they went about their everyday activities such as shopping, driving,
\nor walking down the street. As a result, many changed their routines to reduce
\ncontact with mainstream Americans and chose to remain at home whenever
\npossible. Many reported being fearful for their personal safety and for the
\nsafety of their friends and loved ones. In this chapter, we being by looking at
\nthe forms discrimination can take: blatant, subtle, or covert. We then focus on
\nthe types of discrimination most often studied by psychologists: interpersonal
\nand organizational.
\nForms of Discrimination
\nGiven the many forms that discrimination can take, it is useful to have a system
\nfor classifYing fonns of discrimination to show how they relate to one another.
\nNijole Benokraitis and Joe Feagin (1995) developed one such system, based on
\n372 CHAPTER ,0
\nthree forms of discrimination-blatant, subtle, and covert. Although Benokraitis
\nand Feagin developed their typology in the context of sexism, it applies to other
\nforms of discrinlination as well. In Chapter 1, we discussed levels of discrimination,
\nincluding interpersonal, organization, cultural, and institutional. Note that
\nblatant, subtle, and covert discrimination can be found at all four of those levels
\nof discrimination.
\nU
\nBlatant Discrimination. Blatant discrimination consists of “unequal and
\nharmful treatment … that is typically intentional, quite visible, and easily documented”
\n(Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 39). Extreme cases of blatant discrimination,
\n-such as the murder of Matthew Shepard, a gay man who was beaten and left to die
\non a fence in Wyoming (Laramie Project Archives, 2002), and the murder of James
\nByrd, a Black man who was chained to the back of a truck and dragged along a
\nroad in Texas until he died (Texas NAACP, 1999), often receive national attention.
\nHowever, blatant discrimination occurs in everyday contexts as well. For example,
\na Black college student interviewed by Janet Swim and her colleagues (Swim,
\nHyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003) told of how “a man at a party addressed
\nher by a racist label and ordered her to perform a menial task” (p. 52). To cite
\nanother example, it is not unCOlumon for Black women and Inen to experience
\nblatant discrimination while shopping, including being followed in the store or otherwise
\nbeing treated as though they are likely to steal merchandise. One study
\nfound that 35 percent of Blacks experienced negative treatment while shopping in
\npredominandy White communities, cOlupared to 10 percent reporting similar treatment
\nin their own community (Lee, 2000).
\nSome fOlTl1s of blatant discrimination against some groups are illegal and
\ngenerally condemned, such as racial discril1unation at work, in school, and in
\npublic accommodations” However, other forms, such as discrimination against
\nlesbians and gay men, are often legal and are accepted as “normal” by many people.
\nConsider, for example, a Web site on which visitors can find a picture of
\nMatthew Shepard burning in hell, along with a record of how many days he
\nhas been there. Visitors are invited to click on his picture and hear him scream
\nas he endures the flames of hell. However, examples of blatant discrimination
\nagainst other groups are not difficult to find, especially if they are supposedly
\nhumorous, At the tUlle of this writing, the popular Web site You- Tube featured
\nof series of videos (many rated 5-star) depicting the “Anlazing Racist” discriminating
\nagainst Mexicans, Asians, and Muslims. Although these clips are categorized
\nas comedy, the actions depicted are based on negative stereotypes such as
\nthe belief that all Asians eat dogs, that all Muslims have body odor, and that all
\nMexicans are in United States illegally.<\/p>\n
Subtle Discrimination. Subtle discrimination consists of “unequal and
\nharmful treatment .” that is typically less visible and obvious than blatant discrimination.
\nIt is often unnoticed because people have internalized subde [discrinlinatory]
\nbehaviors as ‘normal,’ ‘natural,’ or customary” (Benokraitis &
\nFeagin, 1995, p. 41). Subtle discrimination tends to be harder to document
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 373
\nthan blatant discrimination, but it can often be done. Unlike the other fOnTIS
\nof discrimination, which are often intentional, subtle discrimination is often
\nunintentional. For example, Claude Steele (1992) related a story told by a friend
\nof his who
\nnoticed over many visits [to her son’s third-grade classroom] that the extraordinary
\nart work of a small black boy named Jerome was ignored–or, more accurately
\nperhaps, its significance [as a sign of artistic talent] was ignored . .&
\ngenuine art talent has a way of doing-even in the third grade-his stood out.
\nYet the teacher seemed hardly to notice. Moreover, Jerome’s reputation, as it
\nwas passed along from one grade to the next, included only the slightest mention
\nof his talent, … Had Jerome had a reading problem, which fits [American
\nsociety’s stereotypic image of black children], it might have been accepted as
\ncharacteristic of him more readily than his extraordinary art work, which contradicts
\n[that image] (p. 72).
\nThus, subtle prejudice had the effect of directing teachers’ attention away
\nfrom Jerome’s artistic talent because, by society’s definition, Black children
\ndo not have that particular talent. Subtle prejudice also can be manifested in
\neveryday speech, as described in Box 10.1.
\nCovert Discrimination. Covert discrimination consists of “unequal and
\nhannful treatment … that is hidden, pUJposeful, and, ofren, maliciously motivated ….
\n[It is] behavior that consciously attempts to ensure … failure, as in hiring or other
\nemployment situations” (Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 42). Covert discrimination
\ntends to be very difficult to document. Examples in the employment context
\ninclude tokenism, hiring one or a few members of a group as evidence that an
\norganization does not discriminate; containment, restricting members of a group
\nto a limited number of job categories; and sabotage, arranging for members of a
\ngroup to fail, such as by assigning them low volume sales territories but setting their
\nsales quotas at levels similar to those of salespeople with better territories
\n(Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995).
\nCovert discrimination is comnlon outside of the workplace as well, including
\nthe housing market. In the United States, housing discrimination is prohibited by
\nthe Fair Housing Act of 1988; however, such unfair practices are difficult to document.
\nLandlords, for example, may simply tell prospective renters that an available
\nunit was just rented. Similarly, real estate agents can subdy encourage buyers
\nto look in certain areas and to avoid others. Adrian Carpusor and William Loges
\n(2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers) studied whether landlords discriminated against prospective renters based
\non their ethnicity. Via email, they contacted landlords in Los Angeles County,
\nCalifornia, about the availability of rental property. The emails were supposedly
\nsent by prospective renters whose names varied by ethnicity: Patrick McDougal
\n(White), Tyrell Jackson (Mrican American), and Said Al-Ralnnan (\u0645\u0633\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u064a\u064a\u0646 – \u062e\u062f\u0645\u0629 \u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0642\u0627\u0644\u0627\u062a \u0645\u0646 \u0642\u0628\u0644 \u0643\u0628\u0627\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628, Arab). The
\napplicant with the White-sounding name received more replies (89 percent)
\nthan did the applicants with Black (56 percent) or \u0645\u0633\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u064a\u064a\u0646 – \u062e\u062f\u0645\u0629 \u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0642\u0627\u0644\u0627\u062a \u0645\u0646 \u0642\u0628\u0644 \u0643\u0628\u0627\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628, Arab (66 percent) sounding
\nnames. Moreover, only 11 percent of the replies to the White applicant were
\nnegative, compared to 44 percent for the African American and 34 percent for
\n374 CHAPTER 10
\nSome of the most common examples of subtle prejudice
\ncan be found in everyday speech. Examples include:
\nhome at Monticello, Virginia. He noted that the
\ntour guide always referred to Jefferson in the
\nactive voice but always referred to the work of
\nJefferson’s slaves in the passive voice. For
\nexample, while describing a set of interior doors
\nwith a complex operating mechanism that had
\nrequired no repair in the 166 years since
\nJefferson’s slaves had built and installed them, the
\nguide said, “Mr. Jefferson deSigned these doors”
\n(p. 147). In contrast, the guide said, “These doors
\nwere installed originally in 1809” (p. 147, italics in
\noriginal), making the enslaved carpenters whose
\nskilled work had created the remarkable doors
\neffectively disappear from history.
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\n\u2022
\nHostile humor calls attention to the negative
\nstereotypes associated with outgroups, such as
\nlow intelligence, selfishness, stinginess, and
\nalleged bad habits such as drunkenness (Ruscher,
\n2001). People are often tolerant of outgroup
\ndisparagement that is presented as a joke because
\nthe humor context implies that listeners should
\nnot take the speaker’s remarks seriously (Ford &
\nFerguson, 2004). Humor can therefore also
\nfunction as a justification for derogatory speech.
\nHow often have you heard someone who has just
\nbeen confronted for making a prejudiced remark
\nreply with “Hey, it was only a joke”
\nPatronizing speech implies that outgroups are less
\ncompetent than members of the speaker’s
\ningroup. Patronizing speech can take two forms
\n(Ruscher, 2001). Baby talk is often directed at the
\nolder adult, implying that they have regressed
\ncognitively to the level of infants (see Chapter 13).
\nAlthough baby talk is usually well intentionedspeakers
\nview it as comforting-recipients find it
\ninsulting. Controlling talk is directed at members
\nof groups the speaker views as having lower social
\nstatus and “functions to keep low~status indivi~
\nduals ‘in their place'” by controlling the direction
\nof the conversation (Ruscher, 2001, p. 88). For
\nexample, when talking to women, men are more
\nlikely to interrupt and to give commands than
\nwhen talking to other men (Caplan, 1994).
\nVanishing uses linguistic devices to make out~
\ngroups disappear. A common way of doing so is to
\nreplace the active voice of a verb (for example,
\n“Bill hit the ball”) with the passive voice (“The ball
\nwas hit”). As Thomas Greenfield (1975) noted, this
\nrhetorical device makes “the creator or instigator
\nof action totally disappear from a reader’s [or
\nlistener’s} perception” (p. 146; see also Chapter 3).
\nFor example, Greenfield (1975) recounted his ex~
\nperiences on a guided tour of Thomas Jefferson’s
\n\u2022 Abnormalization involves describing outgroup
\nmembers in ways that emphasize their lack of
\ncompliance with ingroup norms. For example,
\nMaykel Verkuyten (2001) conducted focus groups
\nin which Dutch residents of Rotterdam discussed
\nlife in their neighborhoods. The participants were
\nchosen because they lived in areas in which large
\nnumbers of immigrants also lived. She found that
\nwhen immigrants were mentioned, participants
\nalmost always described them in ways that
\nemphasized their differences from the Dutch norm
\noften using extreme examples to illustrate a point:
\nFor example, one participant supported his view
\nthat immigrants from India were ignorant and
\ncrazy by citing a case of a family that had built a
\ncooking fire on the floor of their apartment.
\nlinguistic devices such as these serve several functions.
\nHostile humor and abnormalization indicate ways in
\nwhich the ingroup is superior to the outgroup and
\npatronizing speech reinforces the higher status and
\npower of the ingroup (Ruscher, 2001). Vanishing
\ndenigrates the skills of outgroup members and denies
\ntheir contributions to society, implying that progress
\ncomes only through the efforts of the ingroup
\n(Greenfield, 1975). All forms of prejudiced speech serve
\nto draw clear boundaries that separate the “good”
\ningroup from the “bad” outgroup.
\nthe \u0645\u0633\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u064a\u064a\u0646 – \u062e\u062f\u0645\u0629 \u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0642\u0627\u0644\u0627\u062a \u0645\u0646 \u0642\u0628\u0644 \u0643\u0628\u0627\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628, Arab. As Carpusor and Loges note, “long before an Mrican American man
\ngets a chance to show what he is capable of, discrimination tilts the scales
\nagainst him in ways he may not even be able to observe. \u0645\u0633\u0627\u0639\u062f\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062a\u0639\u064a\u064a\u0646 – \u062e\u062f\u0645\u0629 \u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0642\u0627\u0644\u0627\u062a \u0645\u0646 \u0642\u0628\u0644 \u0643\u0628\u0627\u0631 \u0627\u0644\u0643\u062a\u0627\u0628 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0631\u0628, Arab Americans face
\nsimilar obstacles” (p. 948).
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 375
\nINTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION
\nInterpersonal discrimination refers to individual, person-to-person diSCrini.U:’~–ination:
\none person treating another unfairly because of the person’s group
\nmembership. This section addresses three aspects of interpersonal discrimination.
\nThe first deals with the relationship between prejudice and discrimination
\nand the circumstances under which prejudice is more or less likely to predict
\ndiscriminatory behavior. In Chapter 5, we discussed the motivation to control
\nprejudice. Here, we discuss factors that can undermine that motivation and allow
\ndiscriminatory behavior to occur. The third section examines how people
\nreact to having acted in a prejudiced manner.
\nThe Relation between Prejudice and Discrimination
\n& we noted earlier, when asked what causes interpersonal discrimination, most
\npeople would probably reply “prejudice.” If that were the case. one would expect
\nto find a strong correlation between people’s prejudiced attitudes and their
\npropensity to engage in discriminatory behavior. However, when John Dovidio
\nand his colleagues (Dovidio. Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996) reviewed the
\nresults of 23 studies of the prejudice-discrimination relationship, they found an
\naverage of correlation of r ;:::: .32. A meta-analysis of 60 studies found a similar
\ncorrelation of r ;:::: .36, but also found a stronger relationship between prejudice
\nand the intention to discrintinate, r = .45 (Schutz & Six, 1996). That is, the relationship
\nbetween prejudice and what people say they will do is stronger than the
\nrelationship between prejudice and what they actually do. Even when researchers
\nfind fairly high correlations between prejudice and discrimination, about
\n30 percent of the participants in those studies exhibited behavior that was inconsistent
\nwith their attitudes (Duckitt, 1994). Although results such as these might
\nseem discouraging, they are, in fact, consistent with the results of research on the
\nrelationship between attitudes and behavior in general. For example, Stephen
\nKraus (1995) found an average correlation of r = .38 between attitudes and behavior
\nacross a wide variety of domains. As William Graziano and has colleagues
\nnote (Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007), it is one thing to express negative
\nattitudes toward a social group, but another thing to actually discriminate
\nagainst someone. Hence, “the lake of prejudice is wider and deeper than the
\nsmaller pool of discrimination, even if the forruer feeds the latter” (p. 572). As
\nit turns out, prejudice is related to discrimination (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1998),
\nbut the relationship is not a silTIple one: A number of factors influence the
\nstrength of this attitude-behavior relationship including personal stereotypes,
\nattitude-behavior correspondence, and perceived social support for the attitude.
\nPersonal Stereotypes. Recall from Chapter 3 that stereotypes can exist at two
\nlevels. Social stereotypes are characteristics of groups that most people in a society
\nagree on and personal stereotypes are individuals’ beliefs about group characteristics.
\nPersonal stereotypes usually overlap with social stereotypes, but some
\nof their content may be different. Similarly, people recognize the social norms
\n376 CHAPTER 10
\nabout prejudice toward particular groups, but may not personally agree with
\nthose nonns. Replicating the results shown in Table 10.1, William Graziano
\nand colleagues (2007) found that people recognized that there are social norms
\nwhich detelnllne whether prejudice toward particular groups is acceptable or unacceptable.
\nHowever, they also reported that people personally found it even
\nmore acceptable to discriminate against groups such as rapists and terroriststhose
\ngroups for which society approves prejudice.
\nPrejudiced people also are lllore likely to discriminate against those outgroup
\nlllembers who fIt their personal stereotype than against those who do not. In a
\nstudy of this process, Shawna Ramsey and her colleagues (Ramsey, Lord,
\nWallace, & Pugh, 1994) assessed college students’ personal stereotypes of former
\nmental patients. Several weeks later, the students read about a fonner mental
\npatient who either closely matched their personal stereotype or who was very
\ndifferent from their stereotype hut matched other students’ stereotype. For
\nexample, some students stereotyped fonner luental patients in tenns of schizophrenic
\nsymptonls whereas others stereotyped them in tenus of depressive symptoms.
\nThe students then chose from a list of activities those they would be
\nwilling to engage in with the fonner luental patient, such as showing the person
\nthe university library or taking the person to a party. For students who read
\nabout a person who fit their personal stereotype, Ramsey and her colleagues
\nfound a correlation of r = .43 between attitudes toward fonner mental patients
\nand the nunlber of activities in which they were willing to engage. For students
\nwho read about a person who did not fit their personal stereotype, the correlation
\nwas only r = -.07.
\n[
\nAttitude-behavior Correspondence. The tenn attitude~behavior correspondence
\nrefers to how well an attitude matches, as it were, the behavior it is supposed to
\nbe associated with. A higher degree of correspondence results in a higher
\nattitude-behavior correlation. One type of correspondence that is important
\nto the prejudice-discrimination relationship is the degree to which people can
\ncontrol either their responses on the attitude measure or the behavior being
\nmeasured. Dovidio and his colleagues (1996) noted that explicit paperand-
\npencil measures of prejudice assess controllable responses: People can think
\nabout how they want to respond and carefully choose their responses, so social
\ndesirability response bias can affect their answers; however, implicit attitude
\nmeasures assess relatively uncontrollable attitudes, so there is less opportunity
\nfor social desirability response bias to affect responses (see Chapter 2).
\nSimilarly, some behaviors, such as the content of what a person says, are controllable
\nand so can be affected by a social desirability response bias, whereas
\nother behaviors, such as many nonverbal behaviors, are more automatic and
\ndifficult to control and so are less likely to be influenced by a social desirability
\nresponse bias. Drawing on the correspondence principle, Dovidio and his colleagues
\nproposed that scores on controllable measures of prejudice should be
\ncorrelated with controllable behaviors but not with automatic behaviors and
\nthat scores on liuplicit measures of prejudice should be correlated with automatic
\nbehaviors but not with controllable behaviors.
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 377
\nJohn Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami, and Samuel Gaertner (2002) tested this hypothesis
\nin a study in which White college students completed explicit and implicit
\nmeasures of prejudice. The participants then discus,.<;ed several race-neutral
\ntopics, such as what personal belongings were most useful to bring to college,
\nwith a Black student confederate who played the role of another research participant.
\nThe interactions were videotaped, and raters later coded the White students’
\nbehaviors for the frienclliness of their (automatic) nonverbal behaviors
\nand for the friendliness of what they said (controllable behavior). The researchers
\nfound that, as they had expected, implicit prejudice correlated with nonverbal
\nfriendliness but not with verbal friendliness and explicit prejudice correlated
\nwith verbal friendliness but not with nonverbal friendliness. Similarly, Denise
\nSekaquaptewa and her colleagnes (Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, &
\nvon Hippe!, 2003) found that an implicit measure of prejudice was related to
\nWhite students’ tendency to ask a Black student stereotypic rather than nonstereotypic
\nquestions from a list provided by the researchers. Because students were
\nunaware that the questions varied in how stereo typic they were, this was considered
\nan implicit behavioral measure.
\nAttitude-behavior correspondence also can be assessed by the degree to
\nwhich people’s general attitudes toward a social group nlatch behaviors toward
\na specific group member. For example, Michael Olson and Russell Fazio (2007)
\nstudied whether White students’ implicit attitudes toward Blacks in general corresponded
\nto their attitudes toward a specific Black person. They reasoned that
\nwhen these attitudes were similar-that is, if a White student had positive attitudes
\ntoward Blacks, in general, and also liked a specific Black person-the
\nspeaker’s nonverbal responses should indicate little discomfort. However, if this
\nsame White student disliked the specific Black person, it would be evident in
\nnonverbal behaviors, such as self-touching and speech interruptions. Results supported
\ntheir hypothesis; regardless of whether implicit attitudes toward Blacks
\nwere positive or negative, when reactions to a specific Black person differed
\nfrom those implicit attitudes, nonverbal “leakage” occurred. Hence, even nonprejudiced
\npeople can appear prejudiced if they dislike a specific person.
\nPerceived Social Support. The term perceived social support refers to the extentl
\nto which people believe that others share their attitudes and opinions. Generally,J
\nattitudes for which people perceive more social support are more closely related
\nto their behavior than attitudes for which they perceive less social support. For
\nexample, Gretchen Sechrist and Charles Stangor (2001) pretested White college
\nstudents’ level of racial prejudice and selected those with high or low scores for
\nparticipation in a study conducted several weeks later. fu part of the study, participants
\nlearned that either 81 percent of the students at their university agreed
\nwith their racial attitudes (high social support condition) or that 19 percent agreed
\nwith them O-ow social support condition). The researchers then used what is
\nknown as the waiting room ploy to assess discrimination: The research apparatus
\n“malfunctioned” and the experimenter asked the participant to wait in the hallway,
\nwhere seven chairs were lined up in a row, with a female African American
\nstudent seated in the chair next to the door to the laboratory. Discrimination was
\n378 CHAPTER 10
\nassessed by how lllany chairs away from the Black student the participant sat.
\nNot surprisingly, the students who had scored low on prejudice sat closer to
\nthe Black student than those who had scored high, an average of 2 seats versus
\n3.9 seats away. In addition, perceived social support affected the behavior of prejudiced
\nparticipants, with those who thought that most of their fellow students
\nalso were prejudiced sitting farther from the Black woman than those who
\nthought that most of their peers were unprejudiced, an average of 4.3 seats versus
\n3.4 seats. Perceived social support had no effect on seating distance of the students
\nlow on prejudice, Moreover, the prejudice-discrimination correlation was
\nlarger for the students high in prejudice, r = .76, than for the students low in
\nprejudice, r = .33.
\nRegressive Prejudice
\nAs we discussed in Chapter 5, under some conditions people are motivated to
\navoid appearing prejudiced. However, doing so requires a great deal of mental
\nwork: One must recognize that prejudice might be affecting one’s behavior and
\nthen consciously change that behavior to produce a nonprejudiced response
\n(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Although, this process might become automatic
\nfor some people (see Devine, 2002; Plant, 1998), others have to work at it.
\nThe laborious nature of this process is demonstrated by research showing that
\npeople experience a sense of relief when they are allowed to express prejudices
\nthey have been controlling (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Thus, it is not surptising
\nthat even people who score low on measures of prejudice report sometimes
\n_making prejudiced responses toward members of other groups (Monteith &
\n[
\nVails, 1998; Vails, Ashbum-Nardo, & Monteith, 2002). That is, even people
\nwho see themselves as unprejudiced and who score low on measures of prejudice
\nsometimes find thenlselves acting in prejudiced ways. Box 10.2 provides an example
\nof how an everyday event can trigger prejudiced reactions even in unprej-
\nCldiced people. Such expressions of prejudice by people who are otherwise low
\nin prejudice are labeled regressive racism or regressive prejudice (Rogers &
\nPrentice-Dunn, 1981). Regressive prejudice occurs because controlling prejudiced
\nresponses requires attention and mental resources; when those resources
\nare not available or when the control process is mort-circuited people regress
\nfrom controlling prejudice to expressing it. This section examines some of the
\nfactors that can produce regressive prejudice.
\nControl over Behavior. To avoid responding in a certain way, people must be
\nable to control the behavior. As we noted earlier, some behaviors, such as nonverbal
\nresponses, are less under voluntary control than others, such as the content of
\nwhat one says. Consequendy, people may give off nonverbal cues that imply dislike
\nof or discomfort with a nlember of a stereotyped group even while trying to
\nbehave in a positive manner (see, for example, Dovidio et al., 2002). In one study
\nof this process, Dovidio and his colleagues (2002) tested White reseatch participants
\nfor implicit prejudice against Mrican Americans. Each participant then held a
\n3-minute conversation with a Black student who was working for the researchers;
\nMost research on stereotype arousal uses laboratory
\nmethods, so you might wonder how well those
\nprocedures generalize to everyday life. Consider the
\nfollowing commercial that was televised in 1995.
\nThe commercial opens with a picture of a poker~
\nfaced, vaguely threatening and ominous Black man
\nwith his head shaved that takes up the left two~thirds
\nof the screen. After a moment, the following lines appear
\none at a time down the right side of the screen,
\nwith a pause between each:
\nMichael Conrad.
\nMale. Age 28.
\nTrafficking.
\nArmed Robbery.
\nAssault and Battery,
\nExtortion,
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 379
\nRape.
\nMurder.
\nApprehended
\nJanuary 1994 by
\nJoseph Cruthers,
\nShown here. (Urban Alliance on Race Relations,
\n1995)
\nBy the time “Apprehended” appears, most people
\nassume the picture is that of the criminal, Michael
\nConrad. When they learn that the picture is that of a
\npoliceman, they feel both surprised and upset that
\nthey have operated on the social stereotype that Black
\nmen are dangerous and made the racist assumption
\nthat the pictured Black man must be a criminal (Fazio &
\nHilden, 2001).
\nbecause the conversation was about a race-neutral topic, the White participants
\nwere presumably motivated to act in a nonprejudiced manner. However, conlpared
\nto the nonverbal behavior of participants with lower prejudice scores, the
\nbehavior of those with higher scores was rated as less friendly by both the participants’
\nBlack conversational partners and White raters who saw videos of the participants’
\nside of the conversation. Thus, when people hold stereotyped views of
\nother groups, those views may “leak out” through their nonverbal behavior even
\nwhile they are trying to control the effects of those stereotypes on other behaviors
\n(see also Sekaquaptewa et al., 2003).
\nCognitive Demands. As we saw in Chapter 4, cognitive demands, such as
\ntrying to remember an 8-digit number or working under time pressure, make
\nit difficult for people to control the effects of stereotypes and prevent stereotypes
\nfrom affecting their judgments. The same processes affect the expression of prejudice:
\nEven for people who are motivated to control their prejudices, cognitive
\ndemands can reduce their mental resources and so reduce control. To demonstrate
\nthis effect, Daniel Wegner and his colleagues (reported in Wegner, 1994)
\nhad research participants complete sentences about women such as “Women
\nwho go with a lot of men are … ” (Wegner, 1994, p. 47). Half the participants
\nwere instructed not to be sexist in their responses and half received no special instructions;
\nin addition, half the participants in each of these groups were put under
\ntime pressure to respond and half were not. Wegner and his colleagues found that
\nparticipants who had been instructed to avoid sexist responses (and therefore were
\nnlotivated to do so) and were not under time pressure provided fewer sexist responses
\n(such as “sluts” to the sentence stem just given) than participants who
\n380 CHAPTER 10
\nreceived no such instructions. However, time pressure undermined the ability to
\ncontrol prejudice of the participants who were motivated to be nonsexist: They
\nmade sexist responses at the same rate as the participants who were not motivated
\nto control their sexism.
\nDisinhibitors. Because motivation to control prejudice derives from social
\nnorms to avoid being prejudiced, factors that reduce people’s motivation to
\ncOlllply with social nonns can also reduce motivation to control prejudice and
\ndisinhibit its expression. Two factors that motivate nonn compliance are the desire
\nto avoid the social punislunents that other people would mete out for violating
\nnorms and the desire to receive the rewards that others provide for nonn
\ncompliance. As a result, when people are anonymous and cannot be identified,
\nthey are less motivated to cOlnply with nonns than when they are identifiable
\n(see, for example, Mym, 2008 – Affordable Custom Essay Writing Service | Write My Essay from Pro Writers). Edward and Marcia Donnerstein (1976) tested
\nthe effects of anonymity on the release of prejudice in a study in which White
\nresearch palticipants gave what they thought were electric shocks to a Black or
\nWhite confederate for making errors on a learning task. Aggressive discrimination
\nwas accessed in two ways. Overt, direct aggression was measured by the
\nsetting on a dial that indicated shock level. Covert, indirect aggression was measured
\nby shock duration-that is, how long participants pressed the button that
\nsupposedly delivered the shock. Half the participants thought that their behavior
\nwas being monitored and half thought they were anonymous.
\nResults showed that anonymous participants showed lllore direct aggression
\ntoward the Black than the Wbite person, indicating that anonymity facilitated
\ndiscriminatory behavior. Moreover, in contrast to their anonymous peers, participants
\nwho were identifiable favored the Black person by showing less direct
\naggression toward him than toward the White person, perhaps reflecting a motivation
\nnot to appear prejudiced. However, nonanonymous participants showed a
\nhigher level of indirect aggression toward the Black person than the White person,
\nperhaps because covert expression of prejudice is seen as more socially
\nacceptable.
\nStrong emotions also can lead people to ignore social norms. In another
\nstudy of interracial aggression, angered and cahn White research participants
\nhad the opportunity to administer electric shocks to a Black or White person
\n(Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981). Results paralleled those Donnerstein and
\nDonnerstein (1976) found for anonymity: Angry participants gave stronger
\nshocks to the Black person than to the White person, whereas calm participants
\ngave stronger shocks to the White person. Alcohol consumption is another notorious
\ndisinhibitor of compliance with social nonns. Not sulprisingly, then,
\nLaurie O’Brien and her colleagues (as reported in Crandall & Eshleman, 2003)
\nfound a correlation of .31 between alcohol intoxication (as measured by
\nBreathalyzer tests of people leaving bars) and willingness to express prejudice
\nagainst racial and religious groups.
\nThe expression of prejudice is a forbidden act, but the implied approval of
\nan authority figure can release normative restraints. For example, Donnerstein
\nand Donnerstein (1976) reported a study in which White participants observed
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 381
\na peer delivering an intense electric shock to a Black person. Some of the
\nparticipants then saw the experimenter overseeing the study severely reprimand
\nthe person for delivering such a strong shock; other participants saw the experimenter
\nignore the shock level, thus implicitly giving approval to it. Participants
\nin a control condition saw a shock being administered but did not know its
\nintensity. All the participants then took part in the experiment. Compared to
\nthe control participants, those who saw a peer reprimanded for administering a
\nstrong shock gave weaker shocks, but those who saw no reprimand gave much
\nmore severe shocks.
\nThe perceived costs and rewards in a situation also can influence whether
\npeople feel comfortable ignoring social norms, such as the nonn to help others
\nin need. When a motorist is stranded on a highway, for example, potential
\nhelpers must decide whether the costs of helping, such as effort, time, or
\npotential risk, outweigh the rewards of helping, such feeling good about relieving
\nanother person’s suffering. Donald Saucier, Carol Miller, and Nicole
\nDoucet (2005) reasoned that, in such situations, discrimination against Blacks
\nwould be more likely if people could justify the failure to help by detennining
\nthat the costs were too high. These researchers conducted a meta-analysis of
\nstudies assessing whether Black and White people received help in a variety of
\nsituations. Results showed no evidence of universal discrimination against
\nBlack people who needed help. However, in situations where the failure to
\nhelp could be easily justified, such as when helping would take a longer time,
\ninvolved more risk, or was otherwise difficult, Black people received less help
\nthan did White people.
\nFinally, other people’s behavior can disinhibit prejudice. Linda Simon and
\nJeff Greenberg (1996) created a situation in which four White research participants
\nand a Black confederate worked in separate cubicles on a creativity task.
\nThe participants had been earlier detennined to have positive, negative, or
\nambivalent attitudes toward Mrican Americans. The participants labeled their
\nanswers with a code letter they wrote on a yellow sticky note attached to the
\nanswer sheet. They then evaluated what they thought were the other participants’
\nresponses (actually standard responses created by the researchers) that the
\nexperimenter passed around one at a time. Some participants received a list with
\nno comment added to the sticky note, others received a list with a handwritten
\naddition to the sticky note that read “1 can’t believe they stuck us with this Black
\nperson! (please erase this)” (the ethnic criticism condition), and a third group of
\nparticipants received a list with a note that read “I can’t believe they stuck us
\nwith this nigger! (please erase this)” (the derogatory ethnic label condition). k
\nshown in Figure 10.1, participants with positive attitudes toward African
\nAmericans were unaffected by the comment nlanipulation, giving the Black
\nparticipant’s contribution a rating of about six in all conditions. Consistent with
\nthe theory of ambivalent prejudice, racially ambivalent participants inflated their
\nratings in the derogatory label condition, presumably to emphasize that they
\nwere not prejudiced. However, anti-Black participants who had been primed
\nby the derogatory label felt free to express their prejudice, resulting in lower
\nratings than in the other two conditions.
\n382 (HAPTER 10
\n8,—————————————,
\n7
\n6
\n5
\nNo comment Ethnic crtitcism Derogatory ethnic
\nlabel
\nType of comment overheard
\n\u2022 Pro-Black participants
\nAnti-Black participants
\n.. Ambivalent participants
\nFIG U R E 10.1 Priming as a Releaser of Regressive Prejudice
\nWhite research participants either saw no comment about a Black confederate or read a note with a critical comment
\nthat induded a reference to race (“Black person”) or a critical comment that included a derogator ethnic label
\n(“nigger”). Ratings of the Black person made by participants who had positive attitudes toward Blacks were not
\naffected by the type of comment read. However, participants with negative attitudes toward Blacks made more negative
\nratings when they read the derogatory ethnic labeL In contrast, the ratings made by participants characterized by
\nambivalent prejudice were more positive when they read the derogatory ethnic labeL
\nMoral Credentials. When we, the authors, were growing up, it was not unusual
\nfor a White person who was accused of anti-Black prejudice to defend
\nhim- or herself by saying something along the lines of “How can you call me
\nIprejudiced Why, some of my best friends are Black!” The claim of friendship
\ntwas used as a kind of credential to establish the person’s lack of prejudice.
\nMore recently, Benoit Morrin and Dale Miller (2001) have suggested that complying
\nwith the nonn to avoid prejudiced behavior can have an ironic effect: It
\ncan increase the likelihood of behaving in a prejudiced way in the future by re- I ~UCing the motivation to appear unprejudiced. They believe that acting in a
\nnonprejudiced way establishes what they call moral credentials by allowing people
\nto show others that they are not prejudiced and by reinforcing their own beliefS
\nthat they are not prejudiced. Having established to themselves and to others that
\nthey are not prejudiced allows them to act in a prejudiced manner if they are
\ndisposed to do so; if challenged, they can point to their earlier behavior as evidence
\nof their lack of prejudice.
\nMonin and Miller (2001) tested their theory in a set of studies in which
\nsome research participants could establish their unprejudiced credentials by
\neither rejecting a set of stereotypical statements about women or by selecting a
\nwell-qualified woman or African American for ajob. Other participants had no
\nopportunity to act in a nonprejudiced manner. All participants then rated the
\nextent to which they thought a given job (such as construction foreman or
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 383
\npolice officer) was better suited for a man or woman, or a Black person or a
\nWhite person. In all three experiments, participants who earlier had had the
\nopportunity to establish that they were nonprejudiced rated the job in the second
\npart of the study as better filled by a man or White person. Monin and
\nMiller (2001) concluded that “the more confident people are that their past
\nbehavior reveals a lack of prejudice, the less they will worry that their future
\nbehavior is, or can be construed as, prejudiced …. By fostering self-image
\nsecurity … the establishment of moral credentials eUlboldens the [person] to
\nrespond honestly in circumstances in which political correctness pressure militates
\nagainst honest expression” (p. 40).
\nReactions to Having Acted in a Prejudiced Manner
\nGiven that situations can arise that can lead people to make prejudiced responses,
\nhow do they then react to having acted in a prejudiced manner The initial
\nresearch on this topic focused on differences between people high and low in
\nexplicit prejudice. Patricia Devine and her colleagues (Devine, Monteith,
\nZuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Zuwerink,
\nMonteith, Devine, & Cook, 1996) hypothesized that people with nonprejudiced
\nself-images who act or think in a prejudiced manner experience a discrepancy
\nbetween how they think they should respond (that is, in a nonprejudiced manner)
\nand how they do respond (that is, in a prejudiced manner). This discrepancy
\nthen leads to feelings of discomfort and guilt. To test this hypothesis, they examined
\ndifferences in how people believed they should respond in interactions with
\nan African American or a gay man and how they thought they would actually
\nrespond. Not surprisingly, Devine and her colleagues found that people low in
\nprejudice had more stringent personal standards for nonprejudiced behavior than
\ndid people high in prejudice. Nonetheless, people both high and low in prejudice
\nfelt discomfort over discrepancies between how they thought they should
\nact and how they thought they would act. However, whereas people low in
\nprejudice felt guilty about their discrepancies, people high in prejudice did not.
\nRather than feeling negative toward themselves over their discrepancies, people
\nhigh in prejudice experienced negative emotions about other people, such as
\nfeeling angry and irritated at them, perhaps because they believed that other people
\nexpected them to be unprejudiced and would pressure them to behave in
\nunprejudiced ways.
\nIn addition to discovering their own prejudiced behavior, people may be
\nconfronted by others who point out behaviors that could indicate prejudice.
\nHow do people respond then Alexander Czopp and Margo Monteith (2003)
\nfound that the response depended on two factors. The first was the type of prejudice
\ninvolved. People felt more concerned and guilty over racial prejudice than
\nover sexism. In fact, “the predominant evaluative sentiment resulting from confrontations
\nabout gender-biased behavior was amusement” (Czopp & Monteith,
\n2003, p. 541), suggesting that many people do not take gender-based prejudice
\nvery seriously. The second factor was the person who did the confronting.
\nPeople were nlore likely to dismiss an accusation of prejudice when it came
\n384 (HAPTER 10
\nfrom a menlber of the group toward which their prejudiced behavior was
\ndirected than when it came [r0111 a member of their own group. Czopp and
\nMonteith suggested that this reaction occurred because people felt less threatened
\nwhen confronted by a member of their own group. Thus, it appears that the
\ngreatest guilt and discomfort over acting in a prejudiced manner is elicited
\nwhen people have a high internal 111_otivation to control prejudice and when
\nthey become aware of their prejudiced responses themselves or have those responses
\npointed out by a member of their own group.
\nResearchers have found that guilt over having acted in ways that are discrepant
\nfrom one’s self-image leads to action that reaflinns that image (Steele, 1988).
\nInterestingly, there seems to be no recent research on whether feelings of guilt
\nabout having acted in a prejudiced nlanner affect future behavior, but several
\nolder studies have done so. For example, Steven Shemlan and Larry Gorkin
\n(1980) induced some research participants to nlake a sexist decision by leading
\nthem to assume that a surgeon depicted in a story was male rather than female;
\nparticipants in a control condition nude no such decision. Later, all participants
\ntook part in a seemingly unrelated study in which they acted as mock jurors in a
\nsex discrimination case involving a woman who alleged that she had been refused
\na job because of her sex, with a man being hired instead. Shennan and
\nGorkin found that, conlpared to participants in the control condition, those
\nwho earlier had been induced to make the sexist decision were more likely to
\nsee the hiring of the man as unjusti\u00a3ed and were more likely to decide the case
\nin favor of the woman.
\nPerhaps more telling are the results of an eXperll11ent conducted by Donald
\nDutton and Robert Lake (1973). Based on a pretest, they selected 80 students
\nwho were low on prejudice and who had also rated equality as a value that
\nwas important to them. The participants thought they were taking part in a study
\nof physiological responsiveness to vatious stimuli and that high physiological
\narousal indicated the presence of unconscious negative attitudes toward a stimulus.
\nWhile their physiological responses were recorded, participants watched a
\nseries of slides that included pictures of Black people. Half the participants received
\nfeedback that indicated unusually high responsiveness to the picture of
\nBlack people relative to neutral stimuli (thus threatening their nonprejudiced
\nself-images) whereas the other participants received feedback that indicated similar
\nresponses to the two types of stimuli (thus leaving their nonprejudiced selfimages
\nunthreatened). All palticipants were paid $2.00 in quarters (to ensure that
\nthey had change for what happened next) for their participation. On leaving the
\nbuilding, participants were approached by either a Black or a White panhandler
\nwho asked “Can you spare some change for some food” Eighty-five percent
\nof the participants in the self-image threat condition gave money to the Black
\npanhandler compared to 45 percent of those in the nonthreat condition. In
\naddition, the participants in the threat condition gave more money (an average
\nof 47 cents) than the participants in the nonthreat condition (an average of
\n17 cents). Threat condition did not affect donations to the White panhandler.
\nBy the way, if 47 cents does not seenl like much money, it is equivalent to
\nabout $2.30 today when corrected for inflation. Thus, when people who have
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 385
\nnonprejudiced self-images have that image called into question, they feel guilty
\nand that guilt motivates them to reaffiun their self-images of low prejudice by
\nacting in an especially nonprejudiced manner,
\nDISCRIMINATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
\nAs we noted in Chapter 1, organizational discrimination occurs when “thQ
\npractices, rules, and policies of formal organizations, such as corporations or government
\nagencies” result in different outcomes for members of different groups
\n(Benokraitis & Feagin, 1995, p. 44). As we also saw in Chapter 1, although more
\nthan 40 years have passed since the enactment of the landmark Civil Rights Act
\nof 1964, racial\/ethnic and gender discrimination still exist in the workplace, We
\nhave divided our discussion of this discrimination into two parts, The first part
\nexamines employment discrimination at the organizational leveL The second part
\nexamines some of the psychological variables that influence the discriminatory
\nbehavior of individual decision makers, As you read this section, bear in mind
\nthat although the eifects of gender and racial bias tend to be small (see, for example,
\nBarrett & Morris, 1993), small effects can cumulate over time to have a
\nlarge impact on career outcomes, For example, Richard Martell, David Lane,
\nand Cynthia Emrich (1996) conducted a computer simulation that modeled the
\npotential effects of gender discrimination in an organization that had eight levels
\nof promotion, The simulation started with an equal number of male and female
\nnew employees. Althoughjob qualifications vatied among both male and female
\nemployees, they were, on the average, the same for both groups; however, there
\nwas a very small pro-male bias for promotions at each leveL Mter the simulation
\nhad run through all eight levels of promotion, 65 percent of the top-level jobs
\nwere filled by men, Therefore, even when discrimination has a small effect on
\nanyone decision, it can have larger effects in the long mn, In addition,
\nexperiencing disctimination can have profound psychological and physical affects,
\na topic we discuss in Chapter 11,
\nOrganizational Research
\nOrganizational researchers have conducted an enormous amount of research
\nto determine the forms discrimination takes in organizations and the ways in
\nwhich discrimination is related to characteristics of organizations, As we will
\nsee, racial discrimination has been found at many points in the employment
\nprocess, including hiring, job performance evaluations, and promotions, There
\nappears to be less gender discrimination in hiring and performance evaluation,
\nbut evidence still supports gender discrimination in promotion. Let us look at
\nthe results of some of that research,
\nHiring. The first step in the employment process is hiring, so quite a bit of researc has been conducted on the hiring process, most of it focusing on racial discriminaJtion.
\nOne technique that has been used to study this topic is the employment audit.
\nIn an employment audit, members of two groups are matched on appearance,
\n386 CHAPTER 10
\neducation, and relevant experience, and then sent to apply for the same job. Thus,
\none White person and one Black person, both with the same qualifications, dressed
\nsimilarly, and trained to act similarly, would apply for the same job. The dependent
\nvariable in such studies is who is lucre likely to be hired, the Black applicant or the
\nWhite applicant A review this research showed that for the most part, Black and
\nWhite applicants experience the same outcome: in 68 percent of the cases neither
\nwas offered ajob and in 15 percent of the cases both were offered ajob (Heckman,
\n[~998). However, when discrimination did occur, it favored the White applicant:
\noverall, 27 percent of White applicants were offered jobs compared to 21 percent
\nof Black applicants. That is, a White applicant was 1.3 times more likely to get a
\njob than was a Black applicant.
\nThe results of an employment audit study conducted by Marc Bendick,
\nCharles Jackson, and Victor Reinoso (1994) illustrate some specific forms that discrimination
\ncan take. For example, they found that although employers accepted
\napplications from Black and White job seekers at about the Sa111e rate-95 percent
\nfor Whites and 92 percent for Blacks–48 percent of the White applicants were
\noffered interviews cOlnpared to 40 percent of the Black applicants. When more
\nthan one opening was available and the job was offered to both applicants, Black
\napplicants were offered lower starting salaries. In addition, Black applicants were
\nmore likely to be steered toward a job at a lower level in the organization than
\nthe one they had applied for. Bendick and his colleagues also found that discrimination
\nwas more likely to occur when applications were made through employment
\nagencies rather than directly to the company. One reason for this finding
\nmight be that the companies using employment agencies cued the agencies that
\nthey only wanted to see White applicants. For example, evidence was presented
\nin one employment discrimination lawsuit that employers would use tenns such as
\n“all-AInerican,” “front-office appearance,” and “cOlporate image” in the job descriptions
\nthey sent to employment agencies to indicate that they wanted to see
\nonly White job candidates (Wolff, 1989).
\nr
\n– One shortcoming of employment audits is that it is impossible to perfectly
\nmatch a Black and a White applicant in every regard: They are different people
\nwith different personalities, so it is always possible that any differences in the responses
\nthey received are a result of their individual characteristics rather than of
\ntheir racial group membership. Therefore, researchers sometimes use matched
\nmailed-in resumes to see whether a Black or White applicant is more likely to
\nbe called for an interview. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan (2003)
\nconducted a large-scale study of this kind, sending out aInlOst 5,000 resumes
\nin response to 1,300 jobs advertised in newspapers in Chicago and Boston.
\nThey manipulated three independent variables using infonnation in the
\nresumes: applicant race, applicant gender and applicants’ qualifications. They
\nmanipulated race and gender by varying the applicant’s first name: “White”
\nnames included Kristin, Carrie, Brad, and Jay; “Black” names included Ebony,
\nLatonya, Jennaine, and Leroy. The researchers chose the names based on the
\nfrequency of their appearance in birth records and checked the racial associations
\nthe names elicited by asking survey respondents to rate how “Black” and
\n“White” each name sounded.
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 387
\nBertrand and Mullainathan (2003) found that, overall, only 17 percent of the
\napplicants were called for an interview; however, 10,1 percent of the White applicants
\nwere called compared to 6.7 percent of the Black applicants, In other
\nwords, White applicants received an interview offer for every 10 resumes submitted,
\nwhereas Black applicants had to submit 15 resumes to get an interview,
\nIn addition, although White applicants with high quality resumes were more
\nlikely to be called than White applicants with low quality resumes, 11.3 percent
\ncompared to 8,8 percent, resume quality had virtually no effect on the response
\nrate for Black applicants: 7,0 percent for high quality resumes and 6.4 percent for
\nlow quality resumes. Note that a White applicant with a low quality resume was
\n26 percent more likely to be called for an interview (8.8 percent) than a Black
\napplicant with a high quality resume (7.0 percent). Resnlts were similar in
\nBoston and Chicago and for six types of jobs ranging from clerical worker to
\nmanager across six industries, Bertrand and Mullainathan put their results in this
\ncontext: “in our sample, [having] a White name is equivalent to about 8 additional
\nyears of [job-related] experience” in being called for an interview (p. 10).
\nAn important part of the hiring process is the job interview, A review 31
\nstudies of racial group differences in employment interview outcomes showed
\nthat, on the average, Whites received higher ratings than either Blacks or
\nHispanics (Huffcutt & Roth, 1998). Such racial differences in evaluations were
\ngreater for low level jobs than for higher level jobs and discrimination increased
\nas the proportion of Black applicants increased. Thus, White job applicants are
\nmore likely to get interviews than are their equally qualified Black peers and,
\nonce interviewed, are more likely to get high ratings on suitability for the job.
\nBox 10.3 relates one Black man’s experience in applying for a low-level job and
\na few of his experiences on that job,
\nLawrence Graham (1995), a highly successful Harvard
\neducated lawyer, set out to uncover what life was like as
\nan employee at one ofthe all~White country clubs in
\nGreenwich, Connecticut, In his essay on his experiences,
\nhe first describes applying for work, His goal was to be a
\nwaiter and he applied for this job at five country clubs,
\nAs he writes, “During each of my phone conversations, I
\nmade sure that I spoke to the person who would make
\nthe hiring decision, I also confirmed exactly how many
\nwaiter positions were available, and I arranged a
\npersonal interview within forty minutes to an hour of
\nthe conversation, just to be sure that they could not tell
\nme that no such job was available” (p, 4). Upon arrival
\nat each of the five clubs, he was told either that there
\nwere no openings or that he was not qualified. One
\nreceptionist threatened to call security. Another
\nemployer firmly insisted he could not have been the
\nperson she talked to on the phone, No one would even
\naccept his application for a waiter position.
\nGraham did secure a job as a busboy at one of the
\nclubs. In that role, people made negative comments
\nabout “Negroes” and other minority groups right in
\nfront of him. Example comments included “My
\ngoodness. , ‘ . That busboy had diction like an educated
\nWhite person” (p. 12). He learned that the staff
\nquarters were unselfconsciously called the “Monkey
\nHouse” because at one time all the workers had been
\nBlack. At one point, he was instructed to find the
\n“\u8bba\u6587\u5e2e\u52a9\/\u8bba\u6587\u5199\u4f5c\u670d\u52a1\/\u8d1f\u62c5\u5f97\u8d77\u6211\u53ca\u65f6\u63d0\u4ea4\u6211\u6700\u597d\u7684\u8d28\u91cf – Chinaman,” a supply clerk, and was told it was easy to
\nremember his location because it was right next to the
\nlaundry. These and many similar experiences took
\nplace in less than a one~month period. They also took
\nplace in the 1980s, not,. as you might expect by reading
\nthem, during the pre-dvil~rights era of the 1960s.
\n388 (HAPTER 10
\nThere is less research on gender differences in hiring than on racial
\ndifferences. However, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) found that male and
\nfemale applicants were called for interviews at about the same rate, 17.2 percent
\nfor women and 15.3 percent for men. Also, Heather Davison and Michael
\nBurke (2000) reviewed 49 studies in which participants evaluated the suitability
\nof equally qualifled male or female applicants for a job. Overall, they found
\nvirtually no discrimination, although men tended to receive slightly higher
\nsuitability ratings for male-stereotyped jobs and women tended to receive
\nslightly higher suitability ratings for female-stereotyped jobs. Thus, the research
\nindicates that currently there is little gender discrimination in the hiring process,
\nHowever, Davison and Burke noted that research reviews published in
\n1979 and 1988 did find evidence of discrimination, suggesring that gender discrimination
\nhas decreased over time. For example, the 1988 review (Olian,
\nSchwab, & Haberfield, 1988) found that gender accounted for 4 percent of
\nthe variance in hiring evaluations whereas the 2000 review found that it
\naccounted for less than 1 percent.
\nThere is, however, one important factor that leads to gender discrimination in
\nlllring: pregnancy. In the United States, discriminating against pregnant women violates
\nthe federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, passed in 1975 as an am_endment to
\nthe Civil Rights Act. However, the legality of this discrimination has not reduced the
\nnumber of claims filed with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission; in
\nfact, number of claims has increased nearly every year since 1992 (Equal
\nOpportunity Employment Conmllision, 2007). Evidence that pregnancy affects hiring
\ndecisions comes from a study of undergraduate business school students who evaluated
\njob applicants based on an interview. Although pregnant and nonpregnant
\napplicants were seen as equally qualified, pregnant women received lower hiring reconunendations
\nthan did nonpregnant applicants (Cunningham & Macan, 2007).
\nRaters also believed that the pregnant applicant would be absent more often and
\nwould be more likely to quit than the nonpregnant applicant.
\n[
\nPerformance Evaluation. Once a person is on the job, career success is
\nstrongly affected by perfonnance evaluations: Positive evaluations can lead to
\nvaluable training opportunities, promotions, and pay raises, whereas poor evalua~
\nons can lead to losing one’s job. Chieh-Chen Bowen, Janet Swim, and Rick
\nJacobs (2000) reviewed 27 studies of gender differences in job perfonuance ratings
\nin organizations. They found that, overall, men and women received equal
\njob perfonnance ratings, although male evaluators tended to give somewhat
\nhigher ratings to men than to women. Unlike Davison and Burke (2000), who
\nfound that both men and women received slightly higher suitability ratings for
\nsex-stereotyped jobs, Bowen and her colleagues found that the sex typing of the
\njob was not related to perfonnance ratings. However, the sex stereotyping of the
\nitems on perfOlmance evaluation measures was related to the ratings: Men received
\nhigher ratings on measures that included mostly masculine-stereotyped items,
\nWOlnen received higher ratings on measures that included mostly femininestereotyped
\nitems, and men and women received equal ratings on Ineasures that
\ncontained mostly gender-neutral items. Bowen and colleagues also found that
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 389
\nsupervisors who had more opportunity to directly observe employees’ job performance
\ngave somewhat higher performance ratings to women. They concluded
\nthat “any overall gender discrimination that one might observe in the work force
\nis … not directly attributable to biases in performance appraisal” (Bowen et al.,
\n2000, p. 2206). However, their results do indicate that to the extent that perf ornunce
\nevaluations are made by Inen, especially men who do not directly observe
\ntheir employees’ perfonnance, and to the extent that an organizations’ performance
\nevaluations measures include masculine-stereotyped items, men will receive
\nhigher evaluations than women.
\nUnlike the situation for gender, race\/ethnicity does appear to affect job perfor n1.ance evaluations. Based on a review of 48 studies, Philip Roth, Allen HuffcuttJ,
\nand Philip Bobko (2003) found that White employees received higher evaluations
\nthan Black employees, although there were no differences in evaluations of
\nHispanic and White employees. Even when numerical ratings of job perfonnance
\nare the same for Black and White workers, the narrative comments that supervisors
\nmake about employee performance might be biased. For example, Patricia Thomas
\nand her colleagues (Thomas, Edwards, Perry, & David, 1998) compared the perfonnance
\nevaluation comments made by the supervisors of 582 male U.S. Navy
\nofficers who had received the highest nuulerical perfonnance rating. They fouud
\nthat White officers were more likely to be described as outstanding leaders and
\nwere more likely to be recommended for positions of command than were Black
\nofficers. In addition, White officers were more likely to be reconnnended for early
\npromotion and to be described as having characteristics that other research shows
\nlead to early promotion (Johnson, 2001). That is, promotion boards seem to use
\ncertain characteristics as cues when selecting officers for early promotion and evaluators
\nwere more likely to attribute those characteristics to White officers than to
\nBlack officers. Similarly, letters of reference for faculty positions in chemistry were
\nsimilar in length and, overall, were equally positive for male and female applicants.
\nHowever, letters supporting male candidates contained more standout words, such
\nas ”Inost” gifted and “rising” star than did letters supporting female candidates
\n(Schmader, Whitehead, & Wysocki, 2007).
\nAlthough racial group differences in job performance evaluations might reflect
\nracial prejudice, they nright also be accurate, reflecting actual racial group differences
\nin average job performance. For example, Roth and his colleagues (2003)
\nfound that, compared to White workers, Black workers had lower average scores
\non objective measures of work pelfonnance, and that these differences were about
\ntwice as large as the differences in supervisor ratings. However, even though minority
\ngroup employees may actually perfonn at a son1.ewhat lower level than
\nWhite employees, that lower level of performance nright itself be a result of
\nprejudice and discrimination in the workplace (Greenhaus, Parasuramen, &
\nWonnley, 1990). That is, differences in race may lead to differences work experiences
\nwhich, in tum, affect job performance. The possibility is supported by the
\nfmding that although both White and Black supervisors give White workers
\nslightly higher performance ratings than Black workers, White supervisors see larger
\nperfom”nce differences than do Black supervisors (Stauffer & Buckley, 2005). That
\nsupervisor race affects perceptions of work performance suggests that subtle
\n390 CHAPTER 10
\nfactors may be affecting performance ratings. Research shows, for example, that
\nmembers of higher status groups-in this case, White supervisors-are more
\nlikely to favor the ingroup than are melnhers of low status groups-in this case,
\nBlack supervisors (George & Chattopadhyay, 2002); if so, this would give an
\nedge to White workers. Organizational researchers have not paid Inuch attention
\nto issues such as these (Brief, 1998); however, organizational theorists have proposed
\na number of workplace characteristics could adversely affect minority
\ngroup members’ job performance (Roberson & Block, 2001).
\n[
\nOne such characteristic is what Daniel Ilgen and Margaret Youtz (1986) called
\nthe lost opportunities dJect: “Differential treatment of minority and llUjOrity group
\nmembers may result in different on-the-job opportunities for these two groups. To
\nthe extent that minority group members have fewer and less favorable opportunities,
\nlower performance for minorities may result” (p. 317). For example, minority group
\nmanagers report that, compared to their White peers, their supervisors appear to
\nview them as less competent (such as by reviewing their work more fi’equently
\nand more closely) and give them less support and encouragement (Blank & Slipp,
\n1994; Greenhaus et al., 1990; James, 2000). Prejudiced Whites also can create a
\nchilly climate for their Black coworkers. For example, Black managers reported
\nfeeling less accepted than White coworkers by their White peers (Greenhaus et
\nal., 1990; Blank & Slipp, 1994). In addition, lower-level White workers showed
\nnlore work avoidance, such as absences, as the proportion of minority workers in
\ntheir work units increased and expressed stronger intentions to quit their jobs if
\nanother employment opportunity arose (Tsui, Eagan, & O’Reilly, 1992). Such
\ncoworker prejudice can have a direct effect on Black workers’ job performance.
\nFor example, Black research participants who worked with a prejudiced, compared
\nwith an unprejudiced, White participant were 30 percent less productive
\n(Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2001).
\nIlgen and Youtz (1986) also proposed that workplace prejudice and discrimination
\ncould have an adverse effect on minority employees’ morale, which, in
\ntunl, could affect job perfonnance. On a survey of the experience of workplace
\nmistreatment, such as being set up for failure, being treated as if they didn’t exist,
\nand being the target of insulting jokes or comments, Black workers reported
\nmore mistreatment than White workers (Deitch et al., 2003). Moreover, the
\nexperience of such mistreatment was related to reduced job satisfaction. Other
\nresearch shows that lower job satisfaction is related to lower job perfonnance
\n(judge, Thoreson, Bono, & Patton, 2001). For examples of some of the hassles
\nthat Black workers face, see Box lOA.
\nPromotion. Promotion within an organization is based largely on job pelformance
\nevaluations. However, as Bowen and colleagues (2000) have noted, even
\nwhen women and members of minority groups receive the SaIne perfonnance
\nevaluations as men and majority group members, decisions based on those evalua- itions can still be biased. And so it seems to be with promotions. Looking first at
\ngender differences, researchers have found that although women and men receive,
\non average, equal job perfomlance ratings, their supervisors often see them as
\nThe editors of Harvard Business Review asked
\norganizational consultants Keith Caver and AnceUa
\nLivers (2002) to write a fictional letter from a Black
\nmanager to a White boss describing some of the
\neveryday, almost certainly unintentional, incidents that
\nmake B lack managers feel like outsiders. The events
\nthey noted included:
\n\u2022 Being cast as a de facto diversity expert even
\nthough the managers’ training gave them no
\nspecial expertise in that field: “Despite my 15
\nyears of experience, despite my solid track record,
\nmy new colleagues appeared to have little
\ninterest in my business expertise. Instead, they
\nseemed to have assigned me some special role:
\nofficial interpreter of minority concerns for the
\norganization” (p. 78).
\n\u2022 Having one’s presence questioned when others go
\nunchallenged: “One weekend I went to the office
\nin my normal, casual weekend attire …. Before
\ngetting into the elevator I was stopped by an
\ninformally dressed young white man who in a
\nstern voice asked to see my identification …. I had
\nworked here for two years, but because I was out
\nof context, he assumed I was a thug. You might
\nchalk it up to an honest mistake, but I can assure
\nyou he hadn’t challenged any of the white people
\nentering the building” (p. 79).
\n\u2022 Resentment over increased workplace diversity:
\nRobert, a Black manager, hired a Black woman
\nand promoted a Black man. Afterwards, “Robert
\nFROM PREJUD!CE TO D!SCR!MINAT!ON 391
\nbegan to hear whispers in the halls-suggestions
\nthat he was building his own little ‘ghetto
\nfiefdom’ and having a White colleague ‘jokingly’
\nsay to him, ‘So white people aren’t good enough
\nfor you'” (p.79).
\n\u2022 Not being trusted to do one’s job properly: In
\naddition to the comments of his peers, Robert’s
\nboss “suddenly seemed to take a greater interest
\nin the details of his group’s work-asking for
\nreports and updates he’d never needed when
\nRobert’s team was primarily white. Subtly, his
\nboss was letting him know that at some
\nlevel he expected the team’s performance to
\ndrop” (p. 79).
\n\u2022 Having others assume that because you are not
\nWhite, you are a low-level employee: A Black
\nwoman “was recently hired as a senior vice
\npresident for a major financial institution. With
\nthe exception of a few initial interviews and
\nmeetings, she did not set foot in the organization
\nuntil her first day at the office. As she emerged
\nfrom the elevator, she was abruptly greeted by a
\nwhite male who directed her to a small cubicle
\nand asked her to quickly put her things away as
\nthey were expecting a new senior officer to arrive
\nshortly” (p. 80).
\nThe effect of experiences such as these is that for
\nminority workers, “race is always with us. As a friend of
\nmine said recently, ‘I don’t think a day goes by that I’m
\nnot reminded I’m black'” (p. 81).
\nhaving less promotion potential than men (Landau, 1995; Shore, 1992), they mustJ
\nwait longer for promotion (Cannings & Montmarquette, 1991; Maume, 1999),
\nand they receive fewer promotions the higher they move in the organizational
\nstructure (Lyness &Judiesch, 1999).
\nEven in situations in which women receive higher job performance ratingsl
\nthan men, they may be promoted no faster (Cannings & Montmarquette, 1991; J
\nShore, 1992). For example, Ted Shore (1992) studied the results of assessment
\ncenter ratings of male and female managers. When managers attend an assessment
\ncenter, they undergo a set of written and perfonnance tests designed to assess
\ntheir potential for prol11-etion. Shore found that, on the average, women and
\nmen received the same scores on measures of mental ability and similar ratings
\non interpersonal skill. In addition, women scored higher on measures of managerial
\njob perfonnance. Nonetheless, women received the san’le overall managerial
\npotential ratings as men and were promoted at the same rate.
\n392 CHAPTER 10<\/p>\n
‘ Ironically, the male advantage in promotion may be greater in femaledominated
\noccupations, such as clerical and sales, than in male-dominated occupations,
\nsuch as nunufacturing (Maume, 1999), an outcome called the glass
\nescalator effect (Williams, 1992). For example, David Maume (1999) found that
\n—fnen were 17 percent more likely than WOlnen to be promoted in femaledominated
\noccupations. Being in a female-dominated job not only increased
\nmen’s odds of promotion, it decreased women’s. Similarly, Christine Williams
\n(1992) found that male nurses, librarians, elementary teachers and social workers
\nbenefited from being in a female-dominated profession both at the hiring
\nstage and on the job. However, these men often encounter negative stereotypes,
\nsuch as the perception that they are passive or felninine and they are
\nsometimes viewed -with suspicion-so much so that they “alter their work behavior
\nto guard against sexual abuse charges, particularly those in specialties
\nrequiring intimate contact with women and children” (Williams, 1992, pp.
\n261-262). These negative stereotypes sometimes lead to negative self-esteem
\nand, ultimately, career change. Interestingly, negative stereotypes also may
\ncontribute to the glass escalator effect: To avoid outsiders’ criticisms and suspicions,
\nsupervisors may promote the men to higher level jobs where they have
\nless contact with the public (Williams, 1992).
\n[
\nIn regard to race, Black workers are less likely to be promoted than their
\nWhite counterparts (Roth et aI., 2003) and must wait longer for promotion
\n(Maume, 1999). As with women and men, even when Black workers receive
\nthe same job perfOlmance ratings as their White peers, they are likely to receive
\nlower ratings on promotion potential Ganles, 2000; Landau, 1995; Thomas et al.,
\n1998). Even after controlling for differences in education and experience, Black
\nassistant football coaches are less likely to be promoted to head coach than are
\ntheir white counterparts (Sagas & Cunningham, 2005). In addition, White employees
\nare paid more than Black enlployees in jobs with equivalent levels of
\nauthority (Dreher & Cox, 1996; Smith, 1997). Ryan Smith (1997) also found
\nthat although Black employees’ absolute salaty levels increased with promotion,
\nthe difference in Black and White workers’ salaries increased with higher levels
\nof authority: Black workers with no authority were paid 86 percent of what their
\nWhite peers received, 81 percent at low levels of authority, and 77 percent at
\nmiddle levels of authority. (There were too few Black managers at high level
\nof authority for Smith to make meaningful comparisons.)
\nThe problem begins at the lowest level of promotion. Using the results of
\nseparate surveys, David Maume (1999) and Ryan Smith and James Elliott (2002)
\nboth found that Mrican Americans in nomnanagerial jobs were 50 percent less
\nlikely to be promoted to Inanagerialjobs than were their White peers. Smith and
\nElliott further noted that when Mrican Americans did hold first-level managerial
\npositions, they were nl0re likely to supervise Black workers than White workers.
\nBecause most Black workers are in low-level jobs, this ethnic matching of supervisors
\nand employees means that most Black managers are found in low-level
\npositions of authority. Smith and Elliott (2002) refer to this ethnic matching phenomenon
\nas the “sticky floor” effect: “The relative position of one’s ethnic
\ngroup within an organization constitutes the ‘sticky floor’-one to which
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 393
\nindividual opportunity for authority ‘adheres.’ If one’s ethnic group dominates
\nonly entry-level jobs within an organization, then one’s authority chances will
\nbe restricted largely to supervising entry-level workers. If one’s ethnic group
\ndominates higher-level positions, then one’s authority chances will increase accordingly”
\n(p. 274; see also James, 2000).
\nAt least two other organizational factors are related to Black managers’
\nslower promotion rates relative to their White peers. First, Black employees
\ntend to be “tracked” into certain job categories, such as affinnative action officer.
\nBlack coaches, for example, often fill positions such as recruiter or minority affairs
\nofficer that derail them from advancelnent to a head coach position (Sagas &
\nCunningham, 2005). Similarly, Sharon Collins (1997) interviewed Black executives
\nin large White-owned corporations and found that 63 percent had been
\ncareer-tracked into jobs designed to “mediate the social pressures related to black
\nprotest for civil rights, [such as] affinnative action or urban affairs manager”
\n(p. 327). Often, the only “qualification” these executives had was their race:
\nProfessionals with advanced degrees in fields such as accounting, engineering,
\nand chemistry were put into these positions despite the oct that they had no
\ntraining or previous experience in the field. These managers were moved from
\ntheir chosen career fields based solely on a stereotype-that members of minority
\ngroups make better diversity managers simply because of their group membership.
\nJobs in these categories tend to be “dead-end” positions or have slower
\npromotion rates and “top out” at lower levels of authority than other jobs in
\nother categories, such as sales and operations management, regardless of the race
\nof the people holding the jobs (James, 2000).
\nSecond, one’s mentor can have important effects on career progression because
\nof the fonnal and informal training and social support mentors provide, and
\nbecause of the connections they have with upper-level management (Roberson &
\nBlock, 2001). Because White men predominate in upper-level management positions,
\nthey can be especially helpful as menton;. For example, George Dreher and
\nTaylor Cox (1996) found that having had a White male mentor added more than
\n$22,000 per year to manager’s salaries after 10 years of experience compared to
\nmanagers who had had female or non-White mentors. They also found that
\nwomen, African American men, and Hispanic men were less likely than White
\nmanagers to have had a White male mentor.
\nAlthough it is tempting to attribute the differential outcomes for female and
\nBlack workers to intentional discrimination, Smith and Elliott (2000) see the situation
\ndifferendy: “We believe that something more subtle and profound occurs
\nin the process of doing ‘business as usual’-mere maintenance of the status quo is
\nmore than enough to perpetuate racial stratification” (p. 274); the same principle
\napplies to gender stratification.
\nIndividuals in Organizations
\nAlthough people very often talk about organizational discrimination and institutional
\ndiscrimination, if you think about it, organizations and institutions do not
\ndiscriminate: Individuals in organizations and institutions discriminate. That is,
\n394 CHAPTER 10
\nindividuals set and enforce discriminatory policies, make discriminatory hiring
\ndecisions, and give discriminatory perfom1allCe evaluations. Even when decisions
\nare made by committees, individuals have input into those joint decisions. Given
\nthis situation, surprisingly little research has been conducted on how individuallevel
\npsychological processes influence discriminatory outcomes in organizations
\n(Brief, 1998; Roberson & Block, 2001). This section discusses some of those processes:
\nstereotype fit, intergroup respect, shifting standards, contem-porary prejudice,
\nand confom-rity to perceived organizational norms.
\ni-Stereotype Fit. Madeline Heilman (1983; 2001) developed the stereotype fit
\nhypothesis to explain why WOlllen hold few managerial or executive positions
\nin organizations relative to men. The hypothesis postulates that the characteristics
\nassociated with effective managers are very similar to the cultural stereotypes
\n_9f men and very different from the cultural stereotypes of Wonlen. Therefore,
\nnlen are perceived as fItting into the managerial role but women are not; as a
\nresult, women are less likely to be hired for managerial positions and, once hired,
\nless likely to be promoted into higher positions (see also Eagly & Karau, 2002).
\nMore generally, people see men as better suited for “masculine” jobs such
\nas business manager and construction worker and women as better suited for
\n“feminine” jobs such as nurse and secretary (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997;
\nCejka & Eagly, 1999).
\nEvidence for the manager-as-rnale stereotype has come from studies in
\nwhich experienced male corporate managers rated the target groups male manager
\nand female manager on traits that characterize effective managers (Dodge, Gilroy, &
\nFenzel, 1995; Heilman, Block, & Martell, 1995; Mat~ell, Parker, Emrich, &
\nCrawford, 1998). These studies have found that male managers as a group received
\nhigher ratings on the traits than did female managers as a group. However,
\nthe results of the studies were less consistent when the research participants rated
\nsuccesiful male managers and succesifulfemale managers: two studies found a pro-male
\nbias (Dodge et a!., 1995; Heilman et a!., 1995) but one found no difference in
\nthe ratings of successful male and feuule managers (Martell et a!., 1998).
\nInterestingly, the one study that included female managers as participants
\n(Dodge et al., 1995) found that they expressed a pro-female bias when rating
\nmale and female managers in general, although not when rating successful male
\nand fenule managers. These results suggest that an egocentric bias might be at
\nwork when rating managers in general: Because managers are making the
\nratings, they see managers as having characteristics similar to their own-malestereotypical
\nwhen men are making the ratings and female-stereotypical when
\nwonlen are making the ratings. However, given that men predominate in
\npositions of power in organizations, nlen’s belief systems are more likely to influence
\norganizational decisions than are women’s.
\nFurther evidence that evaluators may adjust the criteria to fit their expectations
\ncomes from a study of potential applicants for the job of police chief
\n(Uhhnann & Cohen, 2005). Undergraduates evaluated a male or a female applicant
\nwho was described as either streetwise (tough and had experience in rough
\nneighborhoods) but not fonnally educated or educated but not streetwise. Raters
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 395
\nadjusted the criteria they believed were important for the job such that, regardless
\nof which set of credenrials the male applicant had, he was considered better
\nqualified than the female applicant. When the male applicant was described as
\nstreetwise, for example, those characteristics were seen as most important for a
\npolice chief and not his education. Raters, then, did not stereotype the applicants,
\nbut rather adjusted “their notion of ‘what it takes’ to do the job well in
\na manner tailored to the idiosyncratic credentials of the person they wanted to
\nhire” (Uhhnann & Cohen, 2005, p. 478)-in this case by choosing the male
\napplicant.
\nAn example of stereotype fit in operation comes from a study of the evaluations
\nand decisions that employment interviewers made about male and female
\napplicants for managerial jobs (Van Vianen & Willemsen, 1992). Consistent with
\nthe stereotype fit hypothesis, interviewers believed that the ideal job applicant
\nwould have more masculine traits than feminine traits. Moreover, although interviewers
\nregarded the male and female applicants as being equally qualified in
\nterms of education and experience, they were more likely to recommend that
\nmale applicants be hired. Finally, interviewers attributed more masculine traits
\nto successful applicants than to unsuccessful applicants, indicating that masculinity
\nplayed an important role in their decisions. In short, because the interviewers saw
\nfemale applicants as less masculine than male applicants and viewed the jobs as
\nrequiring masculine traits, they were less likely to recommend that female applicants
\nbe hired even though they had the same objective qualifications as the male
\napplicants.
\nStereotype fit (or lack of fit) can also influence performance evaluations.
\nJennifer Boldry, Wendy Wood, and Deborah Kashy (2001) examined this influence
\nin a study of ratings male and female ROTC cadets nlade of one another.
\nThey found that although male and female cadets scored equally well on objective
\nmeasures of military performance, female cadets received lower ratings on
\nmotivation and leadership from their fellow cadets. Thus, equal performance,
\nwhen flltered through gender stereotypes, can lead to different evaluations. Also
\nrecall the research discussed earlier that found that women are less likely to be
\npromoted despite equal job performance evaluations (Landau, 1995; Lyness &
\nJudiesch, 1999; Maume, 1999); similar processes might be operating in those
\nsituations.
\nAlthough Heilman (1983, 2001) developed the stereotype fit hypothesis to explain
\ngender differences in organizational outcomes, it can also explain racial and
\nethnic group differences in outcomes; however, less research has been conducted in
\nthat context. One study that has addressed this question examined experienced
\nWhite managers’ ratings of managers, African Americans, and Whites on a set of
\ntraits characteristic of good managers (Tomkiewicz, Brenner, & Adeyemi-Bello,
\n1998). Results showed a correlation of r = .54 between the ratings of managers
\nand the ratings of Whites but a correlation of on1y r = .17 between the ratings of
\nmanagers and the ratings of African Anlericans, indicating that Whites were seen as
\nfitting the managerial role better than were Mrican Americans. Similarly, White
\nmanagers in the hospitality industry saw a correspondence between the category
\n“successful middle manager” and the categories “Caucasian American middle
\n396 CHAPTER 10
\nmanager” (r ~ .53) and “Asian American middle manager” (r ~ .56; ChungHerrera
\n& Lankau, 2005). They also saw a relationship between the categories
\n“successful middle manager” and “Mrican American manager,” but this correlation,
\nr::::: .24, was significantly lower than the relationships found between successful
\nand White or successful and Asian managers. The relationship between
\n“successful middle manager” and “Hispanic American manager,” r = .13, was not
\nsignificant.
\nSimilar processes operate for lower level jobs as well. For example, Jaleen
\nKirschenman and Kathryn Neckerman (1990) interviewed 185 Chicago-area
\nemployers about their impressions of workers from various racial and ethnic
\ngroups who fill low-level jobs such as sales clerk, typist, restaurant worker, and
\nassembly worker. They found that employers generally perceived Blacks and
\nHispanics as having none of the characteristics of good workers, seeing them as
\nunskilled, illiterate, dishonest, unmotivated, involved with drugs and gangs,
\nlacking a work ethic, and having few interpersonal skills. The employers contrasted
\nBlacks and Hispanics with recent immigrants from central Europe,
\nwhom they saw as having all the characteristics of desirable workers. These
\nstereotypes were reflected in em-ployee recruitment strategies. For example,
\nKirschenman and Neckerman (1990) noted that “one company advertised for
\nskilled workers in Polish- and German-language newspapers, but hired all its
\nunskilled workers, 97 percent of whom were Hispanic,” through employee
\nreferrals (p. 210).
\nEmployers did have subcategories within their stereotypes, however. For
\nexample, they differentiated between “desirable” Black workers-those who had
\nmiddle- or working-class backgrounds-from “undesirable” Black workersthose
\nwho resided in urban ghettos. However, employers tended to use race as
\na marker for ghetto resident, assuming that Black job applicants were ghetto residents
\n(and therefore would not be good workers) unless the applicants provided
\nevidence of being “desirable.” Such evidence included speaking standard English,
\ndressing appropriately for the job interview, being able to demonstrate job-related
\nskills, having a history of steady employment, and providing a non-ghetto address.
\nIn sum, Kirschenman and Neckerman (1990) found that employers
\nassumed that Blacks and Hispanics were unqualified for even low level jobs
\nunless the applicant proved otherwise, but applied less stringent criteria to
\nmembers of other groups.
\nFinally, although stereotype fit can result in a disadvantage for some groups,
\nit can confer an advantage on other groups. For example, the Asian stereotype
\nincludes being talented at math and computers whereas the female stereotype includes
\nhaving little talent in those domains. Jennifer Steele and Nalini Ambady
\n(2004) hypothesized that an Asian American woman’s perceived qualification for
\na computer technician job would depend on whether her Asian identity or her
\nfemale identity was salient to the decision maker. College student participants
\nread the description of a student computer technician job, reviewed a completed
\napplication for the job, and then interviewed the applicant, an Asian American
\nwoman. The application form was designed to emphasize either the Asian or
\nfemale aspect of the applicant’s identity. When the applicant’s Asian identity,
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 397
\nrather than her female identity was salient, participants gave her a stronger hiring
\nreconunendation and recommended a 12 percent higher starting salary.
\nIntergroup Respect. One explanation for organizational diSCriminationll
\nthen, is stereotype fit: Because the stereotype of White lllen provides a better
\nfit to the managerial stereotype than do the stereotypes of minority group
\nmembers or women, White men are selected over equally, or even better,
\nqualified members of other groups. Lynne Jackson, Victoria Esses, and
\nChristopher Burris (2001) have proposed a different explanation. They have
\nhypothesized that it is not a decision maker’s group stereotypes that primarily
\naffect discriminatory decisions, but rather it is the amount of respect the decision
\nmaker has for the group that affects decisions. They define respect as “feelings
\nof esteem for another that manifest in both valuing the person’s feelings,
\nthoughts, and behaviors as well as willingness to be influenced by that person”
\n(pp. 48-49). Jackson and her colleagues propose that people hold different degrees
\nof respect for various groups based on the amount of power the groups
\nhave in society, For example, “differential respect for men and women may
\nhave its origins in the social structure. In most contemporary cultures, men
\ncontinue to hold higher social status than women” .. Relatedly, men generally
\nstill have more power than women in society (e.g., in politics and economics),
\nin the workplace, and in interpersonal relationships … Because many positions
\noccupied by men are high in status, people are likely to more frequently act
\ndeferentially to men than to women” (Jackson et al., 2001, p. 49). Living in
\nsuch a social context, they argue, leads people to develop more respect for men
\nas a group than for women as a group (although, of course, individual women
\ncan be respected more than individual men).
\nJackson and her colleagues (2001) conducted three studies to test the hypothesis
\nthat respect outweighs stereotypes in affecting hiring decisions. In the
\nfirst two studies, research participants read a description of a gender-neutral job
\nand an application for the job from a man or a woman. Participants rated the
\napplicant on the degree of respect they felt for him or her, the extent to which
\nmale and female stereotypes described the applicant, and how suitable the applicant
\nwas for the job. The researchers found that although both respect and
\nstereotypes had positive correlations with job suitability ratings, respect had a
\nmuch stronger relationship. In the third study, the researchers manipulated both
\nhow respected the applicant was by a previous employer and the applicant’s male
\nand female stereotypic characteristics using a letter of recommendation in the
\napplicant’s file. They also manipulated whether the applicant was applying for a
\nhigh or low status job. They found that greater respect led to stronger hiring
\nrecommendations, especially for the high status job, and that having more masculine
\nstereo typic traits led to stronger hiring recommendations for both types of
\njob; feminine stereotypic traits were not related to hiring recommendations. As
\nin the first two studies, respect had a stronger effect than stereotypes. Taken together,
\nthese findings indicate that the effect group membership has on hiring
\ngoes beyond how decision makers think about groups (stereotypes) to include
\nhow they feel about groups (respect). This distinction is important because it
\n398 (HAPTER 10
\nsuggests that eliminating reliance on stereotypes may not eliminate discrimination
\nthat is rooted in differences in respect for different social groups.
\nShifting Standards. Think back to two of the sets of research results on gender
\ndiscrimination in organizations that we presented earlier. First, on the average,
\nwomen and ll1en receive equal job performance evaluations. Second, on the
\naverage, women are less likely to get promoted than men. Given that rewards
\nsuch as promotions are supposed to be based on performance, these two sets of
\nfindings appear to contradict one another: given equal performance, women and
\nmen should be promoted at equal rates. One explanation for this apparent contradiction
\nlies in Monica Biemat’s (2003) shifting standards model of evaluation
\nthat we introduced iu Chapters 3 and 4. Recall that the model proposes that
\nnegative stereotypes lead people to hold lower performance expectations for
\nwomen and members of minority groups. When evaluators use subjective criteria
\nto rate performance, a person is rated relative to the expectations the evaluator
\nhas for the person’s group. Because most workplace perfonnance evaluation
\nmeasures use subjective rating scales (see, for example, Murphy & Cleveland,
\n1995), job perfonnance ratings are vulnerable to this bias. For example, a woman
\n-manager’s perfonnance would be rated relative to the evaluator’s expectations for
\nwoman managers as a group. The top section of Figure 10.2 illustrates this process.
\nJanet and Jason work for the same manager and perform at the same level.
\nHowever, because their manager has lower expectations for female employees
\n(that is, the female standards are shifted to the left of the male standards in this
\nexample), the same level of performance results in a higher rating for Janet than
\nfor Jason.
\nThe bottom section of Figure 10.2 provides a hypothetical example of how
\nshifting standards can also influence the interpretation of performance ratings. In
\nthis example, Jamal, who is Black, and Jerry, who is White, work for the same
\nmanager, who gives them both a (very good) rating of 4 on a 5-point scale. But
\ntheir manager has, probably unconsciously, rated Jamal and Jerry relative to the
\nexpectations he has for the performance of Black and White employees. That is,
\nhe saw Jamal’s performance as “very good for a Black employee” and Jerry’s as
\n“very good for a White employee.” However, because of the different standards
\nused for rating Black and White performance, Jamal actually scores lower on an
\nobjective common scale that takes both race-based scales into account. Biernat
\n(2003) notes that it is the objective comnlon scale) not the race-based subjective
\nscales, that determines the distribution of organizational rewards such as promotions
\naud pay raises. Thus, although both Jamal and Jerry received ratings of 4 on
\ntheir annual performance evaluations, Jerry is more likely to get a promotion or
\npay raise because his 4 translates to a 7 (very good) on the objective scale whereas
\nJamal’s 4 translates to a 4 (average).
\nRecall, for example, the study conducted by Monica Biernat and Theresa
\nVescio (2002) that we desctibed in Chapter 4, in which participants took the
\nrole of the manager of a coed softball teanl. Even when male and female players
\nwere evaluated as equal in athletic ability, men were more likely to be chosen
\nas starting players and to be placed in the top of the batting order. Thus, men
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 399
\nObjective performance:
\n0 2 3
\n“Female” scale:
\n0 2 3
\n“Male” scale:
\n0
\n“Black” scale:
\n0 2
\n“White” scale:
\nUnderlying common scale:
\n0 2
\nFIGURE 10.2 Shifting Standards of Evaluation
\nJanet
\nJason
\n4
\n4
\nJamal
\n3 4
\n0
\n3 4
\n5
\n5
\n2
\n5
\n2
\n5
\n6 7 8
\n3 4 5
\nJerry
\n3 5
\n6 7 8
\nTop Section: Janet and Jerry perform at the same objective level, but because the evaluator’s expectations for female
\nperformance are lower than his expectations for male performance, Janet gets a higher performance rating. Bottom
\nSection: Jamal gets a high rating of 4, but it is relative to the low expectations the rater has of Black employees. Jerry
\ngets a high rating of 4, but it is relative to the higher expectations that the rater has for White employees. As a result,
\nwhen the two ratings are transformed to a common scale, such as if the rater had to rank employees, Jerry comes out
\nahead of Jamal.
\nSOURCE: Adapt-ed from Biernat (2003, Figure 1. p. 1021).
\nreceived more rewards than women, presumably because shifting standards put
\nthem higher on the objective scale the participants used to make their choices.
\nThese kinds of differential decisions are made not only by evaluators but also by
\nother people who use the evaluations to make decisions. For example, Biernat
\n(2003) reported the results of a study in which participants read a letter of recommendation;
\nhalf the participants thought it was written on behalf of a Black
\njob applicant and half that it was written on behalf of a White job applicant. The
\nparticipants interpreted the letter to mean that, in objective terms, the Black
\n400 CHAPTER 10
\napplicant had perfonned less well on the job described in the letter than had the
\nWhite applicant. Participants apparently assumed that the letter writer had used
\nlower standards to evaluate the Black applicant’s performance.
\nContemporary Prejudice. In Chapter 6 we noted that, because of contemporary
\nsocial norms that condemn prejudice, prejudice and discruuination tend to
\nmanifest themselves in subtle ways and in situations in which prejudiced behavior
\ncan be attributed to other causes, Thus, for example, a prejudiced person could
\nclaim that she voted against a Black political candidate not because he was Black,
\nbut because his platform was too liberal. In the em_ployment context, a prejudiced
\nemployer may use applicant characteristics as a reason to reject a Black
\njob applicant even while hiring a White applicant with the same characteristic.
\nFor example, Gordon Hodson, John Dovidio, and Samuel Gaertner (2002) asked
\nWhite college students who had been classified as being high or low on racial
\nprejudice to make college admission decisions about Black and White applicants.
\nThe researchers created two mixed qualification applicant conditions, a clearly
\nhigh-qualification applicant condition, and a clearly low-qualification applicant
\ncondition. In one mixed-qualification condition, the applicant had high
\nScholastic Assessment Test (SAT) scores but a low high school grade point average
\n(GPA); in the other mixed qualification condition, the applicant had a
\nhigh GPA but low SAT scores. The higb qualification applicant had both high
\nSAT scores and a high GPA; the low qualification applicant had both low SAT
\nscores and a low GPA.
\nBoth high- and low-prejudice participants accepted the highly qualified
\nBlack and White applicants at the same rate (100 percent) and rejected the
\npoorly qualified Black and White applicants at the same rate (69 percent).
\nHowever, high-prejudice participants were more likely to accept the mixedqualification
\nWhite applicant (74 percent) than the mixed-qualification Black applicant
\n(44 percent); the reverse was true for low-prejudice participants although
\nthe difference was not as large: 86 percent accepted the Black applicant and
\n64 percent accepted the White applicant. Participants also rated how much the
\napplicant’s SAT scores and GPA influenced their decisions. The high-prejudice
\nparticipants who had evaluated the mixed qualification Black applicant rated
\nwhichever piece of negative infonnation they had seen-SAT scores in the one
\ncondition and GPA in the other condition-as most influential. Low-prejudice
\nparticipants showed the opposite pattenl, focusing on whichever piece of information
\nwas more positive. Thus, both high- and low-prejudice participants
\nseized on the infonnation that was consistent with their racial attitudes-positive
\nfor those low in prejudice and negative for those high in prejudice-and used
\nthat infonnation to justify- their decisions.
\nEmployers may also use business-related factors to justifY discrimination, the
\nmost common being maintaining workplace hannony and placating customers
\n(Brief, 1998; Kirschenman & Neckennan, 1990). Kirschenman and Neckennan
\n(1990) found that many of the employers they interviewed were reluctant to
\nhire minority workers because they thought doing so would upset their White
\nemployees, leading to morale and productivity problems. This reluctance was
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 401
\nreflected in hiring practices: Employers who said they valued teamwork highly
\nwere twice as likely to have racially homogeneous workforces than those who
\nthought that teamwork was less important. Unfortunately, these employers’ concerns
\nmay have a basis in reality: lower-level White workers, for example, show
\nmore work avoidance as the proportion of minority workers in their work units
\nincreases (Tsui et al., 1992). Kirschenman and Neckerman (1990) also noted that
\nsome employers believed that they would lose customers if they hired minority
\nworkers. They quoted one restaurant owner as saying, “I have all white waitresses
\nfor a very basic reason. My clientele is 95 percent white. I simply wouldn’t
\nlast very long if I had some black waitresses out there” (p. 220). This concern
\nmay also be based in reality: A White suburban restaurant owner who had hired
\nBlack wait staff because he could not find enough White workers received comments
\nfrom his White customers such as “Why do you have those people out
\nhere” (p. 220, emphasis in original). Customer demand can also work in the
\nother direction: Harry Holzer (1996) found that employers with a predominandy
\nBlack customer base were more likely to hire Black workers than White workers.
\nAt colleges and universities, important “customers” include alumni, particular
\nthose who donate to the university. Michael Sagas and George Cunningham
\n(2005) suggest that the possibility of alienating White alumni boosters may be
\none reason why Blacks are less likely to be hired as head college football coaches.
\nConformity to Perceived Norms. Finally, individuals might make diSCrimi~J
\nnatOlY decisions because they believe those decisions are consistent with company
\nnOrms. For example, using a methodology developed by Arthur Brief and
\nhis colleagues (Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000), Lars-Eric Petersen
\nand Joerg Dietz (2005) asked German students to imagine they were a department
\nhead for a Gennan fast-food chain. Their task was to select three candidates
\nfor a job interview, based on a pool that contained both foreign and
\nGerman applicants. Half of the participants read a memo from the company
\npresident that commented on the number of foreign applicants and noted the
\nimportance of nlaintaining a homogeneous workforce. The memo also noted
\nthat the company employed almost exclusively Germans. The remaining participants
\nread no such memo. In addition, participants were categorized as either
\nhigh on a measure of subtle prejudice, high on a measure of blatant prejudice,
\nor nonprejudiced. Individuals high on subde prejudice were less likely to select
\nforeign applicants when they saw the memo than when they did not. Ratings of
\nnonprejudiced and blatandy prejudiced participants were unaffected by the
\nmemo. These findings suggest that individuals who are blatandy prejudiced do
\nnot need a justification to discriminate: these students were less likely to select
\nforeign applicants regardless of whether they saw the memo. Consistent with
\nfindings from previous research (see Brief et al., 2000), those who were subdy
\nprejudice made discriminatory decisions when they believed that doing so would
\nplease their boss. By the way, if pressure from a company president to discriminate
\nseems far-fetched, see Box 10.5, which describes the event that led to Brief
\nand colleagues’ research.
\n402 CHAPTER 10
\nIn 1992 the restaurant chain Shoney’s Incorporated
\npaid $132.5 million to settle an employment
\ndiscrimination lawsuit. The evidence in the case
\nrevealed a long-standing policy of minimizing the
\nnumber of Black employees in the company, especially
\nin customer-contact jobs. For example, 75 percent of
\nShoney’s Black restaurant workers held minimum-wage
\njobs such as dishwasher, cook, and breakfast-bar
\nattendant (Watkins, 1993). These employment policies
\nwere a direct reflection of Chief Executive Officer Ray
\nDanner’s views. For example, one former Shoney’s vice
\npresident described what he called Danner’s Laws:
\n“Blacks were not qualified to run a store. Blacks were
\nnot qualified to run a kitchen of a store. Blacks should
\nnot be employed in any position where they would be
\nseen by customers” (Watkins, 1993, p.427).
\nDanner’s justification for his policies was that
\nWhite customers did not want to see Black employees
\nand would not patronize restaurants that employed
\nBlack customer service staff. In pretrial testimony
\nDanner said, “In looking for anything to identify why
\n[a restaurant] is under~performjng in some cases, I
\nwould probably have said that this is a neighborhood
\nof predominantly white neighbors, and we have a
\nconsiderable amount of black employees and this
\nmight be a problem” (Watkins, 1993, p. 427). Steve
\nWatkins (1993) reported that “the smoking gun in the
\ncase came in the form of a letter Danner wrote
\ncomplaining about the performance of [one
\nrestaurant] and comparing the racial makeup of the
\nstore, which had several black employees-some of
\nwhom were later fired-to the all~white, or nearly
\nall~white, composition of other fast~food restaurants
\nDanner visited in the area” (p. 427).
\nWhen executives from company headquarters
\nvisited restaurants, they would tell managers whom
\nthey thought had hired too many Black workers “to
\n‘lighten up’ their store-a company euphemism for
\nreducing the number of black workers-and hire
\n‘attractive white g’lrls’ instead” (Watkins, 1993, p. 424).
\nIn another instance, “two black Shoney’s employees said
\nthey were ordered by their manager to hide in a
\nrestroom because some company executives had shown
\nup for a surprise visit and there were ‘too many’ blacks at
\nwork that day” (Watkins, 1993, p. 426). These anti~Black
\npolicies did not affect only Black employees: Watkins
\nreported that White restaurant managers who
\ndisobeyed orders to “Iighten up” their staff were fired.
\nHATE CRIMES
\nHate crimes (also called bias criines) are, perhaps, the most severe fonn of dis- !Crimination. Hate crimes are criminal offenses in which there is evidence that
\nthe victims were chosen because of their race, ethnicity, national origin, religion,
\ndisability, or sexual orientation (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
\n-[FBI], 1999). Although whether a crime is caused by bias rather than some other
\nmotive (such as personal animosity unrelated to prejudice) is sometimes a matter
\nof judgment, in many cases the evidence is fairly obvious. For example, a survey
\nof gay, lesbian, and bisexual hate crime victin1S found that in 53 percent of the
\ncases the offender made an explicit statement about the victim’s sexual orientation
\n(Herek, Cogan, & Gillis, 2002). In addition, hate crimes usually have no
\nmotivation other than attacking a member of a particular group. “There appear
\nto be no gains for the assailant: There is no attempt to take money or personal
\nitems and there is no prior relationship between the victim and offender” that
\ncould provide a personal motive, such as revenge (McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett,
\n2002, p. 304).
\nTable 10.2 presents some of the characteristics of the hate crimes reported
\nto the FBI in 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers. The FBI received 7,720 reports of hate crimes that year
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 403
\nTAB L E 10.2 Characteristics of Hate Crimes
\nReported in 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers
\nVictim Group
\nRacelethnicity (65.6% of all hate crimes)
\nBlack
\nWhite
\nHispanic
\nAsian
\nAmerican Indian
\nMultiple races, group
\nReligion (18.1 of all hate crimes)
\nJewish
\nIslamic
\nCatholic
\nProtestant
\nOther
\nSexual orientation (15.3% of all hate crimes)
\nMale homosexual
\nFemale homosexual
\nHeterosexual
\nOther
\nDisability (1 % of alJ hate crimes)
\nMental
\nPhysical
\nRace of Offender
\nWhite
\nBlack
\nUnknown
\nType of Offense
\nAgainst Persons (56.5% of all hate crimes)
\nAggravated assault
\nSimple assault
\nIntimidation
\nOther violent crime
\nProperty (43.2% of all hate crimes)
\nVandalism
\nBurglary or theft
\nArson
\nOther
\nSOURCE: u.s. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers).
\n52.7%
\n16.7%
\n12.9%
\n3.8%
\n1.2%
\n12.7%
\n65.4%
\n11.9%
\n4.9%
\n3.7%
\n14.2%
\n62.0%
\n13.7%
\n2.0%
\n29.9%
\n77.8%
\n22.1%
\n58.6%
\n20.6%
\n12.9%
\n21.6%
\n31.9%
\n46.0%
\n0.3%
\n80.4%
\n16.9%
\n1.2%
\n2.7%
\n404 CHAPTER 10
\ninvolving 9652 victims, which is probably fewer than the true number given that
\nmost crimes of all kinds go unreported (Strom, 2001). fu Table 10.2 shows, most
\nhate crimes were based on the victims’ race or ethnidty. However, one does not
\nhave to be a member of a minority group to be a victim of a hate crime: in 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers,
\n16.7 percent of the victims were White. The majority of the crimes (56.5 percent)
\nwere against persons, such as assault or intimidation; 43.2 percent were
\ncrimes against property, such as vandalism, burglary, or a motor vehicle theft. A
\nstudy of hate crimes reported from 1997-1999 showed that most victims were
\nmale (62 percent) and young (65 percent were under 35 years of age), most of
\nthe crimes were violent (60 percent), and 18 percent involved the use of a deadly
\nweapon (Stonn, 2001). Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt (2002) have further noted
\nthat hate crimes are excessively brutal compared to crune in general: 58 percent
\nof hate crimes involve assaults compared to 7 percent of all crimes and 30 percent
\nof hate crime assault victims receive physical injuries compared to 7 percent
\nof victims for assaults in general.
\nIn this section, we discuss three aspects of hate crimes. First, we look at some
\nof the characteristics of hate crime offenders. We then examine the motivations
\nthat offenders have for taking part in hate crimes. We conclude with a brief discussion
\nof the effects of hate crimes on the victims.
\nHate Crime Offenders
\nWho conunits hate crimes There are two ways of looking for answers to this
\nquestion. One approach is to examine victim descriptions of offenders, such as
\nthose contained in the reports of hate crimes collected by the FBI. Kevin
\nStrom’s (2001) analysis of hate crimes reported from 1997~1999 showed that,
\nlike most offenders, hate crime perpetrators are disproportionately male (84 percent)
\nand young: 62 percent are under 24 years of age and 79 percent are under
\n35 years of age. Vicky Kielinger and Susan Paterson (2007) examined London
\npolice records of hate crimes based on racial or sexual orientation bias; their analysis
\nshowed that two thirds of the suspects were known by the victim, either as
\nneighbors, colleagues, or school mates. As we will discuss, this is consistent with
\nresearch showing that hate crimes are generally not comrnitted by members of
\nhate groups, but instead tend to be opportunistic crimes.
\nAnother approach to detennining offender characteristics is to conduct
\nsurveys and examine the characteristics of people who admit to having participated
\nin hate crimes. Karen Franklin (2000) investigated anti-gay behavior and
\nfound that 10 percent of her sanlple of 489 community college students admitted
\nhaving assaulted a lesbian or gay man (or someone the respondent thought was
\nlesbian or gay) and that an additional 24 percent admitted engaging in verbal
\nabuse. Like Strom, Franklin found that offenders were disproportionately male.
\n(She did not report results by age of respondent.) Franklin also found that men
\nwere increasingly likely to be offenders as the violence of the behavior increased:
\nMen were the perpetrators in 64 percent of name-calling incidents, 79 percent of
\nintimidation incidents, and 92 percent of physical attacks. In addition, Franklin
\nfound that, relative to their representation in her sample, Mrican Americans were
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 405
\nmore likely than members of other racial groups to admit to having engaged in
\nanti-gay behaviors: African Americans constituted 19 percent of offenders versus
\n12 percent of the sample. African Americans were also more likely to admit to
\nphysical violence than members of other groups: 29 percent versus 4 percent to
\n11 percent for other groups.
\nAlthough one might think that hate crime offenders hold extremely negative
\nintergroup attitudes or are unusually aggressive people, that is not always the
\ncase, as we will see shortly, Also, as we saw in Chapter 9, very few hate group
\nmembers commit hate crimes. What factors, then, motivate people to commit
\nhate crimes The next section addresses that question.
\nMotivations for Hate Crimes
\nWhy do people commit hate crimes Based on an analysis of 169 hate crimes
\nreported to the Boston police in 1991 and 1992, Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt
\n(2002) proposed four motivations for engaging in hate ctimes: thrill seeking, defending
\none’s “territory” from outsiders, retaliation for a perceived offense committed
\nby an outgroup member, and a conunitment to a racist, anti-gay, or other
\nbigoted ideology. Franklin (2000) has identified a fifth motivation, peer group
\ndynamics, that Levin and McDevitt had included as part of thrill seeking
\n(McDevitt et al., 2002). Bryan Byers and Benjamin Crider (2002) have suggested
\nthat seeing hate crime as a nonnal behavior may facilitate, if not motivate, such
\nbehavior. Franklin (2000) also examined people’s reasons for not catrying out
\nanti-gay behaviors. Let us look at these motives.
\nThrill Seeking. Thrill seeking as a motivation for a hate crime entails cOurmit-J~
\nting the crime out of a desire for excitement, as an antidote for boredom. For ,
\nexample, McDevitt and his colleagues (2002) noted that young people who had
\nbeen arrested for hate crimes “often told police that they were just bored and
\nlooking for some fun …. The attack in these thrill-motivated cases was triggered
\nby an immature desire to display power and to experience a rush at the expense
\nof someone else…. Several of these young offenders revealed that their only
\nbenefit from the attack was some vague senses of their own importance: a sadistic
\nhigh as well as bragging rights with their friends” (pp. 307-308).
\nThrill seekers generally have little commitment to bias and often express little
\nanimosity toward the group whose members they have attacked (Byers, Crider, &
\nBiggers, 1999; Franklin, 2000; McDevitt et al., 2002). Rather, they are bored and
\nsee violence as a way of alleviating their boredom. For exanlple, Byers and Crider
\n(2002; Byers et al., 1999) interviewed young men who, as teenagers, had participated
\nin criminal and harassing behavior against the Amish residents of the rural
\ncounty in which they and their Amish victims lived. These offenses are so common,
\nand so commonly accepted by the non-Amish, that there is a local word for
\nthem, daping. The role played by boredom in hate crimes is illustrated by the comments
\nof one of Byers and colleagues’ (1999) respondents, who offered this explanation
\nfor his behavior: “It was what our friends were doing at the time to pass the
\nsununer months away or whatever. That was what we were doing on Friday
\n406 CHAPTER 10
\nnights” (p. 85). The results of Byers and colleagues’ (1999; Byers & Crider 2002)
\ninterviews suggest that a lack of respect rather than animosity might be the emotional
\nfacilitator of thrill seekers’ behavior. One of their respondents told them, “I
\njust had the mentahty that they are just Amish …. It is like, we can pick on them
\nbecause they are so different” (Byers et al., 1999, p. 87) and another said, “It is
\nbecause I still have some feeling that they ahnost ‘deserved it’ for some unknown
\nreason because they are different” (p. 88).
\nThrill seekers tend to choose as targets people they see as providing easy and
\nsafe opportunities for violence. For example, an offender who, along with a
\nfriend, targeted gay men as robbery victims said, “It wasn’t because we had
\nsonlething against gays, but because we could get SOBle money and have some
\nfun. It was a rush. A serious rush. Massive rush … , It was nothing at all against
\ngays. They’re just an easy target. Gays have a reputation that they can’t fight
\n[back]” (Franklin, 1998, p. 14, emphasis in original). Similarly, one of Byers
\nand Crider’s (2002) respondents said of the Amish, “They are an easy target.
\nThey offer an easy target because they ‘turn the other cheek’ and don’t fight
\nback” (p. 131). Another characteristic that makes a group an easy target for thrill
\nseekers is an unwillingness or inability to report the crime. For exanlple, one of
\nByers and Crider’s (2002) interviewees noted that the Amish “can’t call the cops
\n[because of their rejection of modern technology, such as telephones] and don’t
\nbelieve in suing” (p. 135). Similarly, lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals may be
\nseen as easy targets because they are reluctant to report hate crilnes due to concern
\nover police harassment or public disclosure of their sexual orientation
\n(Herek et aI., 2002).
\nThrill seekers often justify their actions by minimizing the crime’s impact on
\nthe victims and by portraying their actions as hannless fun (Byers et al., 1999;
\nFranklin, 1998). One of Byers and colleagues’ (1999) respondents said, “It was
\nall, I always thought clean fun …. We always looked at it as there are a lot worse
\nthings that we could be doing” (p. 85). Byers and his colleagues found that denying
\nthat they had hurt anyone was a common justification offenders gave for
\ntheir behavior. One of their respondents said about destroying an outhouse, “No
\none ever really got hurt, and it wasn’t really that much property damage. It was
\npretty much just a mess to clean up” (p. 85). Besides, one respondent explained,
\nclaping causes no real injury because the Amish should expect to be harassed:
\n“Stuff like that happens to them. It happens to them all the time. They are
\nused to it I think” (Byers et al., 1999, p. 86).
\n[
\nTerritorial Defense. In defensive hate crimes, the perpetrators see themselves
\nas protecting their own territory fronl invasion by outsiders. The purpose of this
\n~type of hate crime is to coerce the outsiders to go away and to send a more
\ngeneral message that members of the victim’s group are not wanted in the offenders’
\nneighborhood. For example, Donald Green, Dara Strolovitch, and Janelle
\nWong (1998) found that the incidence of hate crimes was higher in all-White
\nneighborhoods into which minority group members were moving compared to
\nsimilar neighborhoods which remained all White. Defensive hate crimes constituted
\n25 percent of Levin and McDevitt’s (2002) sample of cases.
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 407
\nRetaliation. In retaliatory hate crimes, the offenders are seeking revenge for 0-real
\nor rumDred attack on a member of their ingroup, McDevitt and his colleagues
\n(2002) note that “whether the [attack] actually occurred is often irrelevan .
\nSometimes a rumor of an incident may cause a group of offenders to take vengeance,
\nonly to learn later that their original infonnation was merely unfounded
\nhearsay” (p. 309). Although retaliatory attackers cite revenge as the reason for
\ntheir actions, they usually do not seek out the person they believe committed
\nthe offense against their group, but target any available member of the group.
\nThis is consistent with the vicarious retribution model, discussed in Chapter 9, which
\nexplains how groups decide when to retaliate against an outgroup (Lickel, Miller,
\nStenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006 – Write a paper; Professional research paper writing service – Best essay writers).
\nThis kind of generalized retaliation may be especially likely to occur when the
\nreal target of the offenders’ anger is out of their reach, As Levin and McDevitt
\n(2002) noted, “After [the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks], what made it especially
\ntempting to target college students who spoke with an accent and had a dark
\ncomplexion was the ambiguity in identifYing the real enemy. President Bush
\nblamed Osama bin Laden, a shadowy figure who resided in a far-off land and had
\nbeen seen only a few times on videotape, For most Americans, bin Laden ‘” was
\nan abstraction, little more than a caricature. It was therefore far more satisfying
\npsychologically to target flesh-and-blood human beings [who were close at hand]
\n-international students” (p, 5). Retaliatory hate crimes constituted 8 percent of
\nLevin and McDevitt’s (2002) sample of cases.
\nMission. Mission-motivated hate crimes are carried out because of a commit”::-l
\nment to a bigoted ideology. In these kinds of crimes, “the perpetrator seeks toJ
\nrid the world of evi!” (McDevitt et al., 2002, p. 309). Some mission-oriented offenders
\nare members of hate groups, although they may be acting without the
\nknowledge or support of the group’s leadership. As we saw in Chapter 9, the leadership
\nof many hate groups publicly oppose violence, seeing it as a threat to their
\nrecruitment efforts. Other mission-oriented offenders act on their own, seeing
\nthemselves as victims of conspiracies by groups against whom they seek revenge
\n(Levin & McDevitt, 2002). Mission hate crimes are extremely rare; they constituted
\nless than 1 percent of Levin and McDevitt’s (2002) sample of cases.
\nPeer Group Dynanrics. Many hate crimes, especially thrill- and defense-J-motivated
\ncrimes, are committed by groups of offenders, almost always young
\nmen who know one another (Levin & McDevitt, 2002), so peer group dynamics
\ncan play an important part in motivating participation in these crimes (Byers
\net aI., 1999; Franklin, 1998, 2000; McDevitt et al., 2002). As Kathleen Blee
\n(2007) notes, to outsiders the violence can appear “pointless, irration~ or the
\nproduct of -immaturity or personality disorders” but to group members may convey
\n“a sense of strength, inviolabiliry, purpose, and agency” (pp. 263-264) that promotes
\ngroup afflliation and solidarity. Offenders motivated by peer group concerns
\nact out of “the desire to feel closer to friends, to live up to friends’
\nexpectations, and to prove toughness and [in the case of anti-gay crimes] heterosexuality
\nto friends” (Franklin, 2000, p. 347). As this emphasis on toughness and
\n408 CHAPTER 10
\nheterosexual masculinity suggests, Franklin (1998) noted that men are more
\nstrongly tllotivated by this factor than are women, at least in the anti-gay context
\n(see also Chapter 12). The group-centered nature of some hate crnnes is illustrated
\nin the interviews Byers and his colleagues (1999) conducted with perpetrators
\nof hate crimes against the Amish: “When asked if a person were to clare
\nalone, subjects responded that the person would have to be ‘sick’ to do such a
\nthing” (p. 84). Another said, “It was a kind of male bonding …. It kind of drew
\nus all closer because we went out and did something” (p. 89).
\nLike thrill seekers, peer-motivated hate crime offenders exhibit little animosity
\ntoward their victims’ groups, but also exhibit little respect for them (Byers et aI.,
\n1999; Franklin, 1998). However, unlike thrill seekers, they sometimes do acknowledge
\nthat the victim was hanned, but tend to minimize their personal responsibility.
\nInstead, they portray themselves as having had little choice in the matter (Byers et al.,
\n1999; Franklin, 1998). For example, some of Byers and colleagues’ (1999) respondents
\nblamed their behavior on peer pressure or local nonns, giving explanations
\nsuch as “The harassment was ahnost conunon nature” and “[It] is because of the
\nway I was raised” (p. 92).
\nMcDevitt and his colleagues (2002) note that many offenders who act on
\nthe basis of peer group concerns may be unwilling participants in the crime:
\nThey do not approve of violence (or, perhaps, even prejudice), but go along
\nwith the group because they feel that if they do not they will lose the approval of
\ntheir friends. In many instances, unwilling participants do not actively take part in
\nthe crime, but also do nothing to prevent it or stop it once it has begun and are
\nunwilling to provide infonnation to authorities afterwards (see also Byers et al.,
\n1999). Thrill-motivated hate crimes were the ones most commonly found in
\nLevin and McDevitt’s (2002) Boston sample, constituting 66 percent of tlie cases.
\nNormalization. Based on their interviews with participants in anti-Amish hate
\ncrimes, Byers and Ctider (2002) liave suggested that one factor tliat facilitates, if
\n[
\nnot motivates, such crimes is community acceptance of such behavior. That is,
\nthe community in which the offenders live views such actions as nonnal behavior
\nand so do not strongly condenm it, try to prevent it, or punish it. Byers and
\n— Crider (2002) noted that “victimization of the Amish was sometimes considered
\na rite of passage [in the local non-Amish community] … ‘ If people believe that
\nclaping is hannless, there is a lower likelihood of intervention from parents,
\nteachers, or criminal justice officials” (pp. 133-134). This attitude was reflected
\nin comments made by Byers and Crider’s (2002) interviewees. For exalnple,
\n[Claping] is socially acceptable here …. [Interviewer: In this community]
\nExtremely, in this community. They just pretty much shrug and it is “boys
\ngrowing up.” If I lived here and I had kids and they were 16 or 17, then it
\nwould not surprise me if I just said it is just “kids growing up.” … I think that
\nmost people would see it as something as I will turn my back to it and pretend
\nthat it is not there. Like when people are watching t.v. and you see the starving
\nkids, everyone just turns the channel. It is the same thing …. If something bad
\nreally did happen like say somebody got killed or whatever I would say that the
\nAlthough the exact number of lynchings of Blacks that
\noccurred in the United States in the 19th and
\n20th centuries remains unknown, estimates range
\nfrom 2,500 to over 3,400 (see Leader, Mullen, &
\nAbrams, 2007). As we have seen throughout this text,
\nhistory is replete with examples of such violence
\nagainst outgroups and, at one point in U.S. history,
\nlynchings were, if not sanctioned, certainly
\noverlooked. Consider the now well-known lynchings
\nof two Black teenagers that occurred in Marion,
\nIndiana in 1930. These young men were accused of
\nraping a White woman and killing her boyfriend.
\nAlthough the teens had confessed and were awaiting
\ntrial, rumors spread that they would be let off easy;
\nin response, family members and their supporters
\nstormed the jail. The teens were, one at a time,
\ndragged to the courthouse square and lynched.
\nEvidence that such actions were normalized at that
\ntime in U.S. history comes from James Madison’s
\n(2001) analysis of the crowd’s response. He writes:
\n[Police] reported a scene of peace and remarkable
\ngood humor. One of the mob who had helped
\nwith the rope went with his young wife to a
\nnearby restaurant for a late dinner. But the crowds
\ndid not disperse. People milled around through the
\nnight. A woman nursed her baby, Fathers held up
\nolder children to see the two bodies, .. Newcomers
\nkept arriving, including the youth group from
\nAntioch Methodist Church”. Cars [were] parked at
\nall angles, jammed together like matchsticks
\naround the Courthouse Square, . ,Souvenir collectors
\ncut pieces of clothing from the two bodies and
\nbark from the lynching tree (p. 10).
\nThese actions continued through the night.
\nIn fact, although the second lynching occurred at
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 409
\n10:30 p.m., it was 5:45 the next morning before the
\ncrowd would allow the bodies to be cut down,
\nWhat conditions lead people to participate in such
\nsavage cruelty To examine this question, Tirza Leader,
\nBrian Mullen, and Dominic Abrams (2007) studied
\nreports of 300 lynchings that occurred in the United
\nStates between 1899 and 1946. Results showed that as
\ncrowd size increased, lynchings became more savage,
\nperhaps because bystanders felt anonymous in the
\nlarger groups, \/ls the crowd size increased, norms
\nseemed to shift, allowing the display of antisocial
\nbehavior. Leader and her colleagues also found that
\natrocities were greater when the victim’s alleged crime
\nwas more severe, perhaps providing further
\njustification for the group’s cruelty, The researchers
\nalso considered the possibility that increases in the
\nBlack population fed White people’s desire to protect
\ntheir territory; however, they found no evidence
\nthat the severity of the lynchings increased in those
\nareas with higher proportions of Blacks, suggesting
\nthat people were not responding to population
\nchanges.
\nAs Leader and colleagues (2007) note, lynching in
\nthe United States has come to define a certain time
\nin the past and a culture that was less sophisticated
\nand less educated” (p. 1340). Even at the time, not
\neveryone accepted lynching as normal behavior. As
\nMadison (2001) notes in his report on the Marion
\nlynching, the teens’ jailors tried desperately to prevent
\nthe lynchings and, although the details are not
\ncertain, a voice of reason, shouting from the crowd,
\nwas able to stop the lynching of a third teen.
\nMoreover, some people in the crowd were horrified
\nby what they witnessed and some were physically ill.
\nThen, as now, acceptance of violent group behavior is
\nfar from inevitable.
\ncommunity would be, “That is a shame and all that,” but then the entire town
\nwould be like “Oh well.” I really think it would be that way (pp. 136-137).
\nClaping is so acceptable in the community where Byers and Crider conducted
\ntheir interviews that one of the researchers was invited out on a claping
\nexpedition (he declined the invitation). Box 10.6 describes the normalization of a
\nmore severe hate crime, the lynching blacks in 19th and 20th centuries.
\nInhibiting Factors. It is often as informative to understand why people do n~
\nengage in a behavior as why they do engage in it. A unique aspect of Franklin’~
\n(2000) study is that she asked the nonoffenders in her sample why they “have
\n410 CHAPTER 10
\nnever harassed or beaten up a homosexual” (p. 353). She identified a number of
\nreasons, although she did not report the number of people giving each type of
\nreason. Some people’s responses implied that they refrained from anti-gay behavior
\nbecause of a lack of opportunity, saying they avoid homosexuals or never see
\nhomosexuals. Others reported a fear of negative consequences, such as getting
\ninto trouble with authorities or peer disapproval. Some respondents cited a belief
\nin nonviolence or other religious or moral beliefS. A final reason was knowing
\nsomeone who was homosexual. Franklin also noted that these restraining beliefs
\nmay be fairly weak and so may easily break down under pressure. For example,
\n38 percent of her respondents who had never engaged in anti-gay behavior
\n“reported some likelihood to verbally or physically assault a homosexual who
\nflirted with or propositioned them” (Franklin, 2000, p. 353).
\nEffects on Victims
\nSurveys conducted in different parts of the United States over a period of 10 years
\nhave provided an unusually consistent set of results regarding the effects hate
\ncrimes have on their victims: Hate crune victims suffer more severe psychological
\nconsequences from their victimization and these negative effects last longer
\ncompared to victims of similar crimes that were not motivated by bias (Ehrlich,
\n1999; Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 1999; McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, & Gu, 2001).
\nMoreover, hate crime victims who experienced severe violence, such as sexual assault,
\nreported greater psychological distress than those who were threatened but
\ndid not experience physical violence (Rose & Mechanic, 2002). Table 10.3 lists
\nSOille of the outcomes that hate Crlll1e victims experience to a greater extent than
\nvictims of other crinles. In addition, cOlllpared to victims of nonbias crimes, hate
\ncrune victims report feeling less control over their lives. One factor that helps
\ncrime victims deal psychologically with their victimization is the feeling that they
\ncan control what happens to them and, as a result, do things that will prevent
\nTAB L E 10.3 Effects of Hate Crimes on Victims
\nCompared to victims of similar crimes that were not motivated by bias, hate crime
\nvictims experience more:
\n\u2022 Nervousness, anxiety, depression, and stress
\n\u2022 Intrusive thoughts about the crime
\n\u2022 Trouble concentrating or working
\n\u2022 Anger and a desire to retaliate
\n\u2022 Feelings of being exhausted and weak for no reason
\n\u2022 Fear of future trouble in life
\n\u2022 Distrust of people
\n\u2022 Fear of crime and feelings of personal vulnerability
\n\u2022 Difficulty coping with the effects of victimization
\n\u2022 Difficulty in relationship with spouse or significant other
\nEhrlich, Larcom, and Purvis (1995); Herek, Gillis, and Cogan (1999); and McDevitt, Balboni, Garcia, and Gu (2001).
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 411
\nthem from being victimized again (Davis, Taylor, & Titus, 1997). However, hate
\ncrime victims tend to be chosen at random and so believe that there is nothing they
\ncan do to avoid becoming a victim again: “Victims are aware that their overt actions
\ndid nothing to precipitate their victimization; being the ‘wrong person,’ at the wrong
\ntime and place, qualifies the bias victim [to become a victim]. Therefore, if the impetus
\nfor victimization is something that is outside the bias victim’s control before the
\nincident, it is reasonable that there would be little the victim would do differently
\nsubsequent to the incident” (McDevitt et al., 2001, p. 711). These feelings oflack
\nof control exacerbate the negative psychological consequences of having been a
\ncrime victim.
\nPerhaps because of this, hate crime victims do not always immediately label
\ntheir experience as a hate crime, even if authorities have made that determination.
\nFor example, Kathleen Blee (2007) interviewed members of an Islamic community
\nwhose mosque had been destroyed by arson. Despite clear evidence that the
\narson was not a random act of violence, including a note left at the arson site explicitly
\nstating “we hate you and we want you to leave” (p. 265), members resisted
\nthat interpretation, at least initially. Interestingly, those with higher status positions
\nor who had been in the community a longer period of time were particularly
\nlikely to dismiss the possibility that the crime was directed at Muslims. Similarly,
\nBlee interviewed members of a Jewish community which experienced the firebombing
\nof its Holocaust museum, Some initially interpreted the event as due to
\nanti-Semitic violence but later changed their minds; others initially looked for
\nother interpretations but, over time, came to believe it was a hate crime. Hence,
\n“[w]hether and how victims interpret violent acts as hate violence are the products
\nof collective and individual processes of interpretation” (Blee, 2007, p. 266).
\nA special characteristic of hate crimes is what McDevitt and his COlleague]
\n(2001; see also Ehrlich, 1999) call secondary victimization: A hate crime has
\npsychological effects not only on the victim but also on members of the victim’s
\ngroup. These secondary victims experience, at least temporarily, heightened anxiety
\nover the possibility of becoming victims themselves. Secondary victimization
\nis a major goal of defense-motivated hate crimes and is often a secondary goal of
\nothers (McDevitt et al., 2001). fu McDevitt and his colleagues (2001) note,
\n“a cross burning not only affects the immediate family [that was victimized],
\nbut any African American who beconles aware of the incident” (p. 698). As
\nthe Chinese military strategist Sun T’zu said over 2,000 years ago: “Kill one,
\nfrighten 10,000.” There are few data on the extent of secondary victimization
\nin hate crimes, but Howard Ehrlich (1999) reported that surveys of college students
\nfollowing on-campus hate crimes have found that about two-thirds of
\nother members of the victim’s group experience fear of becoming victims themselves.
\nPaul Iganski (2007) interviewed people who, although not victims of hate
\ncrimes themselves, saw hate-related violence in their jobs as district attorneys or
\npolice officers. These individuals reported that hate crimes had many consequences
\nfor the communities in which they took place, including increased anxiety,
\nthe potential for more crime due to retaliation, and ripple effects that led
\nsome group members to respond as if they had themselves been victimized.
\nThus, hate crimes victimize not just individuals but entire social groups.
\n412 CHAPTER 10
\nSUMMARY
\nDiscrimination consists of treating people differently, and usually unfairly, based
\nsolely or priluarily on their membership in a social group. Discrimination is therefore
\na matter of behavior (including verbal and nonverbal behavior), whereas prejudice
\nis an attitude that can motivate discriminatory behavior. Discrimination can
\ntake any of three forms. Blatant discrimination is intentional and obvious. Subtle
\ndiscrimination is less visible and obvious than blatant discrimination, is often unintentional,
\nand derives from people having internalized discriminatory customs and
\nsocial norms. Covert discrimination is hidden but intentional, and often motivated
\nby malice.
\nAlthough prejudice can motivate discrimination, not all prejudiced people
\ndiscriminate when they have the opportunity and nonprejudiced people can
\ndiscriminate without intending to. A number of factors influence the relationship
\nbetween prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice is more likely to manifest
\nitself in discrimination when the target of the discrimination matches the prejudiced
\nindividual’s personal stereotype of the outgroup. Implicit prejudice is
\nmost likely to result in automatic, uncontrollable behaviors, whereas explicit
\nprejudice is most likely to affect controllable behaviors. Finally, people are
\nmore likely to act on their prejudices when they believe that other people
\nagree with them.
\nBecause of the egalitarian nonn that exists in modern society, most people
\nare motivated to control any prejudice they feel and to avoid discriminatory
\nbehavior. However, regressive prejudice occurs when people lose control over
\ntheir prejudiced responses and act in a discriminatory manner. Thus, people can
\nexhibit nonverbal indicators of prejudice, which are usually not under voluntaty
\ncontrol, while trying to appear unprejudiced through their controllable behaviors.
\nJust as high cognitive demands can lead people to apply stereotypes,
\nsuch demands can let prejudiced behaviors “leak out” by undermining control.
\nAlcohol consumption and strong emotions, such as anger, can also reduce control
\nover behavior. Because people are less motivated to conlply with social
\nnorms when other people cannot identifY them, anonymity facilitates discriminatory
\nbehavior, as does the actual or implied approval of authority figures.
\nWhen people can otherwise justifY their actions, such as when they decide
\nthe cost of helping another person is too high, discrimination is more likely.
\nSeeing other people act in a prejudiced manner can also disinhibit prejudice.
\nFinally, if individuals believe that they have established their credentials as unprejudiced
\npeople, they may let their control lapse and act in a discriminatory
\nmanner.
\nResearch on discrimination in organizations indicates that Black job applicants
\nwho submit resumes are less likely to be called for interviews than equally
\nqualified White applicants and receive lower ratings on interview performance.
\nAs a result, they are less likely to be hired. In contrast, there currently seems to
\nbe little gender discrimination in hiring—-unless the applicant is pregnant.
\nOnce on the job, there seems to be little gender bias in performance evaluations;
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 413
\nhowever, Black workers receive lower perfonnance evaluations than White
\nworkers, especially from White supervisors. Even when numerical ratings for
\nBlack and White employees are identical, White employees tend to get more
\npositive narrative comments. Black employees perfonn less well on objective
\nmeasures of job perfonnance, so evaluations might simply be reflecting that difference,
\nHowever, the lower objective perfonnance might itself be a result of
\nprejudice, reflecting lost opportunities, such as for additional training, and lower
\nmorale caused by prejudice and discrimination.
\nEven when women and members of minority groups receive the same performance
\nevaluations as men and Whites, they are less likely to be promoted,
\nare promoted more slowly, and are more likely to end their careers at a lower
\norganizational level. Also, ethnic minorities can be “tracked” into certain job
\ncategories, such as affirmative action officer, that offer fewer opportunities for
\nadvancement. In addition, the pay differential between Black and White workers
\nincreases as level of authority increases. Black workers may experience slower
\npromotions because of the sticky floor effect-Black managers tend to supervise
\nBlack workers who are disproportionately found at lower organizational levels,
\nare tracked into jobs with little promotion potential, and have fewer influential
\nmentors to help them in their careers.
\nA number of individual-level processes contribute to discrimination in
\norganizations. The stereotype fit hypothesis holds that women and members
\nof minority groups are underrepresented in managerial positions relative to
\nWhite men because the White male stereotype matches the stereotype of the
\neffective manager whereas the female and minority stereotypes do not, As a
\nresult, women and minority group members are perceived as less qualified despite
\ntheir objective qualifications. Similar processes also can operate for lower
\nlevel jobs: The generally negative stereotypes of minority groups contradict the
\n“good worker” stereotype. Wonlen and members of minority groups also may
\nbe excluded from prestigious jobs because, as groups, they garner less respect
\nthan White men. The flnding that women and members of minority groups
\nare less likely to be promoted even when they receive the same perfonnance
\nevaluations as men and Whites may be a result of the shifting standards effect:
\nBecause evaluators have lower expectations for WOlnen’s and minority groups’
\nperfonnance relative to men’s and Whites’, the same subjective rating translates
\ninto a lower rating on an objective common scale that takes the race-based evaluations
\ninto account. Rewards such as promotions are based on the common
\nscale.
\nContemporary prejudice can lead prejudiced decision makers to put more
\nweight on the negative aspects of a minority group member’s qualifications
\nwhen both positive and negative infonnation is available, leading to an adverse
\ndecision that can be justified by the negative infonnation. Employers also may
\nuse business-related justifications, such as maintaining work group harmony and
\ncustomers’ prejudices, as justifications for not hiring minority workers, Finally,
\npeople tend to comply with what they perceive to be the requirements of organizational
\nnonns and authority figures. Thus, if they perceive the organizational
\n414 CHAPTER 10
\nnonn as calling for discrimination or perceive that authority figures prefer to
\nhave as few minority workers as possible, even low prejudiced people may discriminate
\nto comply with those demands.
\nHate crimes are criminal offenses in which evidence shows the victims were
\nchosen because of their group membership. Hate crime offenders are primarily
\nyoung men. Several motives exist for hate crime. The most common seems to
\nbe thrill seeking: People are bored and see picking on or assaulting a member of
\nan outgroup as a way of getting some excitement. They often have no strong
\nanimosity toward their victlins’ groups; they choose as targets members of groups
\nthey believe are unlikely to fight back or to report the crime. Tliey often justify
\ntheir actions by minimizing their impact on the victim or portraying their actions
\nas harmless fun. Defensive hate crimes are designed to drive outgroup members
\nfrom ingroup “territory” and to send a general message to other melnbers of the
\nvictim’s group to stay away. Retaliation crimes are carried out in response to an
\nactual or rumored hate crune against a member of the offender’s group. Mission
\nhate crimes occur because of a commitment to a bigoted ideology and to rid the
\nworld of a perceived evil. Peer group dynamics contribute to hate crimes because
\noffenders are often trying to impress members of the peer group, are going along
\nwith what they see as the group nonn, or have succumbed to group pressure to
\nparticipate. Community norms also can facilitate hate crimes by viewing them as
\nnormal behavior and refraining from disapproving of or punishing them. Factors
\nthat can inhibit people from conunitting hate crimes include lack of opportunity,
\nfear of negative consequences, religious or moral beliefs, or knowing a member of
\nthe targeted group.
\nHate crimes generally have more severe psychological consequences for their
\nvictinlS than do nonbias-motivated crimes, and those effects last longer. The
\neffects may be more severe and longer lasting because hate crime victims feel
\nthat they cannot do anything to avoid being victimized in the future. However,
\nnot all hate crime victims see the experience in the same way and how they view
\nthe experience can change over time. Hate crimes also result in secondary victimization:
\nA hate crime has negative psychological effects not only on the victim, but
\nalso on other members of the victim’s group, who experience heightened anxiety
\nover the possibility of becoming victims themselves.
\nSUGGESTED READINGS
\nThe Relation of Prejudice to Discrimination
\nCrandall, C. S., Eshleman, A., & O’Brien, L. (2002). Social norms and the expression
\nand suppression of prejudice: The struggle for internalization. Journal 4 Personality
\nand Social Psychology, 82, 359-378.
\nCrandall and his colleagues present a set of studies on the role of social nonns in
\nprejudice and discrimination.
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 415
\nRegressive Prejudice
\nCrandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). Ajustification-suppression model of the expression
\nand experience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129,414-446.
\nThis article includes a comprehensive review of factors that act as releasers of
\nregressive prejudice, which Crandall and Eshleman refer to as justifications.
\nReactions to Having Acted Prejudiced
\nCzopp, A. M., & Monteith, M.]. (2003). Confronting prejudice (literally): Reactions to
\nconfrontations of racial or gender bias, Personality aHd Social Psychology Bulletin, 29,
\n532-544.
\nDevine, P. G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with
\nand without compunction, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60,817-830.
\nDevine and colleagues’ article describes some of the initial theory and research
\non how people with unprejudiced self-concepts react to having acted in
\na prejudiced manner. Czopp and Monteith examine the issue in the context
\nof responses to having acted in a prejudiced manner toward different groups.
\nOrganizational Discrimination
\nRoberson, L., & Block, C. J. (2001). Racioethnicity and job perfonnance: A review and
\ncritique of theoretical perspectives on the causes of group differences. Research in
\nOtgal1izational Behavior, 23, 247-325.
\nRoberson and Block discuss four models of factors that affect minority group members’
\nwork perfonnance. Although the discussion focuses on work perfonnance, the
\nprinciples they discuss generalize to other processes, such as hiring and promotion.
\nHate Crimes
\nBlee, K. (2007). The microdynamics of hate violence: interpretive analysis and implications
\nfor responses. American Behavioral Scie11tist, 51, 258-270.
\nEhrlich, H. J. (1999). Campus ethnoviolence. In F. L. Pincus & H. J. Ehrlich (Eds.), Race
\nand ethnic conflict: Contending views 011 prejudice, discrimination, and ethl1ovioience (2nd ed.,
\npp. 277-290). Boulder, CO: Westview.
\nLevin, J., & McDevitt, J. (2002). Hate cdmes revisited: Amen’ca’s war ON those who are different.
\nBoulder, CO: Westview.
\nMcDevitt,]., Levin,]., & Bennett, S. (2002). Hate crime offenders: An expanded typology.
\nJournal of Social Issues, 58,303-317.
\nBlee interviewed victims of hate crimes and discusses the factors the influence
\ntheir interpretation of the event. McDevitt and his colleagues (2002) present an
\noverview of Levin and McDevitt’s\u00b7 (2002) typology of hate crime offenders.
\nLevin and McDevitt’s (2002) discuss the typology in more detail and provides a
\nnumber of case descriptions for each type. They also discuss issues involved in
\npolicing, public policy, and prevention, among others. Ehrlich (1999) discusses
\nthe problem of hate crime on college campuses, usually considered to be
\nbastions of tolerance (see also Levin and McDevitt’s Chapter 9).
\n416 CHAPTER 10
\nblatant discrimination
\ncovert discrimination
\ndiscrimination
\nhate crimes
\ninterpersonal
\ndiscrimination
\nKEY TERMS
\norganizational
\ndiscrimination
\nregressive racism
\n(prejudice)
\nsecondary victimization
\nshifting standards model
\nsocial noons
\nstereotype fit hypothesis
\nsubtle discrimination
\nQUESTIONS FOR REVIEW AND DISCUSSION
\n1. Define discrimination. How does discrimination differ from prejudice How
\nare the two concepts similar
\n2. Define the three fonus discrimination can take and give an example of each.
\nReview the types of contemporary prejudice we discussed in Chapter 6.
\nWhat forms of discrimination do you think those types of prejudice likely
\nresult in
\n3. Describe the factors that influence the relationship between prejudice and
\ndiscrimination. That is, under what conditions is prejudice most likely to
\nresult in discrimination
\n4. What are social nonns How are they related to prejudice and discrimination
\nWhat experiences have you had with social norms and prejudice and
\ndiscrimination
\n5. What is regressive prejudice Describe the factors that can precipitate it.
\nHave you observed any instances of regressive prejudice If so, describe them
\nand explain what factors led to the release of discriminatory behavior in
\nthose cases.
\n6. What is an employment audit Do you think that employment audits are
\neffective tools for studying discrimination in hiring Why or why not
\n7. What has research discovered about race and gender discrimination in
\nhiring What has research discovered about race and gender discrimination
\nin perfonnance evaluation
\n8. Researchers have found that Black workers usually get lower scores on
\nobjective measures of job perfonnance than do White workers. What is the
\nrelevance of this finding for interpreting race differences in supervisor
\nevaluations, which generally have a strong subjective element
\n9. What has research discovered about race and gender discrimination in
\npromotions What organizational factors might contribute to these
\ndifferences
\n10. Describe the costs and benefits for men who are in a female-dominated
\nprofession.
\nFROM PREJUDICE TO DISCRIMINATION 417
\n11. What is the stereotype fit hypothesis How does it explain race and gender
\ndifferences in hiring, perfonnance evaluation, and promotion
\n12. Describe how differences in the amount of respect that different social
\ngroups receive are related to organizational discrimination.
\n13. What is the shifting standards effect How does it explain race and gender
\ndifferences in hiring, perfonnance evaluation, and promotion
\n14. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain the role contemporary prejudice plays in orgartizational
\ndiscrimination.
\n15. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain the role confonnity to perceived nouns plays in organizational
\ndiscrimination.
\n16. If an employer believes that his White customers do not want to interact
\nwith people of other ethnicities, does that justify his decision not to hire
\nnon-White workers Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain your reasoning.
\n17. Rather than attributing the differential outcomes miuority and female
\nworkers experience in organizations to intentional discrimination, Smith and
\nElliott (2002) wrote that ‘We believe that something more subtle and
\nprofound occurs in the process of doing ‘business as usual’-lnere
\nmaintenance of the status quo is more than enough to perpetuate ‘”
\nstratification” (p. 274). Do you agree or disagree Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain the reasons for
\nyour position.
\n18. What are hate crones
\n19. Describe the characteristics of hate crime offenders.
\n20. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain how thrill seeking can motivate hate crimes. Who do thrill seekers
\nchoose as victims How do they justify their behavior
\n21. Some researchers believe that thrill-seeking hate crime offenders feel little
\nanimosity toward their victims or their groups. Do you agree or disagree
\nWrite my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain the reasons for your position.
\n22. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain territorial defense as a motivation for hate crimes.
\n23. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain retaliation as a motivation for hate crimes.
\n24. What are mission-motivated hate crimes Why do you think they are so
\nrare
\n25. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain the role that peer group dynamics play in hate crimes.
\n26. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain how community attitudes can affect the occurrence of hate crimes.
\n27. In what ways do the psychological consequences differ for the victims of
\nhate crimes and those of crimes not motivated by bias What causes these
\ndifferences
\n28. Write my Essay Online Writing Service with Professional Essay Writers – Explain the concept of secondary victimization.