Posted: March 17th, 2024

Russia’s Relationship with the West: Détente or Continued Confrontation?

Russia’s Relationship with the West: Détente or Continued Confrontation?

1. Introduction
The relationship between Russia and the West has been and continues to be a widely studied subject within the field of international politics and foreign affairs. Much has been written and discussed in academic and policy circles about the nature of this relationship, the reasons behind and the driving forces of its development, and the prospects of future developments. It is important to note that “the West” is not a fixed and strictly defined entity. Instead, it refers to the Western European and North American countries that have historically been associated with liberal democracy, capitalism and the free market, and individual freedoms and human rights. These countries are generally considered to exercise political, economic, and military influence, and to have a strong alliance with the United States, thus shaping and leading the global order and world politics. As for the purpose of this research essay, it aims to critically examine the current state of Russia’s relationship with the West by exploring the possibility of détente, as well as continued confrontation. By analysing both cooperative and conflicting aspects of this complex and multi-dimensional relationship, the essay expects to shed new light on the underlying forces and factors influencing the development of Russia-West relations. These forces and factors could help us to understand how realistic détente is, and why confrontation seems to be persistent in reality. If there have been any significant involvement of the West in any form in Russian internal activities, this could potentially be an area of research, as it would help to shed more light in understanding the development of Russia-West relationships. However, this essay does not attempt to draw comparisons between past developments and the present, as it recognises the world is constantly changing and evolving.
1.1 Background of Russia’s Relationship with the West
The roots of Russia’s relationship with the West can be traced back to the time of Peter the Great. In the early 18th century, Peter the Great embarked on a “Grand Embassy” to Europe, seeking political alliances and friendly relations with European powers in order to modernize and develop Russia. Inspired by the developments he saw in Western Europe, he initiated a series of modernizing reforms in Russia, such as the introduction of the western calendar, the creation of the first Russian navy, and the foundation of St. Petersburg as a new capital city. As a result, Russia became a significant power in European affairs. The period of the Russian Empire that followed saw continuous interaction with the West, but also repeated conflicts over clashing interests in Eastern Europe and control over Black Sea territories. This trend continued into the 19th and 20th centuries. For example, France and the United Kingdom backed the Ottoman Empire against Russia in the Crimean War, and Russia’s ambition for territorial expansion was often viewed with suspicion in Western Europe. After the October Revolution in 1917, which led to the establishment of the Soviet Union, Russia’s relationship with the West entered a new and different phase, characterized by ideological confrontation, mutual hostility and tensions as a result of the Cold War, which lasted for more than four decades until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
1.2 Purpose of the Research Essay
The purpose of the essay is to analyze in depth the prospects for Russia-West relations in the context of détente. This would necessarily involve examination of not only historical tensions and periods of cooperation, but also the current state of relations between Russia and the West – particularly tensions in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – and the wider global environment. In the course of the essay, I would seek to critically assess the extent to which the notion of détente might be achievable and the reasons behind both an improvement in relations and the continued existence of confrontation. It is hoped that a series of interrelated research questions, which the essay aims to examine, could be answered in the course of the research and writing process. Firstly, for example, the essay aims to consider whether different political and economic systems necessarily produce confrontation between Russia and the West, as per the “ideological incompatibility” hypothesis, or whether other factors better explain the periodic breakdowns in relations since 1991. Secondly, the essay aims to critically assess the relative importance of a number of different factors in the emergence of détente in history. For example, could it be argued that the human cost of the Cold War and heightened awareness of its potentially catastrophic consequences between the United States and the Soviet Union played a crucial role in allowing the peaceful dissolution of American global leadership? This might have significant implications for the present day, given the rise of China and the potential consequences of strained relations between the US and Russia.
1.3 Scope and Limitations
Broadly speaking, the essay covers the area of Russia’s relationship with the West in the context of international relations. However, the scope is limited to the period after the end of the Cold War, from 1991 to present. The end of the Cold War and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union necessarily marks a significant period in the chronology of Russia’s relationship with the West. As such, the essay does not attempt to provide a full and comprehensive historical survey of all time periods. A key reason is that a historical survey would take a lot of time and space, and also would not allow for the consideration of more recent events in this area. Furthermore, the political landscape and the international context that underpin Russia’s relationship with the West has changed fundamentally since the end of the Cold War. The essay aims to reflect this by providing a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of these changing dynamics, and their implications for the state of relations today and in the future. It is hoped that this will provide valuable insights for students of international relations to understand how politics in the post-Cold War era has shaped the current state of international relations.
2. Historical Overview
Early relations between Western countries, namely Russia, began in the 16th and 17th centuries. Even back then, Russia was considered to be an Asian country. It wasn’t until Peter the Great’s rule, in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, that Russia began to modernize and expand its diplomatic and economic relations in the West. The process of westernization continued until the early 20th century, with Catherine the Great and later the last tsar, Nicholas II. At the same time, the political relations were severely affected by the Napoleonic invasion and the Crimean War. However, the next turning point in the relations happened at the beginning of the 20th century when the powerful nation experienced a clash with the Western countries over the Russian future direction – Europe or Asia. The Revolution of 1917 and later the Civil War set the stage for more than 70 years of ideological confrontation – the Cold War. At the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet leader, Stalin, had nearly free reign over the Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe; this further cemented the great divide between the Western countries and the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, the world was divided into two camps, with the USA leading the capitalist West and the USSR heading the communist East. The Cold War was mainly played out through political propaganda by both sides, as well as a nuclear arms race and regional conflicts, such as the Vietnam War, the Korean War, and the Middle East crisis. Nowadays, Russia-West relations are still haunted by the remnants of the Cold War period. On one hand, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a hope for a new beginning in the relations; however, deep-seated mistrust and constant clashes of national interests soon led to further deterioration in political and diplomatic relations.
2.1 Early Relations between Russia and the West
Early relations between Russia and the West were complex and frequently characterized by antagonism and mutual suspicion. From the 16th to the late 17th century, Russia sought to increase its influence in Eastern Europe following the decline of Mongol power, eventually competing with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the control of Ukraine and Western Russia. The Grand Duchy of Moscow, the political entity that later evolved into the Russian Empire, was drawn into securitising relations with Swedish and Polish states. These contacts were overshadowed by fundamental religious and cultural differences. While Russia was schismatic after splitting from the ‘Romans’ in 1054 and saw herself as a potential defender of Orthodoxy in Europe, the Poles and the Swedes were Catholic countries and the common Catholic faith built a bridge between Western Europeans and the Commonwealth. This cultural division served to alienate Russia from closer contacts with the West and helped produce the deeply-held conviction that Russia was ‘different’ and did not belong to the ‘European’ family of nations. In addition to the support of the older European states, the West could provide the new Tsarist state with the benefits of gunpowder technology, which at that point far exceeded the military equipment and knowledge available to the Russians. The presence and dealings of Western European merchant communities along the rivers of Russia reinforced this belief. In fact, since the rivers themselves were crucial to the movement of Russian trade, the Tsars encouraged Westerners to stay and work in Russia for the benefits of their relatively advanced knowledge of maritime and rivercraft, and so Western Europeans had an increasingly visible presence in the new and expanding Russian state. This, in turn, fueled the traditionalist and religious elements of Russian society to oppose what they saw as an invading influence from Catholic parts of Europe and the ‘Latin heresy’. The aftermath of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars placed an additional and significant strain on Russo-Western European relations. Tsarist Russia had emerged as one of the victors of the 1815 Congress of Vienna and had taken a prominent role in the formation and execution of the Holy Alliance. This was an association of European monarchs, including those of Britain, Austria, and Prussia, formed with the ostensible aim of maintaining the traditional structures of European society and rolling back the tide of revolutionary and constitutional changes that had occurred during and after the Napoleonic period. However, many of the policies that the Tsar proposed and in some cases actively supported on the international stage, such as the suppression of popular revolts against established autocracies and absolute monarchies, brought into sharp disagreement the autocracy of Russia and the more liberal societies of Western Europe. This led to open diplomatic crises such as the Eastern Question of the 1830s and 1840s and the Crimean War, when Britain and France both took the side of the Ottoman Empire against Russian encroachments in the Black Sea region. These incidents cemented in the Russian political mind the idea that the European states would always be opposed to Russian motives and might seek to interfere in the domestic governance of Russia itself.
2.2 Cold War Era and the Soviet Union
The October Revolution of 1917 led to five decades when the Soviet Union, under Communist Party rule, was an antagonist to the Western world. The capital of the Soviet Union was Moscow, but Russia was the biggest and most politically powerful of the 15 countries that made up the Soviet Union. After Russia’s departure from the war, the Bolshevik government, led by Lenin, began negotiating peace with Germany. This led to the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. In that treaty, which was highly controversial and caused great resentment towards both the Bolsheviks and the Germans, Russia gave away much of its land and was forced to give up Poland, Ukraine, and Finland. When the Bolsheviks took power in November 1917, they believed that they could spread communism and overthrow the world’s capitalists by supporting communist movements in other countries. From 1917 to 1921, a civil war raged in Russia between the Bolsheviks and the White Armies, who were made up of tsarists, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and anti-Bolsheviks in general. The White Armies were backed by many of Russia’s former allies in the war. However, the state of the Russian economy made it very difficult for Russia to exist in isolation from the rest of the world. A strong economy was needed to help finance industrial growth and the Communist Party rule, which was also vital in securing the Bolshevik grip on power. However, Russia was mainly an agricultural economy, and nearly 80% of the population were peasants. The few factories that existed were in no fit state to be able to help with the modernization needed to catch up with the rest of the world. As a result of these factors, Russia can be seen as needing some sort of aid from or cooperation with the outside world. Also, America, for example, was worried about Russia’s withdrawal from the First World War. As there had been some American involvement in fighting the Germans, and as the US had sent supplies to the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War, it can be suggested that America was very interested in what would happen to Russia after the war. This indicates that the topic question under analysis – whether Russia is heading towards détente with the West or continued confrontation – is something that can be traced right back to the breakup of the Russian Empire and the loss of influence and power that resulted. So, it seems that the echoes of the historical power struggles between Russia and the West are ones that have a continuing impact nowadays. That is why it is important for us to understand the history of Russia’s relationship with the West, to see the context and the reasons why relations have been difficult and why Russia has sometimes formed alliances with Western countries and sometimes been in opposition to them. This will be the focus of my second section of the essay, and I will use the evidence gathered to consider different viewpoints on potential future outcomes for détente or confrontation.
2.3 Post-Cold War Period and Changing Dynamics
The 1990s started with Russia losing its vast imperial lands and most of its regional and global influence. President Boris Yeltsin, who came to power after President Gorbachev, initiated radical reforms in the political and economic structures. Russia emerged as a sovereign and independent state, and the period of confrontation with the West came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Always supporting the demand for democracy and as the leader of the largest regional association of member nations in the world – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as showing readiness for cooperation in arms control by signing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, Russia made the first steps to adjust its foreign policy to the new international system and the interests of its neighbors. However, the perception of democracy building along both sides of the Atlantic was quite divergent, with Russia and the European Union heading towards closer cooperation and strategic partnership during the 2000s. Russia’s relations with the United States were marked by controversies and misinterpretations. And during the previous decade, Moscow and Brussels signed a long list of the four Common Spaces, including those related to political cooperation, economic integration, justice, freedom and security, and the creation of a united space of research and education. More than 20 sectoral dialogues have been launched on various aspects of the EU-Russia cooperation. As a result, a comprehensive and significant op-ed title was approved by both the European and Russian leadership, ending up with the official declaration proclaiming the establishment of the EU-Russia strategic partnership in May 2005. At the same time, Russia was rotating among the world’s biggest economies and integrating into the global economic system.
And with President Putin gaining popularity and winning his first presidential election, Russia became more confident in their foreign policies. However, with the United States accusing the Kremlin of infringements of human rights and freedom and endangering world security by the initiative of the Millennium Challenge Account, the relationships started to deteriorate. The decade of 2010s has seen a great worsening of the world’s security picture and deepening disagreements between great powers, particularly within the West. Now with such critical times, it sometimes really might make more sense to talk about détente. However, these need to be examined within the framework of the broader historical and contemporary changes in the relations between the US, Europe, and Russia. Currently, we are in a period of practical confrontation, already started by the Ukraine crisis. On the other hand, there is no way to say that the signs for possible détente are absent. The most famous example in this regard is probably the joint Russian-American operations in Syria, which partially contradicted the disagreements and non-cooperation in the Ukrainian events. So, the interpretation and the assessment of the perspectives of those relations are essentially contested.
3. Current State of Relations
Today, Russia-West relations are at a post-Cold War low. There are no significant areas of cooperation and dialogue; instead, both sides have taken measures to limit each other’s influence. On a global scale, Russia is not trying to build an anti-Western coalition; its main goal is strategic autonomy. ‘Strategic autonomy’ does not mean isolationism; rather, it refers to an ability to make independent decisions on national security and economic development. This term has become increasingly popular in Russian foreign policy debates. A number of political and military initiatives have been developed on the basis of this principle recently. For instance, Russia signed the Treaty on the Creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, which came into effect in January 2015. According to the treaty, the Union guarantees the free movement of capital, goods, services and people and provides for common policies in key sectors such as energy, industry, agriculture, and transport. This reflects Russia’s willingness to increase its economic and political power in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Eastern Europe. However, recent proposals and projects show that there is a considerable Eastern and Asia-Pacific vector in Russia’s foreign policy. The Belt and Road Initiative is a global development strategy adopted by the Chinese government; the project is expected to enhance regional connectivity and embrace the global dark. On 8th July 2016, Russia, Mongolia, and China signed an agreement on supporting the alignment of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Silk Road Economic Belt initiative, and Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’ program. By doing so, it is believed that the link between the EAEU and the Belt and Road Initiative will become shorter. This indicates not only the diversity of Russia’s geopolitical aspirations but also its willingness to forge stronger ties with Eurasian and Asia-Pacific states through multilateral initiatives.
3.1 Political and Diplomatic Interactions
In addition to dialogue, postures of deterrence have become more evident in recent years, corresponding to the breakdown in previous efforts at mediation and with issues such as Ukraine and the expansion of NATO, as well as the specific focus on missile defense and the so-called “weaponization of space.” The Bulgarian and Czech decisions to host facilities for the American missile shield prototype and radar despite local opposition in 2007 illustrate a case where American, rather than European, involvement in Russia’s “near abroad” exacerbated tensions and led to a degradation of relationships. For Meier and Nicola, the manner in which decisions made in Washington and the timing of policy announcements by the Bush administration “marginalized” Europe, creating a rift in US-EU relations and exacerbating a sense of insecurity in Russia itself. This has particularly deteriorated in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis; while the EU’s commitment to the fledgling Eastern Partnership was oste
3.2 Economic Cooperation and Trade
In the economic field, the European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner and foreign investment source. Following a peak volume of trade in 2012, EU-Russia trade steadily declined as a result of the 2008-2012 global financial crisis, the Ukrainian crisis, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions against Russia. Russia is, in turn, the EU’s third largest trading partner after the United States and China and the fourth largest trading partner of the EU in 2017. It is also the third largest extra-EU importer of goods in 2017 (6% of EU imports) and the fourth largest extra-EU exporter in 2017 (7.4% of EU exports). In 2007, Russia was the destination for 7% of both EU exports and imports. In the same year, 22% of Russian exports (valued at €66 billion) went to the EU and 30% of Russian imports came from the EU (valued at €94 billion). In 2017, 44% of non-EU EEA exports went to Russia and 20% of non-EU EEA imports originated in Russia. In 2018, 53.3% of all natural gas and coal imports to the EU came from Russia. However, the share of Russian fossil fuels (natural gas and coal) in total EU imports has significantly decreased from over 50% in the late 1990s to about 40% in recent years. This has been accompanied by a big increase in imports from Africa, America, and Asia for the same products. According to the WTO, Russia’s share in global trade was less than 3.4% in 2016, which is still less than the share of its predecessor, the Soviet Union. In general, the largest component of trade is sea transport, which makes up 19% of exports and 20% of imports. The second largest trade flows are rail and truck transport. Air transport makes up less than 1% of Russia’s trade volume. However, EU-Russia air and maritime transport to Russia are still managed based on the agreements that included Russia in the EU. This is subject to change, as air transport agreements require the participation of the member states’ airlines under European Community Aviation Law. The access to market for air transport is mainly concerned with trust, passenger traffic, and investment between Russia and the EU. It would be reasonable to increase Russian-EU air relations, but the restriction of this agreement comes within capacity, frequency, and routing in traffic rights for both air freight and passenger airlines. As a result, only large metropolitan areas such as Moscow and major cities like St Petersburg and Rostov could provide air traffic services to the EU and from the EU. For maritime transport, a 12-mile limit sea-change access in Russia has been granted for the use of loading and unloading seaports, mooring facilities, and Russian nautical pilots under the WTO requirements. In the EU-Russia context, the Nord Stream project and significantly, the North-South Transportation Corridor (NSTC) project, which aims at connecting the Indian Ocean (and Iran) and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea and further to northern Europe via Russia, could offer potential for the EU to develop an improving relation in a trade opportunity to Russia, in which the EU could provide technology for the realization of the project and Russia could gain higher trade satisfaction with other members that are involving (consequence of NSTC not being able to compete with the EU). However, these openings may be overshadowed by the concerns of the reliance on Russian natural gas, European companies’ involvement, the likelihood of economic inequality among members, and the risk of them taking sides against the others, as it is the case in the Sanctions Regime. An example of the effects of current EU economic sanctions against Russia can be shown through the Mistral-class ships’ suspension. Due to tensions in Ukraine, France was forced to cancel a cooperation agreement with Russia and suspended the contract of selling two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships to Russia.
3.3 Military and Security Concerns
Military and security concerns. When compared with the previous two sections, there are more specifics that are articulated referring to military and security concerns of both the Western countries and Russia. Countries that are members of NATO are gradually moving their deployment and movement of the military force closer to Russia’s external border. This consistent pattern of endangering Russia will surely impel Russia to develop and deploy its military force in order to protect its own national security. This in return will lead to the saga of realism, that is the security dilemma, in which one country would tend to enhance their military power when perceiving its national security is being threatened by other countries’ military deployment, but the action itself taken by the first country would further contribute to the insecurity and fear felt by the opposing countries. On a similar note, the wordings of Russia’s security concern were reiterated in the National Security Strategy of the United States in 2015, in which Russia has been labelled as aggressive and defensive military capabilities, which contradicted the interest of the US, its allies and partners, which are seeking regional hegemony and intimidating further countries. Moreover, the adoption of a new approach of reinforcing nuclear deterrence and lowering the threshold for using such weapons while Russia is reducing its reliance on nuclear, which means that the US is triggering yet another arms race globally and degrading strategic stability. The United States is providing military support, training and modernizing the Ukraine’s forces in terms of the military capabilities, aiming for the objective of strengthening the hold of the Ukrainian territories, in which Crimea is lost due to the referendum and the following decision of Russia that Crimea became part of Russia. The use of the word reclaiming was argued and different perspectives were brought out in the section of military and security concerns in a qualitative aspect, but the total absence of mentioning any of the concerns that Russia has and in fact the emphasizing of the critical appearance of western interest and military action has indeed depicted a biased and one-sided national security policy against Russia.
3.4 Cultural Exchanges and People-to-People Contacts
In 2015, Russia and Europe designated it as the ‘Russia-EU Year of Cultural Heritage’ in order to further enhance cooperation. According to an announcement from the EU Delegation to Russia, a range of projects was scheduled in the framework of the Year of Cultural Heritage, such as exhibitions, concerts, exchange projects in the field of museums, cinematography, and popularization of cultural values. The goal was to promote dialogue, exchanges, and mutual enrichment of cultures. Also in 2015, during the Russian Culture Festival in France, the Russian and French sides signed an agreement to hold events in each other’s countries during 2016 and 2017, which were designated as Years of Russia in France and France in Russia, accordingly. Also, there is significant involvement with the European Union in the area of people-to-people cooperation. The EU-Russia Visa Facilitation Agreement entered into force in 2007, allowing citizens easier and cheaper travel within the EU. However, the work of the agreement was suspended since 2014. In fact, the citizens in 20 Russian cities had the opportunity to visit a German Visa Centre, which started operating in 2012, in order to apply for a visa to visit Germany and Latvia. It should be noted that NATO and some Western countries have adopted policies that restrict people-to-people contacts with Russia. For example, under Phase One of the British Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations (the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020), entry to the UK is denied to people listed in the first schedule of the regulation, which includes those involved in the death of Sergei Magnitsky and individuals responsible for human rights violations. On September 4, 2020, the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office confirmed that legislation making kind of a UK Magnitsky sanctions regime has been laid before the Parliament. On December 21, 2020, 6 individuals have been designated under the UK Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. On February 19, 2021, 7 individuals and 2 entities involved in gross human rights violations were listed under the UK Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. On March 22, 2021, 10 individuals and 6 entities were included in the UK sanctions list. Such practices would thwart informal influence and close dialogue between peoples, including stifling cultural and educational interactions. On the contrary, parliaments of some countries stimulate cultural cooperation. For instance, in a resolution of 2013, the Spanish Senate called for the intensification of cultural links between Spain and Russia. The resolution states that regular bilateral contacts in areas of social life, culture, science, and education are important for mutual understanding between countries and their citizens. It also emphasizes the necessity to establish a wider network of Spanish-Russian regional cooperation. It should be noted that such a resolution was adopted on the initiative of the Senate Foreign Affairs and the European Union Committee, thus, it reflects the official position of the upper chamber of the Spanish parliament. In this aspect, the approach of the Spanish Senate is rather unusual. However, Spain is not the only country that seeks closer cultural cooperation with Russia. Similar examples can be found elsewhere. On the other hand, parliaments of some countries stimulate cultural cooperation. For example, in a resolution of 2013, the Spanish Senate called for the intensification of cultural links between Spain and Russia. The resolution states that regular bilateral contacts in areas of social life, culture, science, and education are important for mutual understanding between countries and their citizens. It also emphasizes the necessity to establish a wider network of Spanish-Russian regional cooperation.
4. Prospects for the Future
It is anticipated that in 2021 there is no hydrocarbon consumption increase worldwide. As predicted by experts, energy consumption volatility will be a norm in the future, not an exception. Gas, oil, coal will coexist with nuclear power and renewables and, as a consequence, this mix is likely to remain for the nearest future. In 2020 Russia has shown its resilience to the external shocks and has not abandoned its energy expansion plans. Quite the opposite, the year 2020 became the latest proof of the Russian increasing energy dependence in Asia and the active development of the NSR project, which is likely to be completed by 2030. However, the Russian future in contributing the world energy mix may be uneasy due to continuing energy revolutions and the proclaimed policy of the EU to seek climate neutrality by 2050. Currently, Russia’s economy is not flexible and innovative enough to rely upon the green digital technologies and it will be a serious challenge for the Russian Federation to take the niche between the major energy exporters and survive as a superpower. As a result, Russia may have to shift its energy production towards greener technologies and adapt its energy policy and domestic laws to match the EU climate targets. Furthermore, as the EU is the major importer of the Russian energy resources, Russia may face political pressure from the European Parliament, which could potentially restrict access to the EU market and thus cut off a significant portion of the Russian export economy. However, President Putin disregards European threats and seeks to expand the Russian gas supply to China, strengthen its positions in the Middle East (construction of the nuclear power plant in Turkey, the continuous support of the Assad regime).
For now, there is no political will in the Russian government to undergo serious energy policy transformations and Russian foreign policy and economy remain critically dependent on hydrocarbon export. While President Putin is striving to maintain the status quo, new generations of Russian politicians should focus on the ongoing global energy transformations and seek broader energy cooperation and modernisation to avoid the situation when Russia’s key partners in the EU will leave the Russian energy behind due to greener policies. Also, the international community has to recognise and engage in extensive technology sharing from the EU and the United States to assist the Russia’s economic adaptation to the global energy crisis.
4.1 Factors Influencing Russia-West Relations
The geographical factor is one of the most influential factors determining Russia-West relations. As an Eurasian country, Russia has Europe and Asia as the two districts that are most significant to Russia’s economy and security. The desire to gain strategic depth and to keep potential admirers away from Russia drives Russian foreign policy to strengthen relations with countries in Eastern Europe and those in Asia; to this end, Russia aims at keeping the regions more or less divided, by promoting multilateralism in Europe and advocating regional cooperation in Asia. As for the United States, it is natural for the superpower to aim for global leadership and try to incorporate as many countries as possible in its sphere of influence. Geography also plays a critical role in shaping Russian leaders’ perception and attitudes towards the West. The ‘centuries long antagonistic and violent relationship’ between Russia and Europe makes most Russian politicians suspicious of the intentions of the Western countries. This is particularly amplified after the two waves of NATO expansion in Eastern Europe: the number of member countries increased from 16 to 26 between 1999 and 2009, with the inclusion of 12 countries in the Eastern Europe. Such action is generally perceived by Russian politicians and public as a sign of the intention of the US and other Western powers to isolate Russia and ‘to establish an order of winners and vanquished’. Secondly, the political factor is another influential factor impacting on Russia-West global relations. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia went through ‘a chaotic decade of political and economic liberalisation’ under the government of President Yeltsin. The US, portraying itself as an ally offering necessary help, continuously intervened in Russia’s domestic politics by supporting one favoured candidate after another. More importantly, apart from a few cases of criticism, the Western world has shown no reflection on whether democracy is truly working for the best interests of the people in Russia. Instead, ‘Western capitals support Russian liberals who promote formal democracy and economic liberalism.’ Influenced by what he perceives as ‘Western indulgence into decades of Russian crony capitalism and authoritarianism’, President Putin pursued a new course in Russian politics since his first term. Therefore, from a realist’s perspective, this nature of power struggle is unlikely to change much, given that ‘great powers are in constant competition for power and control over territory and populations’. One can argue that the final fact in support of this worsening nature of Russia-West global relations can be identified as the rise of the unipolar world. As suggested by the realist belief in the primacy of self-help among sovereign states, the ‘United States has acted as a global, preventative hegemony since the end of the Cold War.’ Bush’s doctrine on ‘pre-emptive self-defense’ supports this view that the US ‘has taken it upon itself to act as the world’s sole superpower and policeman.’ While the US attempts to shape its own idea of international order and to ‘unseat nationalist leaders that fail to support US ideals’, it does not bode well for a multipolar equilibrium in global politics. Besides, the challenge and competition coming from the other great powers, China and Russia in particular, may serve to intensify the zero-sum mentality of international relations due to finite resources and influence. The global realist view from John Mearsheimer indicates that when a rising power rivals an established power, ‘deteriorating security is nearly inevitable’ and ‘great powers today seek to maximise their share of the world’s resources.’ All these serve to validate the potential escalations in Russia-West tension, marking the shift from individual struggle for advantage on a national scale to a more widespread conflict, both in terms of the number of players involved and the scope of interests that need to be managed.
4.2 Potential Areas of Cooperation
Opponents of continued Western pressure on Russia and of maintaining sanctions cite potential areas of cooperation that could prove mutually beneficial and lead to improved relations between Russia and the West. One such area is the fight against international terror. Despite the differing appraisals of individual conflict situations, leading political figures in both Russia and the West have repeatedly emphasized the danger of transnational terror and have called for greater international cooperation to counteract it. For example, Gorbachev points out that the Paris attacks of 2015 proved to the West that “Russia is not only a country to point a finger at and demonstrate its disagreement with its foreign policy.” Rather, the attacks had driven home that Russia was a key ally in the struggle. Indeed, Russia’s relations with Europe began to move in a somewhat more constructive direction after President Hollande adopted a more conciliatory line with Russia and invited Putin to coordinate the military efforts of the West and Russia in Syria which, in turn, supported the hampering of ties between Russia and China that Russian military expansionism was allegedly supposed to have furthered. Such cooperation is of significant practical importance, not least because the extremist militant group known as Islamic State is both active in the Middle East and has been linked to successful and thwarted attacks in both Russia and the West. Current Research on Russia-West Relations, 36-50. Prof. Dr. habil. Adela Rozalska 2016.
4.3 Challenges and Obstacles to Détente
The quest for détente between Russia and the West is hindered by a range of deep-seated challenges and obstacles that have developed over a long period of distrust and hostility. First and foremost among these is the persisting legacy of the Cold War and the deep rifts of suspicion that were engendered during that period of intense security competition and the ever-present threat of nuclear conflict. The enduring memories of this age, which shaped the attitudes and doctrines of several generations of leaders and ordinary citizens, have been used to justify confrontation and zero-sum security policies. Ideological differences over international politics, and often competing visions for the global order, serve to underline and intensify these security-based concerns. At times, especially in the early and later stages of the Putin era, these differences have been inflamed and exploited by politicians on both sides for their own domestic political purposes. The increasingly autocratic nature of Russian governance and the degradation of democracy and human rights within Russia itself form a third strand of obstacles to achieving détente. Many in the West find it morally and practically unacceptable to engage in collaboration and partnership with a Russia that is seen to consistently fail to uphold international norms or respect the sovereignty and political equality of other states in the global community. This is not only a barrier to successful foreign policy from the Western perspective, it also presents an obstacle to progressive political change within Russia itself through the model of gradual integration into the institutions and practices of the international liberal order. The increasingly multicultural and multi-ethnic character of Western societies, particularly in Europe, has worked to heighten the importance of human rights considerations in foreign policy relative to the past. Historically, it is clear that human rights were often the first casualty in times of tension during the Cold War and afterwards. However, the emergence of policies of inclusivity, diversity and intercultural dialogue set against the backdrop of rising political instability and extremism in Europe has meant that there is now a more direct public expectation that foreign policy should incorporate and reflect these principles of mutual respect and the upholding of political and civil freedoms. With this in view, the steady erosion of civic liberties within Russia, and the dangers posed to public opposition and minority rights, are impediments to any serious attempt at détente from the Russian side.
4.4 Implications for Global Politics
The potential implications of Russia-West interactions for global politics are enormous and wide-ranging. If the parties are able to overcome the differences and shift to the ‘détente’ type of relationship, it will be considered a significant development towards a more peaceful and stable global order. Historically, the Cold War bipolar systems and its associated alliances and confrontations generated an environment where a war initiated by any of the superpowers could escalate to, in the worst-case scenario, a global nuclear holocaust. In that context, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War were widely welcomed as a gateway to a more balanced and peaceful world order under the hegemony of the only remaining superpower – the United States. However, the rise of other regional powers and the latest rise of Russia as a renewed superpower alternative to the US raised the debate about the likelihood of a multipolar global system. Multipolar global systems could provide an alternative to the decades-old US-led global order and change the ways in which global power is distributed, exercised, and balanced. Especially after the Ukraine crisis and the onset of the new ‘Cold War’, in recent years some Western and Russian political analysts argued that Russia made her choice and started to fundamentally challenge the Western-dominated order. Proponents of this perspective frequently highlighted the increased level of Russian assertiveness and a more aggressive posture against the West, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea, military interventions in Syria and Ukraine, and also the alleged interference with the US presidential elections. It is believed that a multipolar global system could moderate the decisions and actions of any particular superpower, as the presence of other powerful countries would create counterbalances. Historically, some scholars stated that this is indeed how the ‘balance of power’ system allowed the major powers in Europe to maintain peace and stability between the 17th and 19th centuries. On the other hand, a global order under the hegemony of one single superpower is defined by unipolarity. Proponents of the unipolarity perspective generally voiced concerns that a multipolar global system could lead to power struggles, balance-of-power diplomacy, and in the worst-case scenario – an alliance-geared confrontation among superpowers. But such a scenario would inevitably pose a great threat to global peace and stability. It is important to notice that the actual realization of a more balanced global order under a multipolar structure is still under a great deal of speculation and no consensus has been reached among scholars and politicians.

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