Posted: March 17th, 2024

The Future of European Defense Cooperation in a Changing Security Landscape

The Future of European Defense Cooperation in a Changing Security Landscape

1. Introduction

The work plan is outlined. I will start with reviewing relevant literature for the first three months, discussing and modifying my research questions and frameworks in the next quarter, and then working on the intellectual and theoretical challenging part in the rest of the time. More specifically, I am going to bring my results and analysis into the context of every single stage of the historical narrative. I will also compare various paradigms that might explain the evolution of defense cooperation in different epochs. And at the same time, I will organize workshops with relevant stakeholders in Brussels to consult on my hypothesis and findings. This is the plan I envisage, but of course, I’m also open to different ideas and suggestions.

This study will greatly help policymakers in the EU to understand the evolution of the defense landscape in Europe and, at the same time, to identify the areas with potential for further cooperation. By clarifying the merits and shortcomings of the existing cooperation, the study could also provide insights on how to achieve effective defense innovation and a fully-fledged defense integration, which is always a long-desired goal for the EU.

The primary aim of this study is to provide a robust analysis of the potential of the ongoing European defense initiatives in the context of the historical development of defense cooperation in Europe. But more specifically, the objectives of this work are threefold: firstly, to provide a comprehensive overview of the historical development of European security and defense initiatives; secondly, to conduct a critical review of the existing defense cooperation in Europe; and finally, to explore the potential of the latest defense initiatives, including Permanent Structured Cooperation and European Defense Fund.

The security landscape in Europe has been evolving with the end of the Cold War, the rise of new security challenges, and the recent consequences of US diffidence towards European security affairs. In response to that, various initiatives on security and defense cooperation have occurred among the European Union Member States. However, the common understanding of the challenges European countries are facing today, especially in the wake of the Ukraine crisis and the rise of the Islamic State, has led to the most ambitious initiatives in European defense for decades. So far, due to the complexity of the defense sector and the diversity of national defense policies, the success of these initiatives is limited.

1.1. Background

When the Second World War ended in 1945, a new international system was established, characterized by multipolarity and the division of Europe into two antagonistic blocks. The military and political confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact created a long period of security and political stability inside these two blocks. This international system deeply conditioned the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU). After the implosion of the bipolar system in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the EU began to gradually build its own institutions in order to have its own international strategy and not to only depend on NATO. In this sense, the entrance in force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 gave a big impulse to the CSDP by creating new institutions, enhancing the role of the EU compared to the Member States and promoting the cooperation in the development, purchase and joint maintenance of military capabilities. Nevertheless, and despite of all these efforts, the European defense sector still remains highly fragmented. Only 17% of defense procurement is cooperative and the EU has more weapons systems than the US, which has less than half the kinds of systems despite a budget six times bigger. This reality, combined with the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, created the perfect environment for further defense cooperation through the implementation of the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) with the idea of deepening the integration of EU defenses and to develop the ultimate military capabilities for the Union’s common security and defense purposes. All these facts and developments will be analyzed throughout this study.

1.2. Purpose of the Study

The study will limit its analysis within the framework of EU and its member states, so that we can have a clear scope without trying to go to each and every defense cooperation action across the world. The consolidation of the defense market is the main point. However, the next big step in European defense cooperation will come through European Defence Fund (EDF), which is being set up according to the direction of the EU and will complement the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) by financially supporting joint research and the development of defense technologies and products. The European Defense Fund will foster technological innovation and ensure that the EU’s armed forces become even more advanced. The EDF is estimated to generate a total investment in defense capabilities of at least €5.526 billion per year all around Europe and many positive impacts. Most importantly, the EDF will support the EU’s strategic autonomy and reinforce its role as a security provider. The creation of the EDF has a potentially far-reaching effect on the EU’s defense strategy and military capability, and it may also change the cooperative framework within the EU defense sector. And so, this should give an indicative direction for the future of current defense cooperation as EU harmonises the strategy for the capabilities. The Member States taking part in EDF projects will be able to cooperate wherever the project allows for it. This possibility will also be open to the European countries associated with the EU’s defense research program, through the Preparatory Action on Defense Research. All in all, EDF will simplify cooperation within the EU’s defense sector; reducing costs and expanding innovation. This study aims to show where the EU is at and where it is heading in terms of establishing the defense and common security in the region and also what are the benefits and challenges it may face. It will also helps to provide a general guideline to assess the initiatives on European Defense and broader security strategies in academic perspective.

The key aim of this study is to critically analyse the importance of current European defense cooperation initiatives, which were introduced in the European Union, in the context of changing security perspectives in Europe at present. This study will also examine EU’s efforts to establish stronger defense union which were started to make right after the Brexit and try to identify that how practical and effective those initiatives will be in realising collective defense and common security in the region. Last but not least, the study will try to express the possible challenges of the EU defense cooperation and also possible solution in order to make the joint defense and common security mechanisms more effective and efficient from academic point of view. The objectives of this research focus on four major components related to cooperation on intelligence and security. First of all, it is significant to analyse the existing initiatives adopted by European countries with a special attention to the European Union. Secondly, the concentration will be moved to the European Union’s attempts for the development of the defense and common security strategies. This will includes how EU structuring the initiatives and the scope of the EU defense capability developments. Thirdly, the research will try to explore the status of practical implementation of different cooperation initiatives prevalent in current EU defense agenda such as PESCO, EDF, CARD; and finally in what way these evolving efforts of EU in defense would affect on the outputs on the proposed EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. The work which this research will produce could be an academic analysis in support of current European defense agenda and also to providing concrete help for the betterment of the prospective of joint defense and common security in the European region.

1.3. Research Questions

The next important thing is to illustrate the structure of the paper. I like to have my research questions as part of the text in the introduction, as a guide for the reader to have an understanding of what is yet to come. However, as the paper will show, I cannot be limited by the research questions in my findings. The research questions have to be broad in a way that offers the opportunity to have an in-depth analysis of the various European defense cooperation. The research questions are always oriented towards knowing the various concepts in the field of study or a detailed description of a particular phenomenon. Students who have written research papers have often written a research question where we are not so clear about our study. If we are not so clear regarding the “dependent” and “independent” variables in our research, then we cannot write or define our research questions. The research question should be a clear, focused and concise (things to do, things to observe and things to control…) and also academically grounded. I happen to know that sometimes the literature in your department might warrant multiple questions for your research therefore too many questions might arise. The key criterion to this is that it has to be a point of argument. At this stage of your career, you are not bound to a final wording for your question. You should be willing to refine, clarify and update as new insights. But the most important thing is not to leave your research question remain a mystery. Often times you are expecting to know what you are hoping to find.

2. Current Security Landscape in Europe

One of the major aspects of contemporary European security is represented by the exponential increase of issues that all stem from the international environment. With the ending of the Cold War, European nations believed that they would start a phase of democratic peace and a unipolar system led by the United States. The European Security Strategy, established by the European Council in 2003, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), born a few months later and now developed and updated, were both focusing on creating and maintaining a stable all-around security for the continent, underlining how transnational threats and globalization demanded solidarity and unity. Nowadays, Europe does not look even nearly as safe and free from problems as once thought. The 9/11 attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the weaknesses of political dialogue and also the armed forces in the Stability Zone called Western Europe and others, from the North to the South of the continent. With the emergence of issues such as hybrid and cyber-terrorism, illegal trafficking, human smuggling, the rise of ISIS and other radical groups, the Syrian and Libyan civil wars and the flow of migrants and refugees from the Middle East and Northern Africa, a common understanding of where and how these threats generate has become progressively essential to consolidate and enhance the level of cooperation between countries. Also, these security demands have effects and implications on European defence and its nations. The wars in the Middle East have revealed the differences in spending, equipment, personnel and in general in military capabilities between the European nations that were involved, showing how fragmented and inefficient defence can be. Moreover, the birth of the so-called Security and Defence Union in 2016 and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017 both represent the start of a new way of working together on security and defence for the European Union. In fact, countries recognize the social, political and economic potential of a close and strong cooperation also in the military field and the foreseen projects and commitments could really make the difference on the continent’s security and for the states involved.

2.1. Threats and Challenges

Secondly, cyber security, in particular, is referred to often, as in such contexts expressing security without the prefix ‘cyber’ is more and more seen as an anachronism. However, as we shall see, to categorize the principal concerns of security in Europe by reference to ‘cyber threats’ is to apply a solution – the attraction of the latest technological developments – prematurely to a scenario which is not yet, as it were, ripe for such a solution. The danger is that one might be blinded by the ‘light’ of possible solutions and so overlook the underlying, associated but distinct phenomena that together give rise to the true nature of the principal challenges to security in Europe today. Another term that is often utilized in contemporary analysis, the outset suggests that security has entered a new era. That ‘traditional’ conflicts and the systems for addressing security concerns that developed during and reflect the Cold War should be placed in the past, and that a new characteristic of supra-national, global menaces has been identified. Such threats to security ‘particularly menace the most developed and interconnected regions of the world’ and it is the challenge of meeting and managing these new challenges that occupies significant. In an important way, this expression underlines the notion that security, as a concept, is itself changing: it is actively adapting to and reflecting the evolving state of the world, and, it follows, those who seek to define and craft responses to security challenges must, in turn, be alive to this adaptively. Furthermore, this observation gives us a clue as to the nature of the connection between the glosses ‘security’ and ‘cyber-security’ in current. It poses the question of whether what is commonly referred to as ‘cyber security’ is such a radically new field of study and practice in the analysis of security in its various forms or whether, in fact, ‘cyber security’ is merely a number of known, individual aspects of security under a new name; that the rebranding of what we might call ‘intranational’, self-interested computer-based activity as ‘cyber-security’ may have been accelerated, and legitimized.

2.2. Impact on European Defense

The evolving security environment in Europe has already had a great impact on how European nations approach their defenses. Most importantly, the change in security environment has provided an important opportunity for the European nations to coordinate their separate efforts more efficiently. It is worth noting that in the past there has been little consensus on how to meet the security threats; each nation has determined, autonomously, the larger goals of European security policy, whether it is the quest for military capability or the building of a more cooperative security arrangement. Yet, the world has changed with the security environment, like the increasing complex world of terrorism (transnational terrorism groups) and the globalizing world (other non-traditional security threats), made it more difficult for any single European nation acting alone in solving the large threats of security. The interdependent global political and economic stability has strengthened the argument for further security integration at the European level. This so-called “strategic shock” from the current security environment has made people reexamine the ongoing security policy of each European nation, and the results seem to indicate an increasingly integrated European security efforts, regarding both the defense needs and industry strategies. For example, bigger and more ambitious agreements have been reached in the defense industry and collaborative weapons development, such as the recent UK-French summit. And it seems likely that the defense needs will be more aligned towards the larger European policy goals. The changes in the European defense landscape mean that the defense capability of Europe is becoming more seamlessly integrated.

2.3. Need for Cooperation

Firstly, let’s understand what is meant by cooperation. In political science, it is a situation in which two or more actors or countries work together to achieve a certain outcome, which will benefit them equally. This does not mean that they have to merge and become one country – even a very loose type of cooperation, with the participants retaining many aspects of their national autonomy, can be very effective. Why is there a need for cooperation, and not just countries trying to improve their own defense? After all, the aim of any modern defense policy is to defend a country and its citizens effectively. In fact, the area of international politics has long been an area for major debate as to the relative importance of cooperation versus individualism. The fact that in modern Western democracies there is such a range of views, and that there is no full uniformity within domestic politics in any one country, causes major disputes on security and defense. However, the main reason is the changing nature of the threats. The report from the House of Lords, “Taking Defence Seriously: Towards a More Substantive NATO”, published in July 1999, said that in order to meet threats in the future, a “flexible and far-reaching strategy of cooperation” was needed. The report went on to say that such threats “cannot be met by purely national action”. Indeed, the very nature of modern security threats and challenges is such that it is no longer possible for individual countries to provide an effective response on their own. Whether that is a new drive to promote cooperation in Europe and the European Security and Defense Policy, or the support for long-standing alliances. However, cooperation is particularly important in a changing security landscape. With the move away from the old bipolar strategic layout of world politics – in which large and steady power blocks faced each other – the nature of threats facing Western countries has altered. Such large-scale threats, which can be dealt with by large military organizations and massive public support, are now less likely than more localized and yet equally serious problems. For example, terrorism and small-scale conflict is now more common. This changing nature of security threats means that some have argued that a completely new form of international cooperation is needed, based around the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement. Others, however, advocate that traditional military alliances should form the core of any strategy to promote future peace and stability.

3. European Defense Cooperation Initiatives

History tells us that the most powerful nations in Europe have been trying to collaborate their defense capabilities for centuries, but unfortunately, all attempts have failed to materialize except the initiative of European Defense Union (EDU). However, with the emergence of new security threats and following the decision of the UK to leave the EU, the EU has stepped up its already existing defense cooperation strategies. In June 2017, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) were updated to include a mutual defense clause, known as the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO). Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, is another crucial step because it allows member states to work more closely and efficiently together. PESCO projects, which can range from developing new military equipment, to training or joint military operations, will be the centerpiece of the EU efforts to develop its strategic autonomy and also over time it is expected to have a number of positive effects on the signatory member states. For example, PESCO can help member states to improve the commitments to each other through greater economic and defense integration, to invest more in joint capabilities to conduct missions under the CSDP and it can also help industry by encouraging the cross-border consolidation of defense companies which in return could make competition fairer and transparent. Also, considering the Brexit, PESCO becomes more important for both the UK and the EU’s defense and security. Because when the UK leaves the EU next year, London will also leave the EU’s defense and security arrangements as well such as CSDP and PESCO. So, PESCO becomes a vehicle for a deepened defense cooperation among the remaining EU 27 member states and it will require a more political support and commitments from those permanent members. In addition, the UK will face a more complex, unknowable and cloudy international security situation as well. Also, UK’s military relation with both the EU and NATO could be affected by its future defense and security policies. While, for the EU, the UK on its way to exit from the EU offers a major chance of developing closer defense relations among the EU 27 member states. As the UK has always had a somewhat lukewarm attitude to any step to create a European Army, so now there has become a rise in enthusiasm among the member states for the EU defense and security integration. Juncker has urged the EU to do more to protect our Europe and thus the best way to respond to this transitional time and to boost public support for this new defense integration should be held by massive development of the PESCO. He emphasized that the EU should develop an operational readiness of the battle group, strengthen the CSDP and work for further defense integration. The UK’s EU exit thus could offer an opportunity of creating a more effective and collective defense and security for the EU.

3.1. Historical Overview

The path to European defense integration has been historically characterized by periods of acceleration and stagnation, moving from the dream of a cohesive military force directly from the ashes of the Second World War, through the partial and uneven implementation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and, lately, the more integrated and ambitious project of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). EDA has been set up in 2004 as an initiative of the French-German partnership, which proposed the so-called “European Defense Community (EDC), instructed to resolve several issues and make the European army emerge from the national ones. At first, it was refused: the failure of the EDC is indeed considered the first saving step toward supranational defense in the EU framework, opening the way to an intensification of cooperation, due to the fact that the States understood that the multinational military approach would have been more profitable than the attempt to sustain separately their own national military. Thanks to the Single European Act, the decision-making power in internal affairs regarding CSDP was moved from unanimity to qualified majority, which signified the first successful presence of supranational elements in the uniformed European defense. Moreover, in 2007 the Lisbon Treaty transformed the straightforward ESDP into what now is the main part of the Common Security and Defense Policy.

3.2. Key Initiatives and Agreements

A number of key initiatives and agreements in European defense cooperation have been established in the past couple of decades – and especially since the turn of the century. The following discussion offers an overview of the more important ones, particularly in relation to the further development of CSDP. First, though, it is worth noting that the first concrete realization of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty – the establishment of the HLCF – was a significant step. The Headline Goal 2003, as it became known, put in place the framework by which member states could commonly agree to specific operations and missions. It also required that members develop deployable and sustainable national forces – a key consideration since the emphasis on deployable units is a continuing concern in alliance politics. The actual development of the HLCF in terms of EU military capabilities and the realization of the proposed strategies and structures was less impressive. According to Keohane and his colleagues, neither mass nor special forces were predominantly used in the HLCF. Cuts in military spending across Europe were also significant, with only the United Kingdom and Greece actually increasing their defense expenditure. This led to the ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ – the difference between what military resources members expected to be available for EU operations, and what was in reality forthcoming. The key reasons advanced for the lack of strategic success in the HLCF are the familiar trinity of scarcity in resources, difficulty in finding common political objectives and a lack of coherence in military strategy.

3.3. Successes and Challenges

The European Defense Fund is probably one of the most significant and tangible successes for European defense cooperation. It supports and promotes the joint development of defense capabilities and fosters scientific cooperation for EU Common Security and Defense Policy. Compared to the total that has been available for defense research previously, the establishment of the European Defense Fund in parallel with the European Defense Industrial Development Program will boost annual spending more than three times, from €25 million to €90 million in research and development, and from €500 million to €4 billion in the capability window, which can be understood as acquiring defense equipment or technology. However, European defense cooperation also faces some major challenges. Legislation and regulation on combat ability among countries can sometimes lead to failures in European defense cooperation. For example, the high-profile case of PESCO had met many obstacles. When the 25 EU member states of PESCO listed 17 projects on defense cooperation in November 2017, Britain – which is an influential power in European defense – was blocking the formal establishment of the European Defense Fund. The UK had concerns that it created an EU army and also that it shut British companies out of the market in the case that the UK leaves the EU. Some challenges and barriers people might argue that there are not just this challenge facing European defense cooperation. The differences in opinions between countries and the commitment to NATO can also question the effectiveness and efficiency of the cooperation. Any failing in the internal assessment of PESCO by the member states’ government can eventually pause or terminate the involvement at any time. Also, in order to get a well-going for projects and initiatives, it requires having industries and also political will. For example, the letter which had been sent from five industry bodies from France, Germany, Italy, and also Spain through their governments in order to ask the European Commission to revise its recent proposal for a Regulation establishing the European Defense Industrial Development Program and also expressing support for spending research and capability funding collaborations. Therefore, we can see that having industries’ engagement and alignment of political thought are quite important for the challenges we face in ensuring the continuation of projects. Lastly, Brexit could be seen as another key factor which brings challenges for European defense cooperation. The UK – which is a leading military power in Europe – will leave the EU by 2019. It becomes a huge concern on what will happen to Europe’s defense capability and also the maintenance of the biggest overseas secondment with Britain after Brexit. Even though both the UK and the EU have expressed their wish to continue European defense cooperation, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU brings uncertainty to both sides. The UK will also no longer take part in decision making of the EU member’s defense and security measures. In this case, the potential of European defense cooperation will be affected by the withdrawal of the UK but at the same time, it forces the EU to think about reinforcing Europe’s defense and security in their own hands. This will perhaps bring support to further counter the challenges.

3.4. Lessons Learned

Over the years, European defense cooperation initiatives have seen many successes and failures. The biggest achievement in the field of defense cooperation in Europe has been the establishment of the European Defense Fund. The legal framework for the fund was proposed by the European Commission in June 2018, and in December 2019, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the Regulation on European Defense Industrial Development. The fund provides financial support to the Member States for actions in line with the common Union defense policy. It can support defense cooperation. The fund has a substantial financial envelope, estimated to be 13 billion euros in current prices over the period of seven years (2021-2027). This is a significant amount for defense cooperation in Europe. The fund benefits from an integrated EU security of challenges. Defense cooperation has the potential to play a critical role in the changing security landscape in Europe. However, structural and strategic obstacles exist to full defense cooperation, such as the perceived duplication of resources and lack of joint strategic culture. According to the Survey on Security and Defense, conducted by the European Union Institute for Security Studies in 2018, defense cooperation in Europe has significant advantages. The survey respondents, high-profile decision-makers and officials in the field of security and defense, have identified sustained time and heavy resource commitments as the chief disadvantages of defense cooperation. However, full defense cooperation necessitates financial resource commitments and time. But when the defense cooperation projects begin to show outputs, they lead to a gradual reinforcing intervals. So, the question arises: “When will the defense cooperation start to show outputs?” It is difficult to say when showing outputs, but when the projects become tangible, outputs will be materialized. As the focus is on a gradual and long-term reinforcing process, once the cooperation succeeds, it will be solid and long-lasting. This is because when outputs start, they are reinforced at each interval, resulting in steady and incremental growth. Last but not least, the United States are former-mentioned disadvantages and point of ‘Messy Trial and Error’ as its inherent theme. There are also a matter of potential bone of contention over the ownership and result of the defense cooperation. All of these mentioned issues and problems will exist in every step of defense cooperation initiatives.

4. Future Prospects and Recommendations

4.1. Emerging Trends

4.2. Potential Areas of Cooperation

4.3. Strengthening European Defense Capabilities

4.4. Policy Implications and Recommendations

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