The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism, Anti-Theodicy and the Limits of Explanation

Institution: University of Essex, School of Philosophical, Historical, and Interdisciplinary Studies
Module: PY407-5-SP-CO Philosophy and Religion (Level 5, 15 credits)
Study period: Spring term, 2026
Assessment: Assessment 2, essay (Assessment 1 is the two page essay plan)
Length: 2,000 words, excluding the reference list
Referencing: Harvard, author and date in the body, page numbers for every direct quotation
Weighting: 50 percent of the module mark, with the essay plan carrying a further 30 percent
Submission: electronic copy through the module Moodle dropbox by 12 noon on the published deadline

Assessment Context

PY407 Philosophy and Religion at the University of Essex builds its whole spring term around one objection to theism. The module description is blunt about the shape of the problem: how can there be a God who is supremely wise, powerful and good, given the evils we suffer, both natural and human? The teaching draws on classic texts and on live debates in analytic philosophy of religion, then adds attention to the phenomenological and ethical dimensions that traditional discussion has often set aside. Assessment 2 asks for a 2,000 word essay that answers a set question and takes a position, since the module’s learning outcomes centre on comparing arguments, assessing the limits of your own procedure, and processing a large volume of conflicting material.

Two features of this module shape the essay more than anything else. Assessment is entirely by coursework, with no examination, so the essay carries unusual weight. The module’s own aims also require you to develop a position on whether the human predicament calls for a religious or an atheistic response, which means a survey of what other philosophers think will not satisfy the brief. The essay plan submitted earlier in the term provides the skeleton. The essay must build on that plan rather than depart from it in silence.

Task Description

Answer one question from the list below in 2,000 words. State your answer as a thesis in the first paragraph, defend it with argument rather than exposition, and engage at least one opposing position at its strongest.

Set Questions

1. Does the evidential problem of evil survive skeptical theism?
2. Assess the claim that theodicy is morally offensive, and that we should abandon the project altogether.
3. Is the existence of gratuitous evil incompatible with the existence of an all perfect God?
4. Can a non-identity theodicy justify God’s permission of horrendous suffering?
5. Do analytic treatments of the problem of evil neglect the ethical and phenomenological dimensions of suffering?
6. Does the distinction between the logical and the evidential problem of evil do any real work, or does it disguise the strength of the atheological case?

Requirements

1. Define the version of the problem you are addressing. The logical, evidential, and existential formulations are not interchangeable, and the essay must say which one it takes up.
2. State a thesis in the opening paragraph. An essay that concludes that the question is complicated will score in the lower second band.
3. Explain the argument you oppose before you attack it. Present the strongest formulation available in the literature, not the version that is easiest to defeat.
4. Distinguish theodicy from defence. A defence shows that a proposition is possibly true; a theodicy claims to identify God’s actual reasons. Confusing the two is the single most common conceptual error in this field.
5. Use at least eight scholarly sources, four of them peer reviewed articles or monographs published since 2010.
6. Quote primary philosophical texts precisely and cite page numbers. A paraphrase of Mackie or Plantinga without a page reference will be penalised under the referencing criterion.
7. Address one objection that your own position cannot easily answer, and say what it would take to defeat your view.
8. Follow Harvard referencing throughout. Wikipedia, lecture slides, and study websites do not count as scholarly sources.

Required Structure

Section 1: Framing the Question

Approximately 250 words. Locate the question within the module’s debates, define your terms, and state the thesis.

Section 2: The Argument Under Examination

Approximately 450 words. Reconstruct the strongest version of the position you will challenge.

Section 3: Your Case

Approximately 700 words. Build the argument in numbered steps, each labelled, so the reader can see where the weight sits.

Section 4: Objections and Replies

Approximately 400 words. Take the best objection, not the most convenient one.

Section 5: Conclusion

Approximately 200 words. State what you have established, and what remains open.

Companion Assessment: The Two Page Essay Plan

The plan submitted earlier in the term carries 30 percent of the module mark and must contain five items on no more than two pages. State the chosen question at the top. Give the thesis in two sentences. Outline the argument in five or six numbered steps. List five sources with a note on what each contributes. Name the strongest objection you expect to face. Plans are marked on the accuracy of the reconstruction and the feasibility of the argument, so a plan that promises more than 2,000 words can deliver will lose marks at that stage rather than later.

Marking Criteria

Feedback and Marking Process

Essays are marked anonymously through Moodle with Turnitin enabled. Feedback returns within fifteen working days as a completed rubric plus prose comment identifying one line of argument to develop. Marks follow the University’s Common Marking Scheme for Level 5, and the boundary between 69 and 70 is applied strictly: an essay reaches the First band when it argues a position that a competent philosopher could contest, not when it reports one accurately.

Academic Integrity

Submit original work. Unattributed paraphrase counts as plagiarism in the same way as unattributed quotation, and Essex applies the same procedure to both. Turnitin reports are reviewed for text matching and for indicators consistent with generated prose. Reusing an essay submitted for another module, at Essex or elsewhere, falls under the misconduct regulations even where the earlier submission was your own.

Learning Materials and References

Coley, S. M. (2021) ‘The problem of evil, skeptical theism and moral epistemology’, Religions, 12(5), 313. doi:10.3390/rel12050313.

Franklin, J. (2020) ‘Antitheodicy and the grading of theodicies by moral offensiveness’, Sophia, 59(3), pp. 563–576. doi:10.1007/s11841-020-00765-w.

Hill, S. (2022) ‘Why God allows undeserved horrendous evil’, Religious Studies, 58(4), pp. 772–786. doi:10.1017/S003441252100038X.

Naraghi, A. (2022) ‘God, tragic dilemmas, and the problem of gratuitous evil’, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 61(2), pp. 311–324. doi:10.1017/S0012217321000354.

Oliveira, L. R. G. (2023a) ‘God and gratuitous evil: between the rock and the hard place’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 94(3), pp. 317–345. doi:10.1007/s11153-023-09883-0.

Oliveira, L. R. G. (2023b) ‘Skeptical theism: a panoramic overview (part I)’, Philosophy Compass, 18(10), e12947. doi:10.1111/phc3.12947.

Ooi, D. (2022) ‘Theodicy on trial’, Philosophia, 50(4), pp. 2015–2034. doi:10.1007/s11406-022-00493-0.

Verification note. The module title, code, level, credit value, term dates, learning outcomes, and the essay plan and essay weightings are published in the University of Essex module directory for PY407-5-SP-CO. Coursework patterns for earlier sittings record a two page plan and a 2,000 word essay across several academic years, with the quiz weighting adjusted between sittings. Confirm the reference style against your departmental handbook, since philosophy at Essex accepts more than one authorised convention provided it is applied consistently.

What a Strong Essay Argues

The strongest essays on the gratuitous evil question notice that the debate has quietly reversed direction, and they make that reversal part of the argument. Luis Oliveira points out that the long standing assumption, that God must have justifying reasons for every evil we observe, now has serious defenders of its denial, and he presses the consequence that on most accepted accounts of God’s reasons for permitting evil, human agents would also have justifying reasons for permitting the same horrors in God and gratuitous evil: between the rock and the hard place (Oliveira 2023a, 317). That symmetry challenge is genuinely uncomfortable for both camps, because it refuses the choice between a God with reasons and a world of pointless suffering. An essay that builds its case around the symmetry rather than around Rowe’s fawn will read as current, and it will also satisfy the requirement to name the version of the problem under discussion. Note the move being made here. The objection is no longer that evil counts against God, but that the standard defence of God costs too much elsewhere in moral theory. Defending that objection requires precision about individuating instances of evil, since Oliveira concedes that the point is vexed and then sets it aside. An essay that does not set it aside so quickly will find an original line to argue.

Anti-theodicy supplies the second half of a strong case, and it shifts the argument from metaphysics to moral cost. James Franklin grades theodicies by how offensive they are, and he reaches a conclusion that unsettles the usual ordering: soul making and free will theodicies carry real moral faults, while Leibniz’s best of all possible worlds theory, the one everybody enjoys mocking, escapes the charge because it excuses God through the impossibility of choosing better Antitheodicy and the grading of theodicies by moral offensiveness (Franklin 2020, 563). Daryl Ooi then argues that theodicists have answers to the global anti-theodicist challenge, but that a weaker version of it survives, and he proposes theodicies of embrace and protest that keep the explanatory work while conceding the moral criticism Theodicy on Trial (Ooi 2022, 2015). Taken together, these two papers let a student argue that the problem of evil has an ethical dimension that analytic treatment cannot bracket out. That is precisely the neglected dimension the module description flags. Strong essays quote Franklin’s grading principle, then test it against Ooi’s concession rather than accepting either wholesale.

Weighing the Symmetry Challenge

Oliveira’s two 2023 papers work well as a pair, and a student who reads both gains an advantage that most essays in the cohort will lack. His panoramic survey in Skeptical theism: a panoramic overview distinguishes three separate skeptical strategies, Wykstra’s on appearances, Bergmann’s on goods we know of, and van Inwagen’s on the possibility of worlds without suffering patterns, and it shows that each blocks a different argument rather than all of them at once (Oliveira 2023b, 4). Arash Naraghi offers a fourth route, arguing that the idea of a tragic dilemma can either justify God’s permission of gratuitous evil or support a theodicy of divine tragedy, so the argument from gratuitous evil fails whichever horn it takes (Naraghi 2022, 311). Scott Hill adds a non-identity theodicy that permits horrendous suffering on five stated conditions, including an infinitely good post-Resurrection existence for the creature who suffers (Hill 2022, 772). Placing these three side by side lets an essay say something specific about what each strategy buys and what each one costs. Skeptical theism buys epistemic humility and pays in moral knowledge, a point Scott Coley develops at length (Coley 2021, 313). Non-identity theodicy buys an explanation for horrific suffering and pays with a demanding metaphysics of origins. Naraghi’s tragic dilemma buys the possibility of divine justification and pays with the coherence of divine obligation. An essay organised around those exchanges will not need padding.

Objections Students Meet Most Often

Questions that come up repeatedly about this assignment have answers, and knowing them early saves a rewrite:

1. Can I write about the logical problem even though Plantinga settled it? Yes, provided you argue that the standard settlement is incomplete rather than pretending the debate is still where Mackie left it.
2. Do I need to decide whether God exists? No. The module assesses the strength of arguments about evil, and a confident theism or atheism asserted without argument scores poorly.
3. Is it acceptable to conclude that both sides have a point? Only if you specify which premise each side gets right and what follows for the other side’s conclusion.
4. How much exposition should the essay contain? Roughly a quarter. Beyond that, exposition displaces the argument the rubric actually rewards.

A related question surfaces every year. Students ask whether the essay may lean on Plantinga’s free will defence without engaging its critics. It may not, because the module’s learning outcomes require you to compare and evaluate arguments and to assess the limitations of your own position. Several of the newer strategies make the point concretely. Skeptical theism blocks evidential arguments from evil while leaving the existential complaint untouched, and Coley’s argument that it threatens moral knowledge suggests the cost is higher than its defenders admit (Coley 2021, 313). Naraghi’s tragic dilemma defence concedes that God may face genuine moral conflict, which many theists will find as costly as the problem it solves (Naraghi 2022, 313). Choose a strategy, state its price, and defend the purchase.

Phenomenology and Moral Cost

The essay will reach the top band more easily if it takes the module’s hint about neglected dimensions seriously. Analytic treatments tend to work with bare descriptions of suffering, and the philosophical point of those descriptions is that they strip away narrative so that the evidential weight can be assessed. Franklin’s grading exercise shows that this stripping has a moral price, since a theodicy that treats a child’s death as an instance of a type can be experienced by the bereaved as an insult (Franklin 2020, 566). Hill’s non-identity theodicy answers that worry by insisting on compensation for the particular creature who suffers, which is a move toward the personal and away from the aggregate (Hill 2022, 780). Add a paragraph on this shift and the essay demonstrates that it has read the module description rather than only the reading list. One caution belongs here. Do not import empirical psychology as though it settled a philosophical question, because a study of how people perceive pointlessness in suffering cannot by itself refute an argument from evil. Use it to show why a premise feels compelling, not to show that it is true.

Conclusion

Pick the question you can actually answer rather than the one that sounds grandest, because 2,000 words runs out faster than students expect. Write the objection section before the positive case, since the objection will tell you what your argument has to do. Read Oliveira’s survey first if you are new to this literature, as it maps a debate that otherwise looks like an unmanageable pile of papers. Keep the essay plan beside you while drafting, and if the argument drifts, change the thesis rather than letting the plan and the essay disagree. Footnote everything in Harvard and check the page numbers on direct quotations twice. Submit a day before the deadline so the Turnitin report can be read while there is still time to fix what it finds.

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Is Theodicy Morally Offensive? Anti-Theodicy and the Limits of Explaining Evil

Section 1: Framing the Question

The existence of suffering presents a serious challenge to belief in an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good God. The problem becomes particularly difficult when suffering appears unnecessary, excessive or unrelated to any moral wrongdoing. Philosophers have responded through theodicy, which attempts to identify God’s actual reasons for permitting evil, and defence, which argues that God’s existence remains logically possible despite suffering. Although these approaches address the problem of evil, they also raise a moral question: does explaining suffering risk treating victims as instruments for achieving greater goods?

Anti-theodicy argues that attempts to justify suffering may insult victims, weaken opposition to injustice and impose explanations on experiences that resist them. The concern extends beyond whether a theodicy succeeds intellectually. It asks whether the act of explaining suffering is morally appropriate in the first place. Franklin (2020) demonstrates that some established theodicies face serious moral objections, particularly when they present suffering as necessary for spiritual development or human freedom.

This essay argues that theodicy can become morally offensive when it presents horrendous suffering as justified or necessary for a greater good, but that abandoning the entire project is not warranted. Philosophical reflection remains legitimate when it distinguishes explanation from justification, recognises the limits of human knowledge and preserves the moral significance of suffering. The strongest position therefore rejects careless attempts to excuse evil without abandoning every attempt to understand its relationship to divine goodness.

Section 2: The Argument Under Examination

The moral case against theodicy

Anti-theodicy challenges the assumption that philosophical explanations of suffering necessarily serve a worthwhile purpose. Its central concern is that theodicies may transform individual suffering into an abstract philosophical problem. When a philosopher explains that suffering develops character, preserves freedom or contributes to a greater good, the victim’s experience risks becoming secondary to the theoretical explanation.

Franklin (2020) identifies moral problems in free-will and soul-making theodicies. The free-will defence argues that God permits moral evil because meaningful freedom requires the possibility of wrongdoing. Soul-making approaches, associated with the development of moral and spiritual character, suggest that suffering may contribute to personal growth. Both approaches attempt to connect suffering with goods that would otherwise be unavailable. However, their moral difficulty becomes apparent when they address severe suffering that destroys lives rather than develops character. A child experiencing prolonged abuse, for example, should not be described as suffering for the moral improvement of others. Such an explanation risks treating the child’s pain as a means to somebody else’s development.

Anti-theodicists therefore argue that theodicy may produce harmful consequences. It can encourage passive acceptance of suffering, weaken demands for justice or suggest that victims should interpret their experiences as necessary parts of a divine plan. Ooi (2022) examines this consequentialist objection and argues that theodicists can resist its strongest conclusion, although a weaker moral criticism remains. The objection matters because an explanation may appear intellectually coherent while producing harmful effects in practical life.

The distinction between theodicy and defence

The moral criticism also depends on distinguishing a theodicy from a defence. A theodicy claims to identify God’s actual reasons for permitting evil. A defence, in contrast, establishes that a possible explanation exists without claiming to know God’s actual intentions. The distinction matters because the defence makes a more limited claim.

Plantinga’s free-will defence, for example, attempts to establish that God and evil are logically compatible. It does not demonstrate that every instance of suffering serves a particular divine purpose. Consequently, the existence of a possible justification does not establish that a specific tragedy was necessary or morally justified.

Anti-theodicy becomes less convincing when it treats every philosophical defence as an attempt to explain an individual’s suffering. The distinction does not remove every ethical problem, but it prevents the criticism from becoming excessively broad. Philosophers can examine whether belief in God remains logically coherent without claiming that victims deserve suffering or that their experiences contribute to a beneficial outcome.

Section 3: The Case Against Complete Abandonment

Philosophical explanation can become morally offensive

The first argument supporting anti-theodicy concerns the moral treatment of victims. A theodicy becomes offensive when it presents an individual’s suffering as justified by benefits that the individual may never experience or accept. The problem is particularly serious when philosophers discuss horrendous suffering in general terms, without acknowledging the personal and social consequences involved.

Franklin (2020) argues that soul-making and free-will theodicies can carry genuine moral faults. His analysis suggests that philosophers should assess the moral implications of explanations rather than judge them solely by their logical strength. A theory that protects divine goodness by assigning instrumental value to a victim’s suffering may achieve its intellectual purpose at an unacceptable ethical cost.

However, the moral failure of some explanations does not establish that all explanations are offensive. A philosopher who investigates whether suffering contradicts divine goodness does not necessarily minimise suffering or excuse wrongdoing. The moral character of philosophical reflection depends partly on its claims, context and practical implications. The problem lies in justifying suffering without adequate grounds, not in asking philosophical questions about suffering itself.

Theodicy can weaken moral responsibility

The second argument concerns the consequences of explaining evil through divine purposes. If suffering forms part of a divine plan, individuals may conclude that preventing it would interfere with God’s intentions. Such reasoning could weaken responsibility toward victims, particularly where human beings possess the ability to prevent or reduce suffering.

Ooi (2022) acknowledges the force of this consequentialist objection while arguing that it does not establish the need to abandon theodicy altogether. His approach suggests that philosophical reflection can retain value while acknowledging the dangers of explaining suffering too confidently.

The practical distinction is important. A belief that God permits suffering does not logically require people to tolerate preventable harm. Religious traditions may encourage compassion, resistance to injustice and assistance to vulnerable people. Consequently, the moral consequences of theodicy depend partly on how believers interpret and apply its claims.

A defensible theodicy must therefore preserve human responsibility. It cannot treat suffering as acceptable merely because somebody believes it serves a divine purpose. Any explanation that discourages intervention against abuse, oppression or disease creates a serious moral problem.

Skeptical theism limits certainty without eliminating responsibility

Skeptical theism offers another response to the problem of evil. Its central argument holds that human beings possess limited knowledge of God’s purposes and therefore cannot confidently determine whether apparently pointless suffering serves a greater good. Oliveira (2023b) identifies several forms of skeptical theism, including approaches that question human judgments about the appearance of gratuitous evil.

The position challenges the assumption that human beings can identify every morally relevant reason God might possess. However, its implications extend beyond the problem of evil. Coley (2021) argues that skeptical theism raises concerns for moral epistemology because excessive skepticism about divine reasons may undermine confidence in human moral judgments.

The difficulty becomes practical when uncertainty about God’s purposes appears to weaken the obligation to prevent suffering. Human beings do not need complete knowledge of divine intentions to recognise abuse, cruelty or injustice as reasons for intervention. A person can remain uncertain about the ultimate meaning of suffering while responding decisively to its immediate causes.

Skeptical theism therefore supports intellectual humility, but it should not become a general excuse for moral inaction. Its value lies in limiting claims about God’s intentions rather than weakening ordinary ethical responsibilities.

Anti-theodicy overlooks the value of limited philosophical reflection

The final argument concerns the difference between explaining suffering and responding to it. A complete rejection of theodicy may protect victims from insensitive explanations, but it also risks preventing legitimate philosophical inquiry. Questions about divine goodness, human freedom and the relationship between suffering and moral responsibility remain important for religious believers and critics of religion.

Sollereder (2021) distinguishes intellectual approaches to theodicy from practical responses to suffering and proposes a more constructive relationship between them. Her work supports the possibility of philosophical reflection that recognises suffering without allowing explanation to displace compassion.

Ooi (2022) similarly proposes theodicies that combine acceptance with protest. Such approaches acknowledge that philosophical explanations may remain incomplete while preserving the importance of resisting suffering. The position does not claim that every tragedy has an identifiable purpose. Instead, it recognises that philosophical reflection and moral protest can coexist.

The distinction is essential. A person may question whether God permits suffering for a greater good while continuing to investigate the philosophical implications of divine goodness. Complete abandonment would eliminate this possibility without demonstrating that every form of theodicy causes moral harm.

Section 4: Objections and Replies

The strongest objection: explanation itself may insult victims

A serious objection maintains that even limited theodicy remains morally offensive because it approaches suffering from an external perspective. Philosophers may discuss tragedies as examples of abstract principles, while victims experience them as personal losses that cannot be adequately represented through theoretical reasoning.

Franklin (2020) strengthens this objection by showing that some established theodicies fail moral scrutiny. The concern is particularly forceful when a philosopher claims that suffering contributes to a greater good without establishing whether the victim benefits from that outcome. Theodicy may therefore reproduce the moral problem it claims to solve.

This objection cannot be dismissed simply by appealing to good intentions. Philosophical arguments can cause harm even when their authors intend to defend religious belief. Moreover, an explanation that satisfies a theoretical requirement may remain unacceptable to someone experiencing profound grief.

Reply: moral limits should restrict theodicy rather than eliminate it

The objection establishes that theodicy requires moral restraint, but it does not demonstrate that every form of philosophical reflection is unacceptable. The distinction between a general defence and a claim about a particular tragedy remains relevant. Philosophers can examine whether divine goodness and suffering are logically compatible without asserting that a victim’s pain was necessary or deserved.

Echazú (2024) examines whether moral anti-theodicy begs the question against the possibility of a plausible theodicy. His analysis highlights a central difficulty: rejecting every theodicy in advance may assume the very conclusion that the debate needs to establish.

Nevertheless, the reply must acknowledge a genuine limitation. Philosophical reasoning cannot establish that every instance of suffering has a morally sufficient divine explanation. Nor can it replace the testimony of victims or the practical work of preventing harm. A defensible position therefore accepts that some questions may remain unanswered.

The argument would become less convincing if evidence showed that even carefully limited philosophical reflection consistently encouraged indifference toward suffering. Such evidence would strengthen the case for restricting theodicy further. At present, however, the moral criticism supports caution and ethical accountability more directly than it supports complete abandonment.

Section 5: Conclusion

Theodicy can become morally offensive when it explains horrendous suffering as necessary for spiritual development, human freedom or a greater divine purpose. Anti-theodicy correctly identifies the danger of treating victims as instruments within philosophical arguments. Its criticism also demonstrates that logical consistency alone cannot establish the moral acceptability of an explanation.

However, the argument for abandoning the entire project remains unconvincing. The distinction between theodicy and defence shows that philosophical reflection does not always claim to identify God’s actual reasons for permitting suffering. Skeptical theism further demonstrates that uncertainty about divine intentions can encourage intellectual humility, although it must not weaken human responsibility.

The most defensible position rejects the unjustified explanation of suffering rather than philosophical inquiry itself. Theodicy should remain open to criticism, acknowledge its epistemic limits and preserve the obligation to prevent harm. Philosophical reflection cannot remove the suffering that motivates the problem of evil, but it can examine religious claims without dismissing the experiences of those who suffer. A morally responsible approach therefore combines intellectual inquiry with protest, compassion and practical action.

References

The references below follow Harvard style. The sources supplied in the assignment brief are supplemented with recent scholarly work on anti-theodicy and the moral consequences of philosophical explanations.

• Coley, S.M. (2021) ‘The problem of evil, skeptical theism and moral epistemology’, Religions, 12(5), 313. Available at: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050313.

• Echazú, G. (2024) ‘Does moral anti-theodicy beg the question?’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 95, pp. 115–130. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09893-y.

  Springer Nature Link

• Franklin, J. (2020) ‘Antitheodicy and the grading of theodicies by moral offensiveness’, Sophia, 59(3), pp. 563–576. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00765-w.

  PhilArchive

• Hill, S. (2022) ‘Why God allows undeserved horrendous evil’, Religious Studies, 58(4), pp. 772–786. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S003441252100038X.

• Naraghi, A. (2022) ‘God, tragic dilemmas, and the problem of gratuitous evil’, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 61(2), pp. 311–324. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217321000354.

• Oliveira, L.R.G. (2023a) ‘God and gratuitous evil: between the rock and the hard place’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 94(3), pp. 317–345. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09883-0.

• Oliveira, L.R.G. (2023b) ‘Skeptical theism: a panoramic overview (part I)’, Philosophy Compass, 18(10), e12947. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12947.

• Ooi, D. (2022) ‘Theodicy on trial’, Philosophia, 50(4), pp. 2015–2034. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00493-0.

  PhilArchive

• Sollereder, B.N. (2021) ‘Compassionate theodicy: a suggested truce between intellectual and practical theodicy’, Modern Theology, 37(2), pp. 382–395. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/moth.12688.